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Abstract: 
As the modern economy becomes more and more reliant on Intellectual Capital (IC), so businesses 
assets structure dramatically changes towards intangible assets. This has built the appetite for 
researchers to examine IC from different angles. Some have examined the concept and the 
components of IC, some have examined the measurements of IC while others have examined the 
effect of IC on the performance.  
 
This study offers a genuine contribution to the literature as it departs from the main stream of prior 
research’s concentration on the concept and the measurements of IC; instead it focuses on 
examining the relationship between Corporate Governance (CG) and ICD quantity and quality. 
Also, this study contributes to the literature by offering evidences based on data form a brand-new 
research context: a geographical area that has been previously neglected by the research 
community. 
 
The data relating to IC has been captured through a disclosure index. The index is adopted from 
prior studies after bening customised to take into consideration the specific feature of Jordanian 
economy and the social, cultural, and political climate. Also, the disclosure index has been 
developed to allow the researcher to measure ICD quality. The data been collected from corporate 
annual reports which pertain to 100 listed in the Amman stocks exchange (ASE) which account for 
75% of the total market capitalisation.  Descriptive statistics and panel regression models are used 
to analyse the collected data. In addition, semi-structured interviews have been conducted to 
validate the results of the regression model and to provide a more insightful explanation of ICD in 
Jordan.  
This study provides a comprehensive picture of the ICD patterns in Jordan. And, it provides a 
detailed explanation of the relationship between the CG and the level and quality of IC information 
shared by Jordanian companies through their annual reports. This study reveals that not all IC items 
are of the same importance to Jordanian companies: focus seems to be on structural capital among 
the IC sub-capitals and within the structural capital, the focus was on the corporate strategy and IT 
systems. Meanwhile, the effect of CG mechanisms varies on ICD. There is a significant positive 
effect found for foreign ownership, institutional ownership, audit committee characteristics and 
having a CG committee within the board on the ICD levels or quantity of the information while the 
family ownership found to be negatively affect the ICD. Moreover, institutional ownership, audit 
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committee size and independence were all found to significantly affecting the variance of the ICD 
quality. 
The present study has provided significant empirical evidences that will help in generating 
additional improvement of the state of knowledge in relation to IC disclosure and the effect of the 
CG on the level of transparency and the quality of information both empirically and 
methodologically. It provides information users, preparers, regulatory bodies as well as academics 
with a state-of-the-art understanding of IC disclosure practices in the annual report. 
 
Keywords:  
Intellectual Capital Disclosure, Content Analysis, Annual Reports, , Corporate Governance, 
Amman stock exchange, Jordan.  
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Study Overview 
As the beginning of the twentieth century has affected by the industrial revolution, the machinery 
and fossil-fuel industry explosions, the ending of that century has been affected by the introduction 
of a knowledge-based economy. This knowledge based economy and the huge investment in the 
intangible assets including: R&D, media industry, PR, and the information and telecommunication 
industries collectively have led to a brand-new component of the economy and a very promising 
production input i.e. Intellectual Capital or the intangible assets (Lev & Zambon 2003).  
Intellectual Capital (IC) which according to Zambon, (2016) recently forms a scholarly-hub and is 
a timely and very important topic not only for academics but also for professionals, analysts and 
policy makers (Zambon 2016). As a result of significantly increasing value of intangible assets and 
the sheer shift towards a knowledge economy (CIPD & PIRC 2015), questions about (IC) can be 
insurmountable without having a clear definition of the capital itself. This will definitely change 
according to the context, as many types of capitals have been introduced by scholars since the 
beginnings of capitalism. The concept was initially introduced in the mid 1870’s by Sir Adam 
Smith, who defined “Capital” as the resources invested now to gain future benefits. That definition 
was derived from his theoretical concept for the production according to his philosophy. The 
production process consists of four factors namely: “Land”, “Capital”, “Labour” and 
“Entrepreneurship”. Hence starting by approaching the literature for a generic definition of 
“Capital”; we can find different types of “Capitals”. The best and the most overarching 
classification is that the one offered by The Technical Task Force of the International Integrated 
Reporting Council (IIRC) (2013) which 
introduced a six types (classifications) for 
the capital according to the figure shown in 
the right side of the text. 
 
Moreover, IIRC offered a comprehensive 
definition for each type of these “Capitals” 
which mentioned below: - 
Financial Capital: This is generally 
perceived as the pool of funds available to 
entities. This includes both debt and equity 
finance. This description of financial capital 
Figure 1.1 Types of Capitals (IR, 2013) 
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emphasises the source of funds, rather than how they may be used, which results in the acquisition 
of manufactured, intellectual or other forms of capital. 
Manufactured Capital: This type of capital is defined as the production-oriented, human-created, 
instruments, equipment and tools that are used for production process.  
Intellectual Capital: According to IIRC Intellectual Capital includes all knowledge-based assets 
such as intellectual property, tacit knowledge, systems and protocols. Intellectual Capital is a very 
important component in the firm’s future prospective profits, with a tight link and contingency 
between investment in R&D, innovation, human resources and external relationships, which can 
determine the firm’s competitive advantage (Mouritsen 1998; Naidenova & Oskolkova 2010). 
Moreover, the literature e.g. (Botosan & Review 1997; Guthrie & Petty 2000; Dumay 2009) mostly 
agreed on identifying the following three subcategories for the IC: 
 
Figure 1.2 IC sub-components 
Human Capital: This is introduced as the collective abilities, competencies, skills and/or 
experiences carried by the firm’s employees in the form of tacit knowledge.     
Social & Relational Capital: This refers to the relationships, networks, agreements and any other 
kind of connections between the company and the groups, communities, stakeholders and other 
parties involved, affecting the firm’s business or affected by its operations. 
Natural Capital: this includes resources, such as wood, fisheries, water (oceans, seas or rivers, 
minerals, etc., that could be utilized by humans to produce goods, services or other resources. 
Another definition for natural capital introduced by Wackernagel et al. (1999), where they define 
“Natural Capital” as all the natural resources taking part in creating and/or of supplying human 
wealth, examples would be, timber, winds, tidal power and minerals.  
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It is notable that the IIRC separates Human Capital and “Social” and “Relational” capitals from the 
Intellectual capital despite the extant literature, which introduces human capital and relational 
capital as subcategories of IC. They justify this separation by the following: - 
1- There are some aspects of human capital and social capital that could be downplayed if 
considered as part of intellectual capital e.g. (recognition of human capital and the trust and 
shared values under social capital). 
2- Separation of these items as independent categories of capital will help in understanding 
their value and better understanding of the proposed capital model. 
However, for the purpose of this study, the researcher will consider human capital and relational 
capital as components of the IC, following the extant literature (Edvinsson 1997; Guthrie & Petty 
2000; Mouritsen 2003; Guthrie & Boedker 2006; Dumay 2009)1.  Which also overlap with 
pioneering practices in industry example: (Edvinsson 1997; CIMA 2003). In addition, Jordanian 
companies (study context) still have not employed the integrated reporting yet. Thus, as the current 
practice of ICD within Jordanian companies stick to the three dimensions IC (structural, human, 
relational).    
This study aims to examine the Intellectual Capital Disclosure (ICD) patterns in publicly-held 
companies in Jordan and the relationship between ICD and Corporate Governance (GC); this is still 
one of the most timely and controversial topics in accounting’s concurrent stream of research. 
(Serenko & Bontis 2009). (Serenko & Bontis 2004). John Kenneth Galbraith as cited in (Sveiby, 
1998), was the first to introduce the modern concept of IC. When he (Galbraith) wrote in a letter to 
the well-known and highly distinguished European economist Michael Kalecki saying “I wonder if 
you realize how much those of us in the world around have owed to the intellectual capital you 
have provided over these past decades”, and he meant Kalecki’s Intellectual Productions [Books, 
Articles…etc.,]. Since that time many definitions and related concepts have been introduced. Some 
definitions, such as (Brooking, 1996 (P.12); (Mouritsen et al. 2002)) refer to IC as the value of the 
intangible assets of the firm. Researchers as just mentioned before; have divided IC into two 
categories, non-financial and non-physical resources that create competitive advantages (e.g. 
OCED, 1999; Roos et al., 2005 and Jussupova et al., 2007). A threefold classification of IC was 
introduced by researchers like Sveiby (1997) and Guthrie & Petty (2000). The former categorizes it 
into structural, human and organizational capital, while the latter alternatively classifies it into 
external structure, internal structure and human capital. CIMA (2003) offered a more overarching 
and comprehensive definition of IC, where it refers to it as: “….the possession of knowledge and 
                                               
1 This also agreed amongst professional bodies e.g. (EY 2013; PricewaterhouseCoopers 2012; CIMA 2003) 
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experience, professional knowledge and skill, good relationships, and technological capacities, 
which when applied will give organization a competitive advantage”.  
Despite the various advantages of the reporting of value creating intangible resources, corporate 
practices, in both developed and developing countries, are still weak in the field and perform below 
expectations (Li et al. 2008). In a recent study, Bellora & Guenther (2013) found low levels both on 
quantity and quality of voluntary intellectual capital disclosure of 51 European firms. This 
therefore, exacerbates the information asymmetry problem and makes deficiencies in the allocation 
of financial resources in the capital markets (Li et al. 2007). However, this raises many questions 
inncluding: why companies do not pay sufficient attention to ICD, what are the common categories 
of ICD, and what are the determinants of amount of ICD?  
1.2 Corporate Governance 
It is well known that sound corporate governance mechanisms will lead to enhancing the forms and 
quantity of corporate disclosures (Aljifri et al. 2014). Agency theory provide the theoritical linking 
between the CG and voluntary disclsosure, where the governance mechanisms intend to reduce the 
agency problem which arise due to management and ownership separation. In addition, Literature 
(Li et al, 2008; Aboody and Lev, 2000) suggest that information asymmetry between the investors 
and the managers is expected to be wider in IC reliant companies more than physical capital reliant 
companies, due to the unique nature of the IC which make it vague for informatin users without a 
sufficient details about the items, classifications, costs and future plans and expected growth. 
Finally, reporting on IC is still not well regulated in comparison with tangible assets which appear 
on the face of financial statements. All these reasons highlight the importance proper CG 
mechanism to safeguard the intangible assets and secure a sufficient level and good quality of ICD.  
Many studies have proven the existence of an impact of different proxies of corporate governance 
on the levels and nature of ICD practices (e.g. Keenan and Aggestam, 2001; Cerbioni and 
Parbonetti, 2007; Li et al. 2008; Li et al. 2012 and Moeinfar et al. 2013). Thus, companies that 
possess a robust and sound corporate governance system and an effective board of directors as well 
as effective board level committees (e.g. Audit Committee and Nomination and Remuneration 
Committee) are normally associated with higher level of transparency and a greater extent of 
disclosure. This is empirically proved in many different contexts (e.g. Ben-Amar and Zeghal 
(2011); Donnelly and Mulcahy (2008); and Andrea et al (2008)). Likewise, Nor, et al (2015) as 
they investigated the relationship between the corporate governance and the R&D disclosure which 
is one subcomponent of structural capital. They examined 187 annual reports of a publicly-listed 
company in Malaysian stocks exchange. This was used to assess the effect of corporate governance 
on the “board structure, ownership structure and audit firm size”. Controlling for firm size, 
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leverage and performance, they found that government ownership has a positive effect on the R&D 
information in annual reports and they failed to show any significant relationship between R&D 
disclosure and other independent variables. In contrast, poor governance mechanism may lead to 
loopholes or allow more opportunistic behaviour for the managers (Devos et al. 2015) and this 
eventually will jeopardise other stakeholders’ interests.  
Despite IC significance and importance for firms and for nations as well, its need to be closely 
monitored. There is a  significant need for transparent control mechanisms to be developed that will 
ensure that these vague sources of wealth are not being misused by the executive managements. 
Thus, the importance of the Corporate Governance (CG) for investment in IC is of a fundemental 
essential. CG is defined as the system that defines the rules and guidelines for managing the firms 
(Hagiu & Bărbulescu 2016). Another definition for the CG introduce it as a set of policies, 
procedures and mechanisms that determine the way in which business is run. Solomon, (2013, 
PP.11-13). According to the Oxford Dictionary for Finance and Banking CG is defined as “The 
means in which entities, principally limited liability companies, are directed and the means 
of accountability of the managers to the owners”. This topic has been of increased importance since 
the publication of the Cadbury Report (1992), which set out guidance in a Code of Practice 
(the Cadbury Code). Furthermore, the collapse of companies like, Barings Bank, Enron and 
WorldCom; contribute further to drawing the public’s attention toward the importance of the CG 
and the effectiveness of the board of directors in supervising the executive managements. 
1.3 Motivations of the study  
The widely-recognised importance of the IC in creating value, leveraging firms market value, and 
enhancing its operations performance and connectedness to outer parties magnifies the necessity of 
providing sufficient and reliable information about such resources. Other parties (including potential 
investors, creditors, financial analysts, and suppliers) need adequate information about IC to allow 
them to make a proper judgment and informed decisions. Thus, it is the role of CG system to ensure 
adequate disclosure relating to this value driver and furthermore, the information disseminated by 
management should be reliable and trusted which can be achieved be ensuring a sound internal 
control system as an integral part of proper CG system.   
Proper CG system in companies has a crucial role in enhancing the transparency and enforcement of 
voluntary disclosure about the IC which otherwise can be easily manipulated by management either 
by passing inaccurate information or by withholding information to achieve gains by taking 
advantages of the information asymmetry. Hence, a sound and strong CG system is a greater 
necessity in IC intensive firms because the IC and intangible property can widen the information 
asymmetry: information users can be either misled or misunderstand the financial and operational 
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position for such firms. Furthermore, transparency and information availability can reduce 
information asymmetry and allow accurate estimations can be made by the investors and analysts as 
well as other stakeholders. Thus, examining the relationship between the CG and ICD seems to be a 
very interesting and challenging field of study. It also can bring many benefits to the companies, 
analysts, investors as well as for both academics and professionals by advancing knowledge and 
providing new empirical evidence about the possible effect for the CG and ICD: this is the primary 
motivation for this study. Moreover, this study can be of a great aid to the policy makers either in 
Jordan or other Arab countries in planning and the policies concerning the IC. It can reveal how IC 
can be used to increase the firm’s value and facilitating the access to capital market as well as 
providing proper allocation of resources. In addition, legislators will benefit from the deliverables of 
this study by shedding light on the importance of creating a legal framework for disclosure with 
regard the IC components. Finally, the following points summarise the motivations of the current 
study: 
First, studies, that have investigated the determinants of IC voluntary disclosure in annual reports 
are still underdeveloped. Furthermore, the studies that have examined the drivers of ICD in annual 
reports, despite being a few; they have considered only firms’ characteristics (e.g. (Li et al. 2008; 
Abeysekera & Guthrie 2005; Abeysekera 2008; Dumay 2016; Guthrie & Petty 2000), with limited 
evidence regarding the corporate governance variables (e.g. Li, et al., 2008; Li, et al., 2012; Nor et 
al., 2010; Nekhili et al., 2012; Nekhili et al., 2015). Thus, this study is motivated by exploring a 
new evidence on the relationship between CG and ICD. 
 
Second, exploring the difference across countries regarding the ICD is another motivation for 
introducing helpful insights into ICD practices in the annual reports of the Jordanian firms. 
Furthermore, this study examines the relationship between corporate governance and IC different 
forms of disclosure (narrative, numerical, and visual) for a respectively big sample of listed firms 
in ASE, to the best of my knowledge, the studies that have examined IC voluntary disclosure in 
annual reports conducted in many countries such as UK, US, Australia, and Scandinavian 
countries; while the developing countries been neglected by research community; which represents 
a gap in the extant literature and this study aims to address.  
 
Third, as mentioned in the second point this study comes to fill the existing gap in literature by 
considering new empirical evidence for the effect of the CG and ICD based on newly explored 
research context with wide applicability as the results that will be concluded based on Jordanian 
context are generalized to other Arab and MENA countries due many similarities between these 
countries.  
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 Fourth, morover, this study aims to address the call for more research to examine the ICD e.g. 
(Schaper et al. 2017; Sudibyo & Basuki 2017; Aljifri et al. 2014; Dumay 2016) who called for 
more studies in IC field to deepen the understanding of the ICD phenomenon.  
 
Fifth: another motivation for take the burden of this study is the potential benefits for the people in 
business, policy makers, analysts and researchers who interested in IC and ICD phenomena. The 
expected outcomes of the current study will provide a clear picture and deeper understanding of the 
ICD practices in developing countries with a state of art evidences that provide a full picture of the 
current situation and what could be developed either in terms of the practices and/or the 
regulations.   
 
1.4 Research Objectives 
This study aims to examine the effects of the corporate governance on the ICD. Accordingly, a 
survey will be carried out on the annual reports of the Jordanian listed companies to collect the data 
relating to the board of directors and governance mechanisms adopted by them and the level of 
disclosure about the IC items based on a specially developed research: the disclosure index. 
Therefore, the research objectives are summarised by the following points: - 
A) Extending the understanding of IC and ICD by identifying the patterns of ICD among the 
Jordanian listed companies and the trends of ICD within the study period. 
B)   Providing a new evidence from an underresearched geographical context about the 
relationship between the CG and ICD.  
1.5 Research Questions 
Despite the reality of having a plenty of accounting literature that has dealt with the corporate 
voluntary disclosure; studies in ICD are still rare and feeble (Cuozzo et al. 2017; Abdifatah Haji 
Ahmed & Nazli A Mohd Ghazali 2013; Li et al. 2008). Besides, the existing literature in IC 
generally and in ICD has focused mainly on the developed countries and overlooked the 
developing nations (Dumay & Cai 2014; Morariu 2013). 
MENA region as one of the most populous and geographically large area formed of many 
developing countries with great economic and scientific potential has been neglected by research 
community and exploring this region with empirical study on ICD and the effect of CG on the ICD 
will provide a great contribution to the extant literature. However, due to the time, resources and 
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scope limitation it would not be possible to conduct the research on all MENA countries but due to 
the shared characteristics between MENA countries including the cultural, demographical, 
geopolitical and historical similarities doing the study over a sample from one country in the region 
(Jordan) will help to understand the full picture of the ICD in the whole region. Thus, the current 
study will explore the ICD phenomenon and its determinants focusing on the CG factors due to the 
rapid development in regulations and regulatory framework that organize the business environment 
and the governmental serous endeavor towards developing the financial market and investment 
environment targeting efficient and fully transparent market.  
This study which as in the stated objectives will address the existing gap in literature and answer 
the calls for more studies in developing countries will try to answer the following questions: 
1- What are the current practices of ICD in Jordanian listed companies? 
2- To what extent does corporate governance affect ICD quantity and quality within the 
Jordanian listed companies? 
Thus, an empirical longitudinal study will be carried out by the current PhD to understand the ICD  
practices as well as the causal relationship between CG and ICD. As discussed in detail in the 
methodology section the research questions will be answered based on data collected from 
corporates annual reports using a disclosure index to capture the data relating to the ICD quality 
and quantity and a check list for the CG variables. 
9 
 
1.6 The Structure of the thesis 
The current thesis is organised in two sections and seven chapters. The following diagram 
summarise the orgnisation of this PhD thesis: 
 
Figure 1.3 Thesis Organisation 
 this thesis is formed of seven chapters: 
The present chapter includes an overview of the PhD project and summary of the research aims and 
objectives, research questions and the description of the general structure of the study.  
The remainder of this theses is orgnised as the following:-   
Chapter 2. Includes the description of the study’s context (Jordan) and the justification of 
choosing that context as Jordan provide a very interesting research context due to numerous factors 
including: it’s economic and political situation as developing country and emerging market, ability 
to generalise the resutls to other Arabian countires and MENA countries due to the similiarities and 
other factors mentioned in detail in chapter 2. Also, chapter 2 gives an overview of the regulatory 
framework for that context as well as the financial market and economic affairs for the country and 
how this interact and affects the phenomena investigated in this study.  
Chapter 3. This chapter provides a brief presentation of the broad range of theories that have been 
tested and proved to provide an explanation and justification of voluntary disclosure in general and 
the ICD specifically. The suggested theoritical framework to explain the ICD presented to facilitate 
the understanding the conceptual foundation for ICD.  
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Chapter 4.  A comprehensive literature review provided in chapter five. The current study is keen 
to provide all views and critically discuss all the prior studies in the field of ICD. The determinants 
of ICD and the link between the CG and ICD. The gaps in literature also have been identified and 
strategies of how the current research will address these gaps.   
Chapter 5. The fifth chapter of this thesis discusses the used methodology, research reasoning, 
ontological stance of the study, research paradigm and the justifications made for choosing the 
current research methods and methodology. Also, this chapter has showed the process of 
developing the research instrument and data collection processes.  
Chapter 6. In chapter six the thesis provides a detailed description of the data including a 
descriptive analysis and discussion of the patterns of ICD sectorial analysis. Regression models for 
both level and quality of ICD discussed and the regression analysis results presented.  
Chapter 7.  The concluding remarks are provided in chapter seven. This includes the summary of 
the study’s findings, applications and implications, recommendations to the industry and policy 
makers and of course its contributions. In addition, this chapter includes a brief discussion of the 
study’s limitations and areas for further research. 
11 
 
1.7 Summary  
This chapter has provided an overview of the current thesis aims and objectives, motivation, 
research questions and this thesis’ structure and organisation.  
This PhD project comes to fill existing gaps in accounting literature and especially in the field of 
IC; it empirically examines the effect of CG on ICD. IC has become a very researchable topic and a 
very important issue for the professionals, academics and for policy makers. This is related to the 
continuous shift towards a knowledge economy and societies thriving on technologically smart 
solutions: this calls for a huge and continuous investment in IC and IC’s infrastructures. Thus, the 
IC starts and on unceasing bases to occupy bigger space in the companies’ books. 
Nevertheless, IC despite its very significant importance for the businesses and for the societies as 
well. It needs to be closely monitored and develop a much improved level of transparency to ensure 
that this type of assets is not misused by the executive management. Hence, a strong CG system is 
really needed to guarantee that the facts and information about IC will be shared and made 
available for the interested parties on timely basis.   
This study is motivated to explore a new context and deepen the understanding of ICD patterns and 
to examine the relationship between the CG and ICD as the topic is timely and debatable. Prior 
studies in the IC field have failed to offer a conclusive and prepossessing opinion about the 
relationship between the CG and ICD. The current study aims to extend the understanding of ICD 
motivations and limitations by examining this phenomenon in an overlooked context neglected by 
the research community. Also, this study aims to offering an empirical evidence to explain the 
relationship between CG mechanisms (board structure, and ownership structure) and ICD either in 
terms of level of disclosure or the quality of information.  
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2 Study context  
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter will show the background and the relevant information concerning the present study’s 
context. The social and demographical characteristics of Jordan will be briefly summarised. The 
characteristics of the Jordanian financial market will be discussed and the legal and regulatory 
framework also will be discussed including a brief discussion of the characteristics of the Jordanian 
economy and the different economic sectors.  
2.2 Jordan 
Jordan a middle east country. It is now, considered as a developing country, classified by the World 
Bank in 2016 as an upper middle-income country with a GDP of about USD 39 Billion2. After 
being awarded the status of an independent state by Britain in 1921, five years after Sykes-Picot 
agreement between the French and British to divide the Ottoman Empire territories: this led to the 
creation of new countries including (Iraq, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, and Palestine were given a 
special status, Egypt was under British administartion, Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco, Mauritania, 
were under French direct conquest and Libya was aministered by Italy3), (Thomas, J., 1971). 
Jordan remained under the British administration until 1946; or as known “Mandatory of Jordan”4 
this impacts on the Jordanian institutional and constitutional structure. As on one hand the former 
British administration remains the role model for the bureaucratic style of public administration. 
And on the other hand; there is a tendency in Jordan to mimic regulations and legislative change in 
the style of this colonial legacy, resulting sometimes in form without achieving the prerequisites in 
substance. 
Jordan faces many challenges which will be discussed in detail later in this chapter. It is not 
privileged with natural resources and the economy is partially dependent on international aids and 
support basically from the west and some other oil exporting Arab countries.  
Since the establishment of the state, the economy has been suffering from many challenges. The 
public finances of the country suffer from many deficiencies and chronic problems. These include 
                                               
2 For more details, please visit the world bank website: - https://data.worldbank.org/country/Jordan  
 
3 These countries in addition to modern Turkey share many similarities including cultural and religious similarities, 
language, political and social structure.   
4 http://www.britishempire.co.uk/maproom/transjordan.htm  
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high tax avoidance, long-lasting high-levels of unemployment, unstable political and geographical 
area and poor utilization and allocation of resources. 
Jordan is heavily dependent on foreign aids. And at the absence of a real heavy industries (cars, 
ship building, machineries and tools, mining, and exportable goods) the Jordanian balance of 
payment is heavily depends on overseas remittances, tourism, and a few raw materials exports 
(basically Potash, Phosphates, and seasonal fruits and vegetables): these are the main sources of 
foreign currency earnings which are used to pay for the imports which are basically energy, food, 
feed machineries, medicines and defensive equipment. Unlike its neighbouring countries, Jordan 
suffers from a lack of oil, gas and coal reserves.  
In the decades following the award of independence, the 1950s and 1960s the Jordanian economy 
was totally exhausted, largely caused by Arab coalition’s defeat the protracted war against the state 
of Israel5. At this stage the economy was small, limited and fragile. The infrastructure was 
damaged and obsolete. Even the demographical structure was unstable and has remained so auntil 
the present day. This unfortunate situation became the norm in Jordan and it further degenerated 
when Jordan has lost some of its most agricultural productive area to Israel in 1967.  
Between 1969-1970 Jordan, experienced a form of civil war between the Jordanian regime’s 
military and the Palestinian militias who thought at that time the regime in Jordan had played a role 
in the establishment of Israel. The socio-political situation did not help the Jordanian economy to 
grow and in the 1987, due to the sharp decline in oil price, oil exporting Arabian countries stopped 
the financial support to Jordan this was in conjunction with the decline of the expats remittances, 
some of whom had already lost their jobs because of the oil price crash. This had put Jordan in a 
really serious situation as the options were very limited and the government was running out of 
foreign exchange reserve (Jaradat, 2010). Accordingly, in 1988, and as a result of the continuation 
of the deteriorating economic situation, the government in an attempt to mitigate the effect of the 
public debit depreciated the Jordanian Dinar: it had lost about 45% of its value against the US 
dollar, and the inflation rate had seriously increased; consequently the percentage of the population 
that was below the poverty line rose to 30% (Alhababseh, 2016).  
The government to remedy these problematic complications which nearly brought the state to 
financial destress; had sought the help of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Accordingly, the 
Jordanian government underwent a very tough austerity budgets and a strict economic reform 
                                               
5 Israel declared its independent on 14th of May 1948. Following to that it was recognized by the two major powers USA 
on 15th, of May and USSR 18th, of May.   However, it became a member of UN a year later in 11th, May,1949. Details on 
the Israeli ministry of foreign affairs website: 
http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/foreignpolicy/peace/guide/pages/declaration%20of%20establishment%20of%20state%20of%
20israel.aspx   
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process under the close supervision of the IMF in 1989. The IMF reform package to Jordan at that 
time included a reschedule of the outstanding loans and its arrears (interests and the installments) 
and a new loan basically to pay the salaries and necessary expenses for three months (Brynen, 
1992; Alissa, 2009). However, in 1990 and 1991, and due to the Jordanian political stance in 
supporting the Sadam Hussein’s regime in Iraq when he has invaded Kuwait during the second 
Gulf-War, the Jordanian economy encountered a sheer cut off financial and logistic support from 
Gulf cooperative council countries (GCC) and Western countries too. Moreover, GCC countries to 
pay back Jordanian for supporting Sadam Hussein’s dismissed half million Jordanian expat 
workers and their families.  
In addition, Jordan had received more than a million Iraqi citizens who escaped the war as a 
refugees. However, there were some positive aspects in the situation as some of those who came 
due to the war had brought their savings to invest in the Jordanian economy and of course they 
brought their experience in business and expertise. Because of the Iraqi refugees and Jordanian 
expats deportation from GCC countries and in order to solve problem resulting from huge pressure 
on infrastructure and steep increase in energy bills Jordan signed another Stand-By Agreement with 
the IMF in 1992 to cope with the consequences of these catastrophic events on its economy 
(Alhababseh, 2016). That tough economic and fiscal situation found Jordan falling behind its Arab 
neighbouring countries. As a prerequisite for any kind of support from the USA and its allies; 
Jordan found itself obliged to sign a peace treaty with the state of Israel in order to unlock financial 
support and it was the second Arab country to do this after Egypt.  
Following to the peace process; a huge financial and technical support have come to Jordan from 
the west mainly from the USA and EU (Al-Akra et al., 2009). Moreover, Jordan had access to a 
new technical assistance form the World Bank Group and the IMF had agreed to support a new 
economic reform programme. Therefore, with the guidance, supervision, and assistance of the 
World Bank and the IMF, Jordan began many economic and financial reform processes. It 
introduced sales tax (value-added tax) in 1994, reduced maximum custom tariff from 70% to 50% 
in 1996, trade liberalisation followed, and most importantly, launched the privatisation process (Al-
Akra et al., 2009; Alissa, 2009).  
The privatisation process in Jordan is one of the most successful privatisation programmes in the 
Middle East (Alhababseh, 2016). The programme started in 1996, and the main aims were to 
enhance the efficiency and productivity of the targeted enterprises, creating a suitable investment 
environment to attract external investment, and strengthening the economy and financial market by 
this long-term investment (ASE, 2014). 
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Moreover, and since the inauguration of king Abdullah the second in 1999, a massive programme 
of economic and regulatory reforms have been taking place. These include huge tax increases, the 
narrowing of the tax exemptions and the widening of the tax base; there has been a notable 
shrinking of governmental subsidies for food, feed, health care and education. And perhaps the 
most importantly the huge process of privatization which led to giving away of more than 90% of 
the state-owned assets.  
Privatization has introduced different styles of corporate governance as assets had been directly 
soled to strategic foreign investors the government intention of enhancing the management 
practices: the government was betting on the foreign investors bringing fresh expertise and  a new 
paradigm of management to the country examples: the selling of the government’s shares in the 
Jordan-telecom to the French telecommunication company (Orange), and selling its shares in 
Jordanian Cement Company to Lafarge group, also selling its shares in Arab Potash Company to 
Canadian Chemicals Corporation. Privatization also took the form of direct sales in the financial 
market for the state shares; an example being the Royal Jordanian Airways (the national carrier). 
(Al-Hosban, 2015).  To stump up , after 1994 and following the peace process with Israel and the 
resumption of democracy in Jordan,  various regulatory changes have been taking place making 
Jordan an attracting investment environment either for local investors, expats and especially 
foreign investors. 
Hence, as part of these reform processes new organization have been created either to replace old 
ones as in the: Amman stock exchange replacing Amman financial market or in new regulatory 
bodies being created like the Jordan security commission and security depositary centre which 
serves as a clearing house to prudently manage and supervise the process of documenting deals and 
contracts that take place in the ASE.  
In the following section a brief presentation of the regulatory framework that govern the financial 
and capital market and how these have developed until we reached the current corporate 
governance code which was issued for first time in 2006: an improved version was issued in 2008.  
 
2.2.1  Regulatory framework for business in Jordan 
As mentioned before Jordan’s regulatory system has been frequently reviewed by the regulators to 
cope with the region’s radical changes which impose a political, social and economic consequences 
calling eventully for these changes. The government want to actualize the announced vision to 
make Jordan the first destination for foreign investors in the middle-east.  
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However, this PhD project is interested in the regulations that have effect on the business and 
capital market which eventually have either direct or indirect effect on the investment in 
intellectual capital. As a part of its efforts to succeed with the privatisation process, to improve 
governance and the disclosure system, and to increase confidence in the overall economy and 
financial environment to attract more investment, the Jordanian government enacted the most 
important regulations for contemporary business and the financial environment, which are: The 
Corporate Law as amended of (2006),  Securities law (2002), Disclosure directives (2004), Listing 
securities instructions (2012) and the patents law (1999). These laws set the framework for the 
corporate governance system, improved corporate disclosure, and emphasised the adoption of 
International Accounting Standards/ International Financial Reporting Standards (IAS/IFRS).  
2.2.2 Corporate Law No. 57 of 2006 
The government has enacted this law, part of normal course of legislative development to replace 
the previous one (Companies Act 1997) to keep pace with its new economic phase: the  previous 
act was enacted in 1997 which was before the major privatisation flow took place.  
Subject to the provisions of corporate law no. 57, companies registered under this law should be 
divided into the following forms: General Partnership, Limited Partnership, Limited Liability 
Company, Limited Partnership in Shares, Private Shareholding Company, and Public Shareholding 
Company (Article 6).  
With respect to the Public Shareholding Companies (PSCs), the law provides in details the PSC 
procedures of establishing such entities, minimum capital requirements (capital increase and 
decrease), offering procedures, annual general assembly meetings (GAMs) process, PSC’s 
management, merger, takeover, and cease and liquidation. Also, the new act emphasises the 
requirement to adopt IAS (IFRS) and ISA.  
The following brief discussion will shed the light on the main contents of the act and how it affects 
the listed companies’ management, supervision, and reporting and how it promotes or protect 
intellectual capital ( or intangibles ).   
- Chapter One6: 
- Article (5) of the aforementioned law emphasise the protection of the company’s name 
brands and logos and prohibits the use of one company name to deceive the customers or 
                                               
6 Of the Corporate Law.  
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other stakeholders. This reflects some aspects of corporate law that aims to protect some 
aspect of IC. 
-  Chapter Eight:  
This part of the Corporate law focus on the management of public shareholding companies. 
The following summarises the main articles that affect the governance structure, board 
memebers sellection, and their relationship with executive management and other 
stakeholders. 
-  Article (132) deals with management of the shareholding companies, which states that the 
members of the board are elected for a period of four years by the shareholders in a secret 
ballot. The voting is cumulative and the number of the board members will be   between 
three (minimum) to thirteen members (maximum); according to the provision of this law 
those who can be elected must not be have a criminal record or any convections that breach 
the integrity “Any felony or misdemeanour involving honour such as bribery, 
embezzlement, theft, forgery, abuse of confidence, false testimony, or any crime against 
public manners and morals, or if he is incapacitated or declared bankrupt unless 
rehabilitated”. However, membership is not allowed in a PSL company until they have 
finished his/her twenty-first year and nor could they be public servant unless representing a 
legal entity that has hire him/her.  
- The board will elect amongst its member in a secret and direct ballot its chairman and 
his/her deputy chairman.   
- In articles (140-142) the act states that the Board of Directors “shall prepare, within a 
maximum period of three months from the end of the fiscal year of the company, the annual 
balance sheet of the company, its profit and loss statement, and cash flows statements 
accompanied with their clarifications compared with those of the previous fiscal year, all 
duly certified by the company auditors, to be presented to the annual general assembly 
meeting”.  
The board also, “shall prepare semi-annual financial statements and the chairman, CEO, 
and the external auditor will be responsible of the correctness and fairness of the annual 
financial statements”. Moreover, the board will prepare annual report discussing the 
financial and operational conditions of the company and this report shall discuss all 
material aspect affecting the company business and its plans for the next year.  An 
important pillar of the transparency by this law which make it mandatory for the PSL 
companies to publish its financial statements and the annual report “The Board of 
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Directors shall publish the Company balance sheet, its profit and loss account and a 
detailed summary of the annual report of the Board of Directors, along with the auditors’ 
report within a period not exceeding thirty days from the date of the meeting of the General 
Assembly”.  
- Publicly listed firms shall prepare thier financial statements in accordance with the 
international accounting and auditing standards. The Companies law shows some aspects 
relating to the process of board of directors’ nomination and selection. Within four months 
after the end of the financial year, an invitation is sent to each shareholder (at least fourteen 
days prior to the date set for the meeting) to attend the General Assembly meeting. This 
invitation letter is accompanied by the agenda of the meeting and the report of the board of 
directors, its annual accounts, in addition to the auditors’ report (Article 144). Other 
invitations are also sent to the head of the Jordan Securities Commission (JSC) and the 
Companies’ Controller Department (CCD) in order to attend the GAM (usually they send 
representatives on behalf of them).  
Company law directives board of directors to announce the date set for the meeting of the 
Company General Assembly Meeting in two local daily newspapers, within two weeks 
prior the date of the general meeting (Article 145). Also they should announce the verbal 
invitation once through radio or television within a maximum period of three days prior to 
the date of meeting (Article 145). Based on this act, the shareholders have the right to give 
a proxy to another shareholder to attend the meeting on his/her behalf, and the proxy 
should be in writing, on a special template prepared for this purpose approved by the 
official companies’ controller (Article 179). 
- In article (152), which describes the Chairman responsibilities and powers. As the 
chairman shall represent the company in all matters and the ability to delegate any of these 
responsivities to executive management or any other member of the board. Under the 
provision of this article of the law the chairman can be fulltime with the agreement of two 
third of the board and can dually occupy the position of the chairman and CEO. And this 
point of the law is subject to critique as it hinders the separation of duties despite the code 
of corporate governance has suggested the separation of two positions. 
- Article (153) gives the board the authority to hire a qualified general manager GM or chief 
executive officer CEO to run the company and it also gives the board the authority to 
terminate the GM/CEO with an immediate notification to the Companies Controller and 
the Jordan Security Commission JSC.  
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- Article (155) stipulates that the board shall hold six meetings during the year and this is the 
minimum and the board can hold more if the company’s operations and its activities nautre 
need more or the nature of business need more repetitive meetings.  
- Article (165) talks about the dismissal of the board and it gives the general assembly the 
right to do this action “The General Assembly of a Public Shareholding Company shall 
have the right, during an extraordinary meeting and upon a signed request of shareholders 
holding at least 30% of the Company shares, to dismiss the chairman of the Board of 
Directors or any of its members except for members representing the shares of the 
government or any corporate body. The dismissal request shall be submitted to the Board 
of Directors, and a copy thereof shall be sent to the Controller”.   
2.2.3 The Securities law no (76) for the year 2002  
This law was issued as an amendment to replace the Securities Act 1997. This law has been 
enacted to replace the previous act of 19977 which targeted the organisation and regulation of 
Jordanian capital market in line with international standards (Al-Shiab, 2006). Under this Law, 
three controlling and supervisory bodies came into existence. Those new bodies are the Jordan 
Securities Commission (JSC), the Amman Stock Exchange (ASE), and the Securities Depositary 
Centre (SDC). The Jordan Securities Commission (JSC) was established to protect investors, and 
organising and promoting the capital market ensuring fairness, efficiency and transparency. To 
achieve these main targets, the JSC has a responsibility to regulate the issuance of securities and 
monitor the dealing process, regulating and promoting firms for accurate disclosure, and to regulate 
the licensing and registration of listed companies. Furthermore, the JSC regulates and monitors the 
Amman Stock Exchange and Securities Depositary Centre (Securities Act, article 8).  
The Amman Stock Exchange (ASE) was established in March 1999 as a non-profit, private 
institution with an independent administrative and financial position. It replaced the Amman 
Financial Market (AFM) which was established in 1978. The ASE is authorised to operate as an 
exchange for the trading of securities. The stated ojective of ASE is to secure the fairness, 
transparency, efficiency, and liquidity of Jordanian capital market, and to offer a strong and reliable 
environment for its listed securities while protecting the rights of its investors, (ASE, 2013). 
However, the Securities law of 2002, strengthened the role of the JSC, ASE and SDC and required 
all listed companies to adopt the IAS/IFRS. Also it gives more power to the JSC with respect to 
imposing fines, suspending trading, or delisting companies in case of significant violations.  
                                               
7 JSC Law was the first Jordanian regulation to make it clearly mandatory to all Jordanian PSC to prepare 
financial statements according IAS and later IFRS. This considered the first official adoption of the 
IAS/IFRS even though many listed companies especially banks were adopting the IAS voluntarily.  
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2.2.4 the Disclosure Directives (2004)  
These instructions issued by the JSC and it deals with the minimum required level of disclosure by 
listed companies and specifiy accounting and auditing standards that should be implemented by 
listed companies as a prerequisite for listing. The directives come in 24 artciles8. Perhaps the most 
imprtant part of this directive is article no. (4) which to some extent partially represnts a leverage to 
the ICD as it states the following: “The Board of Directors of the issuing Company shall prepare the 
Company’s annual report within three months from the end of the Company’s fiscal year and shall 
provide the Commission therewith. The annual report shall include: A) the sttement from the 
chairman. B) A report from the board of directors.”  In addition, according to the provsion of part B) 
of the article (4) mentioned previously, the board of directors must provide sufficient information 
about many issues and aspect of the company operations, performance,  risk exposures and risk 
management, orgnasiation structre and its employess allocation on the orgnisation strucutre.  
The items required to be covered unders this atricle and that have direct or indirect effect on the IC 
are the following:  
➢ The board of directors report shall provide information about The Company’s accomplishments 
supported by quantitative indicators and a description of significant occurrences to the Company during 
the fiscal year. 
➢ The board of directors report shall include a description of any government protection or any concession 
granted to the Company; as well as a description of any Patents or Licensing Rights obtained by the 
Company. 
➢ The board of directors report shall clearly state if the company enjoys any govermantal support, 
subsidies, favourable contracts et cetera.   
➢ The board of directors report shall provide information about the company compatativness, compliance 
with the internatinoal standards for business, and the implimentation of the intarnational quality 
standards if any, must be acknowledge.   
➢ The board of directors report shall provide information abouth the company’s accomplishments, 
achievments during the past fiscal year and how these will affect the company’s business.  
 
2.2.5 Listing Securities Instructions 2012  
The ASE listing directives 2004 is mainly a document listing the requirements that would cause  
suspension and delisting of the companies. Under these directives, companies to list shares in the 
                                               
8 The full version of the directive can easily be accessed on the JSC website through the link: 
http://www.jsc.gov.jo/Public/English.aspx?Site_ID=1&Page_ID=717  
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market, at least one year should have passed since the company obtains permission to work. 
Moreover, the company should provide the ASE with the “company's memorandum of association, 
articles of association and prospectus, annual report for the last financial year, the interim financial 
statements reviewed by an independent auditor”.  
As required by the listing directives (2012); and in line with the provision of the corporate act the 
company's board of directors should issue a report containing the following information: 
1.  A short profile of the firm's establishment, its major aims and its relationship with other 
related firms.  
2.  Detailed specifications of the securities issued by the firm, and for potential issuance in 
the future.  
3. The board of directors' assessments supported with figures, of the firm’s performance, as 
well as achieved targets compared with the set plan.  
4. Important incidents the firms faced or that affected the firms from the date of its 
establishment till the date of submission of the listing application.  
5. The future plan of the firm over the next three years.   
6. Names of the persons (entities) who hold 5% or more of the firm’s shares.  
 
2.2.6 The Patents Law 1999 and the following amendments for 2002  
This law has been enacted since the beginning of the year 2000. This law aims to facilitate and 
organise the process registering the patents and secure these patents from being abused, misused or 
illegally used by the others without the permission of the inventor(s) or the owner of the patents. 
  
Although, the patents law creates organisational procedures for registration, and the issuing the 
certificate of ownership of the patents and or the inventions, it does not include anything relating to 
supporting the inventors, or offering any logistic assistance to the inventors. And it also does not 
cover the establishment of a national database for patents or the national intellectual capital.  
 
The law focuses on the process of registering the patents, documents needed, and the legal 
protection offered by the government to the inventors. the process of lawsuit in case of dispute 
between parties. Moreover, the legal period for protection which based on this law is twenty years 
from the date of registering the patent in the patent’s registrar office in the ministry of industry and 
trade.   
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2.3 Corporate Governance in Jordan 
Jordan strives to put in place all the requirements to make itself a suitable destination for foreign 
investment and to protect investors and to secure an attractive investment environment. Thus, and 
since the OECD has issued the CG principal document in 2004, Jordan has taken noticeable steps 
to develop the governance framework for corporation in Jordan (Alshhadat and Abdeljalil, 2012).   
The corporate controller department (CCD)9 has issued the first draft of the Jordanian Corporate 
Governance guidelines in 2006 as a recommendation and it is not mandatory (Hussein, Ala 
Albawwat, Bandar Barunilai 2015). This code applies to all companies wether public shareholding 
corporation, private shareholding, or limited liabilities.   However, the Jordan security Commission 
(JSC) has issued a specific Corporate Governance Code (JCGC) in 2004 which has been briefly  
amended in 2008, providing certain enhancements to the previous one and with participation from 
the IMF mission to Jordan and the Central Bank of Jordan (CBJ): it becomes a listing requirement 
for the public shareholding compnies.  
The JCGC is principle based (Alhababsah, 2016) and similar to the UK combined Code of 
Corporate Governance (2003) adopting “Comply or Justify” approach in CG models as mentioned 
before it currently provides guidelines and is not yet mandatory. This means the public 
shareholding companies are expected to comply with CG principles; however, if they are not 
complying they need to justify their departure from the CG principles and they need to 
acknowledge the non-compliance in their annual report.     
The JCGC is compliments other laws and acts i.e. corporate law, securities law and disclosure and 
listing instructions and I quote from the JCGC itself: “These rules are based principally on a 
number of legislations, mainly the Securities Law and related regulations, the Companies Law, 
and the international principles established by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD)”. The following part includes a summary and brief description of the JCGC 
as issued by CCD in 2008: 
1. The Aim of the JCGC: as mentioned in the code itself; the stated aims are: to develop the 
national capital market and its regulatory and organizational framework. It seeks to enhance 
transparency and accountability. It safeguards the shareholders’ rights and enhances the 
performance of our national economy, increasing confidence in it and in the investment climate. 
                                               
9 This is a regulatory body its basically take care of the companies’ registration maintain records of all companies in 
Jordan and have a supervisory role over them and to make sure they are complying with the requirements of corporate 
law and the regulations issued following to that law. More information about the CCD on: www.ccd.gov.jo  and the 
JCGC also available on the same website: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cGLnQ1gQkA4  
23 
 
2. The Board of Directors: in the second chapter of the JCGC has specifies that the recommended 
number of members as between 5 -13 and these should be elected by the general assembly in a 
secret direct ballot for a term of four years. A third of the board are recommended to be 
independent members10.   The code stipulates that any member should do his/her duties in 
managing the company’s affairs with the highest level of professional care, transparency and 
honesty and should take the interests in consideration when executing the monitoring role over the 
executive management. Board members should have the sufficient qualifications and relevant 
experience in the company’s business and it is their responsibility to make sure that the executive 
management is has the relevant professional qualifications to run the company. It is the board of 
directors’ responsibility to establish an effective internal control system and to ensure that it 
operates according to the specifications in the company by-laws and best professional practices. 
3. The Structure of the board: the board shall establish among the members an audit committee, a 
nominations and remunerations committee and any other committees that allow the board to carry 
out its role effectively and efficiently.  
4. The board meetings: the board holds its meetings either by invitation from the chairman or if a 
one quarter of the members have requested a meeting. Decisions should be voted in meetings and 
voting only accepted by person - no proxy voting allowed. The board at minimum shall hold six 
meetings a year one meeting each two months. The frequency of meeting must be disclosed in the 
annual report.  
5. General assembly meeting: the general assembly shall hold an ordinary meeting once a year 
which takes place within the four months following to the end of the financial year. In the general 
assembly meeting each investor should have the opportunity to participate effectively in discussion 
and to express his/her opinions regarding the financial and operational affairs of the company.  
6. Shareholders’ Rights: The executive management and the board should take the necessary actions 
to achieve equality to all shareholder disregarding their ownership without discrimination. The 
rights include: proper documentation for ownerships of shares and the shareholders have the right 
to access any information in accordance with laws in-force. Voting in general assembly meeting 
may be either in person or by proxy. They have the right to file a lawsuit against the company, its 
management or its board of directors to compensate for any damages or losses resulting from 
neglect or mismanagement. The shareholder has the right to requisite for an extra ordinary general 
assembly meeting.  
                                               
10 The Code define the Independent Member as: A member of the board of directors who is not tied to the 
company or any of its upper executive management, affiliate companies, or its external auditors by any 
financial interests or relationships other than his shareholding in the company that may be 
suspected to bring that member benefit, whether financial or incorporeal, or that may affect 
his/ her decisions or lead to exploitation of his/ her position with the company. 
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7. Disclosure and Transparency: The JCGC has emphasised the issue of transparency as it stated in 
the fifth section of the code on the following: 
“The company shall provide shareholders and investors with accurate, clear, timely 
disclosure information, in accordance with the requirements of the supervisory authorities and the 
legislations in force, in a manner that would enable them to take their decisions. This 
includes disclosures related to: 1. Periodic reports. 2. Material information. 3. Dealings of insiders 
and their relatives in securities issued by the company, including members of the board of directors 
and upper executive management. 4. Related parties’ transactions. 5. The privileges of members of 
the board of directors and upper executive management”. Also, the code emphasises the 
importance of website disclosures on a timely basis and finally focuses on forbidding of any insider 
information misuse or passing such insider information to others to achieve trading benefits.   
8. Audit Committee: JCGC gives a comprehensive authority to the audit committee and assigns a 
good part of the code for the Audit Committee and its duties and organisation.   The code 
emphasises that the Audit committee members should possess proper standards of education and 
qualifications to carry out their duties. The committee is recommended to hold at least four 
meetings yearly. The Audit Committee will engage in many financial and managerial supervisory 
activities e.g. “Discussing matters related to the work of the external auditor, including his, 
observations, suggestions, and reservations, pursuing the level of responsiveness of the company’s 
management to them, and submitting recommendations to the board of directors accordingly”  in 
addition, the committee will review the external auditor plan and risk assessment to the company, 
receive and review the external auditors report and make the suitable recommendations to the 
board. The audit committee will make sure that the internal audit function is independent and 
carries out its duties according to the internal audit standards and have access to all necessary 
resources and information.  
9. Other Committees: the code gives the board full authority to form amongst its members any other 
committee according to the business and its operation; the code namely mentions the following 
committees (Nomination and numeration committee, Corporate governance committee, Risk 
management committee … etc.,). 
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2.4 Jordanian Capital Market 
Capital market in general works as growth leverage for society. Certainly, it has a very important 
role in the economy as a hub for free and fair equity trading. The capital market gives the public the 
opportunity to invest and grow their liquid resources, and access funding through public offerings; 
it boosts the social mobility through wealth sharing11. Jordan enjoys a relatively good and well-
established capital market.  
Jordan has the second largest capital market in MENA region in terms of the market capitalization 
preceded by Qatari one (Moumen et al. 2015).  It is the second to the Cairo Stock Exchange in 
terms of the date of establishment as the first was established in 1906 and the second in Amman 
was established in the early 1930s. according to the information published on the ASE website. 
Jordanian Securities Market (as the most important component of the Jordanian capital market) 
“Jordanian public already subscribed to and traded in shares since that time where in that time 
there were three publicly shareholding companies i.e. the Arab Bank was the first public 
shareholding company to be established in Jordan in 1930, followed by Jordan Tobacco and 
Cigarettes in 1931, Jordan Electric Power in 1938, and Jordan Cement Factories in 1951”. 
However, at that time the financial market was unregulated and run by private sector through 
private porkers and agents and that remain the case until the issuance of the company act at 1964. 
Anyway, the public trading and financial instruments exchange have experienced many and 
extensive developments and reforms; one important advancement was the amendment to the 
companies’ law as of 1974 were under the provision of this amendments the companies become 
legally liable to disclose to public its financials and other information about its management and 
operations. Many reviews of the trading activities and the regulatory framework have been carried 
out to let the capital market cope with the international best practices applied in this field.  
Recently and after the liberalisation process of the economy and the huge privatisation procedures, 
the most important legislation was the securities act of 1999: under the provision of that act 
Amman financial market have been replaced by the Amman Stock Exchange (ASE) as an 
independent entity owned by the government. It aims to offer suitable environment for a 
progressive financial market to succeed and to be efficient technically and legislatively, both 
regionally and globally; it operates with the utmost possible compliance with the latest 
international standards in the field of financial markets to support the national economic growth 
provide an attractive investment environment. And to achieve this ASE will try to do the following: 
Create a fair, secure, competitive, transparent and credible investment environment, 
                                               
11 This is a summary of training workshop about capital markets by Goldman Sachs can be accessed through: 
http://www.goldmansachs.com/s/interactive-guide-to-capital-markets/   
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in addition, to increase the public awareness right across all society of the importance of the 
securities trading. In addition to enhance the market discipline, transparency and corporate 
governance to reach a fully efficient market. Furthermore, the securities law has established two 
more bodies to compliment the capital market and make sure that trading is conducted according to 
the provisions of the enacted laws and regulations and that transactions are properly documented to 
protect the rights of all interested parties. These two bodies are the Jordan security commission - a 
regulator and supervisory body and the securities depository centre as a clearing house to 
documents all trading operations and ownership transfers. In the next part, a brief description 
follows of the two bodies’ objectives and role in maintaining transparency, fair trading, and the 
highest possible of corporate governance.  
2.4.1 Jordan Security Commission (JSC) 
The stated aims of establishing the JSC can be summarised in three points: 
Licencing and Registration: JSC takes the necessary steps to regulate financial markets starting 
from the earliest phase of registering the public shareholding companies in the JSC records and 
licencing them for listing in ASE. In this phase the JSC will check if the company has 
accomplished all the listing requirements. In addition, the JSC will license the brokers and 
brokerage houses that operate in Jordan including investments advisory firms and those who 
deliver services such as investment management, investment trusteeship, safe keeping and issuance 
management and will maintain a registry of these entities.   
Disclosure and Transparency: the JSC will supervise the listed companies and will take the 
necessary actions to make sure that they all comply with the requirements of Corporate law and 
adhere to the dates of publishing their financial statements and the annual reports and semi-annual 
reports which are a listing requirements.  
Continuous Inspections on the financial companies: Companies that provide any service 
specified in the securities law no (76) of the year 2002 shall be subject to ongoing onsite inspection 
by JSC inspectors to make sure that they fully comply with the provisions of the law and to make 
sure that they provide services in accordance with the professional standards with proper policies to 
organise their operation and clearly specify their activities in accordance with their licence. 
Moreover, JSC will organise on a regular basis a training sessions for all parties to make sure that 
they will be up to date with all regulatory and professional developments that take place in the 
field.  
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2.4.2 Securities Depository Centre (SDC) 
 Like the previous two bodies, the SDC has been established by the virtue of the securities law no. 
(76) of year 2002 to serve as a clearing house and this will include the following three basic 
functions:  
1. Registration and desposits of securities. 2. Safekeeping and ownership transfer. 3. Execution the 
clearance and   settlements operations. The SDC provide a crucial job to Jordanian capital market 
as it holds the ownership registers of all issued shares. It has been assigned, in cooperation with the 
JSC and the ASE, the task of developing the Jordanian capital market, enhancing market efficiency 
and supporting rights and protections and transparent and well governed trading.  
The figure below summarises the regulatory framework for business in Jordan and the orgnising 
bodies: 
 
Figure 2.1 Regulatory Framework for Business in Jordan 
 
2.5 Intellectual Capital in Jordan 
Intellectual capital is a very important component of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) for developed 
countries. One example for this high importance is the investment in the intangible in UK for the 
last 10 years was higher that investment in the tangible assets according to  Intellectual Capital 
Office (ICO) standing at £133 bn, £121bn respectively (IPO 2016). According to the same resource 
the allocation of that investments in IC were as follows: training accounts for £26 bn, 
organisational capital for £22bn, design £14bn, software £28bn, branding £15bn and scientific 
R&D £19bn. The same pattern is seen in countries like Denmark, Switzerland and Austria (OECD, 
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2014). However, this is not the case in developing countries and Jordan clearly fits into that 
category.  
Jordanian government does not produce any official report summariesing its IC nor any kind of 
official document that provides a clear picture of the country’s status in terms of its intellectual 
abilities may be impeded in its citizens or institutions. It is the same case in respect to intangible 
assets or investments in knowledge based assets.  However, Jordan had many initiatives to 
maximise the utilization of the current intellectual capacities especially the human capital.   
One of these initiatives and perhaps the most important on Jordan level is the King Abdullah II 
Centre for Governmental Performance Excellence and Transparency12.  As after a king’s creed of 
establishing a specialised and independent centre which it’s stated ojectives are to promote 
excellence and standardised performance that is in line with the international best practices in 
delevering public services and running business.  
King Abdullah II’s Centre for Excellence aims at promoting a culture of excellence in Jordan and 
the region through developing excellence frameworks and assessment criteria based on 
international best practices, assessing organizations' performance, manages King Abdullah II’s 
awards for excellence and promotes excellence within the public sector, private sector, not-for-
profit and non-governmental organizations. The role of the King Abdullah II Centre for Excellence 
is to promote continuous  excellence in the public sector, private sector, business associations and 
non-governmental organizations and Education Services Providers for the purpose of increasing 
Jordan's international competitiveness and so to help secure a sustainable, prosperous future for 
Jordan. The evaluation process covers the policies and procedures, accuracy and speed in providing 
the service to the beneficiaries doing so in transparent manner and with the best compliance with 
international best practices.  
Another institution which deals with empowerment of intellectual capital at the state level is the 
Royal Scientific Association which provides technical support to other institutions, investors and 
researchers to mainly in R&D field. It tests against the international standards and to some extent 
provides training for public and private sectors to spread awareness among them of the importance 
of compliance with the international standards of performance and production.  
                                               
12 King Abdullah II Centre for Excellence was founded in January 2006 further details found on the 
centre website: http://www.kace.jo/index.php/en/about-the-center/the-vision-mesion-objective  
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Other governmental and semi-governmental institutions established with the implicit objective of 
enhancing the process of producing and developing intellectual capital including the King Hussein 
Fund for Excellence, Jordan River Foundation, and Institution for Leadership Excellence. 
Unfortunately as is often the case in developing countries the activities of these bodies tend to have 
a lack of transparency and accountability and to some extent overwhelmed by mismanagement 
(Odat, 2017)13. Despite these bodies being funded from tax monies but they do not have any 
material effect in developing the economy or providing any opportunity rather than having any 
positive effect on the national intellectual capital. In sum the public sector in Jordan despite many 
initiatives to increase the productivity and improve the intellectual contents of the sector; is still 
and after 70 years of establishment of the state characterised by poor-management, out-dated 
systems some low productivity, disguised unemployment (administrative gridlock), nepotism, 
deep-state interfering, and malfunctional system.  
Jordanian companies generally thrive when competing for the opportunities offered by 
international market and especially on the regional countries. Many Jordanian companies rely on 
business in the Gulf Countries market and most of them have already reached out directly to 
neighbouring countries examples include: The Arab Bank group has open branches in all Arab 
Countries except Libya, Jordan National Bank has opened branches in Palestine, Lebanon, Bahrain 
and UAE. Many other companies as well operate regionally and internationally either directly with 
branches and subsidiaries or indirectly by franchising agreements and/or licensing.  
The below figure summarises the institutional environment for IC in Jordan: 
 
Figure 2.2 Institutional Environment for IC Support in Jordan 
                                               
13 The article in Arabic to be found on: http://www.ammonnews.net/article/305709  
also more details about the main reasons behind such situation can be found on: 
http://maqar.com/?id=71893   
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2.6 Why Jordan   
Jordan is a very interesting research context due to many facts and characteristics that make Jordan 
researchable context and these include: 
•   Jordan is one of the Arab countries which share many similarities including cultural, 
political, social and demographic issues. These make any conclusion come out Jordanian 
context applicable and generalizable to the neighbouring countries.  
•   Jordan which maintains one of the oldest financial markets in the region provides and 
facilitates investment in IC’s infrastructure. Thus, exploring the ICD within the Jordanian 
firms will give researcher  a good context with respectively long established firms that 
allow the researcher to dig deeper into the phenomenon to develop a good understanding 
of this phenomenon.     
•   Jordanian financial market is dominated by the family ownership comparing to western 
countries and this will provide a new contribution to knowledge considering this 
difference in ownership structure between developed countries and developing ones.  
•   Jordanians and Arabs generally are conservatives and risk-averse in their investment 
behavior. Thus, approaching the ICD phenomenon within this context and considering 
the point of view of people from such environment will provide a very interesting 
contribution to disclosure’s literature. 
•  To the researcher’s best knowledge, in all MENA region countries, especially in Jordan, 
there is no previous literature examining the effect of CG on ICD. Hence, there is a strong 
motivation to study this matter in a virgin context where both CG and IC research, in 
general, is underdeveloped. Additionally, an analysis of this issue from the developing 
countries allows exploring the phenomenon in underdeveloped legal and institutional 
settings given the context of relatively weak investor protection which will provide a 
valid and interesting contribution to literature. 
2.7 Summary 
This chapter has presented an overview of the research context and why the researcher has decided 
to conduct his research project in Jordan considering Jordanian listed companies; it examined 
benefit of the research outcomes and deliverables to the literature, practice in the contexts’ country 
and other neighbouring countries who share the same economic, cultural and socio-political 
circumstances. Moreover, this chapter presents the significance of researching the Jordanian 
context and how this will participate in filling the one of the existing gaps in literature. In addition, 
in this chapter a description of the IC in Jordan has been presented. This include the common 
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utilised elements of IC. Providing an essential information about the IC and IC infrastructures on 
both levels the public and private’ sectors.  
This chapter also has described the legal framework that regulates the business practice in Jordan 
and how this will affect the investment in IC and intangible assets. A brief description of the 
Jordanian corporate law, Securities law, Patents law, disclosure directives and other regulations as 
well as the CG situation in Jordan, and a brief summary of the Jordanian CG code. Meanwhile, this 
chapter presents a background information about the Jordanian financial market: the types and 
nature of organization that the market subjects to its supervision.  
The components of the capital market in Jordan have been presented and the supervisory agencies 
that facilitate trading process which all affect the investment environment either directly or 
indirectly.  
Finally, this chapter provides an overview of the IC, the agencies that sponsors and support 
investment in IC and help in providing suitable infrastructures for more investments in IC. 
Moreover, the current chapter has provided a brief discrebtion of the problems that affect the 
advancement of the investment in intellectuals and other intangible assets.    
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3 Theoretical framework 
3.1 Introduction 
Positivistic research builds its hypothesis and questions about phenomena based on empirically 
proved theories to formulate the theoretical framework for the research project. This then directs 
the researchers when they test certain relationship between two or more variables before they 
empirically test it. However, one major obstacle encountered by the researcher in the accounting 
field is the absence of one universally agreed and accepted theory for accounting. Hence, a 
multiplicity of theories co-exist and  heated debate and conflicting points of views will continue to 
exist  (Bromwich, 1992). This challenge is clearly appearing in the definition of financial 
accounting which simply refers to identifying, analysing, classifying, documenting, and reporting 
the economic and financial activities on timely basis.  This indicates two important points to be 
considered: (1)  Financial accounting consists of many interrelated activities and (2) Accounting is 
bound by a combination of theories and practices. The previously mentioned state of a lack of a 
comprehensive and universal theoretical framework according to Schroder and Clark, (1995) 
makes the scholars in accountancy field when it comes to  voluntary disclosure use several theories 
to explain disclosure practices and choices. Even the prior literature on ICD has failed to provide a 
comprehensive theoretical framework to interpret the companies’ incentives and motivations to 
disclose information about its intellectual capital (An et al. 2011; Abeysekera 2006).  
Theory is defined as a set of interconnected relationships between variables, definitions, and 
propositions which present a systematic view or offer a description of phenomena and explain to 
some extent the patterns or directions of that relationship between the specified variables (Creswell, 
2009 p. 51). Hence, the relationship between the IC and CG could be inferred from many theories 
despite the absence of agreement on a theoretical model for studying the ICD. This state of 
disagreement on the theoretical framework is considered by some scholars a research problem 
(Vlismas & Venieris 2011). 
Extant literature suggests that many theories can be used to explain voluntary disclosure and why 
firms tend to provide extra information about its IC including: projects, business lines, future plans, 
staff qualifications and management’s capabilities despite it not being required by either law or 
professional standards (Dumay 2012), (An et al. 2011), (Vlismas & Venieris 2011), (Mouritsen 
2006), and (Rodrigues 2005). The literature survey has revealed that many theories have been 
tested and used to give explanation to  ICD e.g. agency theory, stakeholder theory, signalling 
theory and legitimacy theory (An et al. 2011). agency theory, political cost theory, legitimacy 
theory and signalling theory by (Rodrigues 2005) in contrast (Li et al. 2008) used only the agency 
33 
 
theory to test the relationship between the CG and the ICD while (Abeysekera & Guthrie 2005a) 
used signalling theory to explain the ICD phenomena.  
It is advisable in the research community that the researcher presents briefly all the conflicting 
theories that might explain or help to offer an explanation for the phenomenon that is subjected to 
examination. Thus, in the following section the theories that usually are used to interpret the 
corporates behaviour in voluntary disclosure will be presented.  
 
3.2 Conflicting theories in voluntary disclosure literature 
3.2.1 Agency Theory 
 When it was first introduced by Jensen and Meckling, (1976) agency theory has provided an 
explanation to the principle agent relationship which put managers under pressure from the 
firm’s owners who exercise a monitoring role over the managers and the firms’ performance. 
Under this assumption, managers will find themselves obliged to voluntary disclose 
information to satisfy the owners need for information and allow them to evaluate the 
managers’ performance as well as the firm’s performance too. However, most accounting 
scholars who implemented agency theory in their research to justify the voluntary disclosure 
e.g. (Jensen & Meckling 1976; Cooke 1989; Watts & Zimmerman 1990; Guthrie & Petty 
2000; García-meca et al. 2005; Deegan 2002; Holland 2005; An et al. 2011) have built their 
assumptions based on two conceptual points: 
1.  Information asymmetry and; 2. Principal vs Agent conflict of interests.  
Under the first assumption, information asymmetry,14 the executive management (the insiders) 
have unlimited access to the firm’s information including its operations, level of production, 
productivity and its performance and most importantly its future plans. This type of 
information is not available to the other stakeholders (the outsiders); thus, this kind of 
information gap between the two parties (insiders and the outsiders) put the management 
under pressure to share voluntarily more information to satisfy other stakeholders needs for 
information. The other assumption under agency theory that seeks to explain voluntary 
disclosure is that managers (agents) who run the business on behalf the owners (principals) 
                                               
14 The concept of the asymmetrical information perhaps first introduced by George A. Akerlof in 1970 in his paper the 
market for “lemons”: Qualitative uncertainty and the market mechanism, where he gave an example from the used cars 
market in USA where the seller knows the good car and the bad car, the Peach and Lemon, and the buyer do not know 
such information; under these conditions the sellers will make extra income due to knowing thing that the buyers do not. 
This kind of behaviour is connected to the opportunistic behaviour of the managers under agency theory assumptions.   
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will find themselves under-pressure to allow the principals (owners, creditors, governmental 
agencies) to access information which facilitate their supervisory role (M. Griogore, et al, 
2013). The above mentioned work of Jensen and Meckling has been further extended by 
Watts R., and Zimmerman J. (1978), when they introduced the positive accounting theory 
which has emphasised the concept of collection of contracts to refer to the organization: this 
implies that managers, when they choose the accounting methods to report the firm’s 
performance, will do a kind of Cherry-Picking among the accounting methods to suggest that 
they did a great job and have fulfilled their contractual requirements. This is described as the 
opportunistic behaviour of management. As they (the managers) will remain loyal to 
themselves and are driven by perceptions of self-interest. Thus, the managers need to be put 
under ongoing supervision by the owners to make sure that this conflict of interests will not 
affect the business continuity and other stakeholders’ interests (a detailed discussion of the 
agency theory will come later in this chapter).  
The difference in disclosure practices according to the listing status is explained also by the 
agency theory which according to Wang et al., (2008) who stated that dual listed firms are 
really motivated to share more information voluntarily as an action for investors interests’ 
protection thorough providing better quality of disclosure. 
Under agency theory’s premises, the contractual relationship between the principal and the 
agent is a means to put all involving parties’ interests in alignment (Fama F and Jensen M.C. 
1983). However, such contracts are remained insufficient in eliminating all agency’s conflicts 
as to some extent the managers (agents) still have significant residual control rights, which 
may lead to possible misuse of these discretionary authorities. Another aspect of contractual 
shortfall is the managers’ ability to make the accounting choices that serve their own interests 
including (earning management, creative accounting and/or income smoothing) to keep their 
performance-based incentives (Watts & Zimmerman 1990).  
Beattie & Smith (2012) suggested that accounting reports will provide additional mechanism 
for effective direct and indirect monitoring from the shareholders which will lead to high level 
of transparency in the capital market.   
Agency theory has been used by many accounting researchers to explain the voluntary 
corporate disclosure practices e.g. CSR reporting (Td et al. 2014; Schwindenhammer 2013; 
Michelon & Parbonetti 2012); corporate governance (Hermalin & Weisbach 2012; Madhani 
2016; Rodrigues & and Cia Lima 2017); corporate internet based disclosure (Kelton & Yang 
2008; Satta et al. 2015) and also, in ICD (Li et al. 2008; Mangena & Pike 2005; Kang & Gray 
2011; Ahmed & Hussainey 2010).  
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How can agency theory explain voluntary disclosure?  
Under the theoretical premises of agency theory, we find that the ownership management 
separation principle is a primary motivation for the disclosure as owners will demand higher 
level of information to reassure themselves that the agents are acting according to the 
contractual agreement between the two parties (Jensen and Meckling 1976).  
 The agency theory suggests that the ownership diffusion will create huge pressure on the 
executive management to provide better disclosures so the shareholders can evaluate their 
investments and that will facilitate their decision-making process and of course that 
meanwhile will facilitate their supervisory role over the management (Holland 2006).   
  Under agency theory the concept of independent supervisory role within the introduced as a 
guarantee of stronger internal control system and this will lead to more rational managerial 
decisions and more transparent business environment (Hussainey and Mouselli 2010).  
In the light of the agency theory we can expect a direct theoretical connection between the   
agency problem and ICD is manifested in many points summariesd in the following: - 
• IC represents the lifeblood for businesses and it surrounded with a great deal of 
ambiguity and investors will be very uncertain about investment decisions 
associated with intangible assets generally thus, demand for more information to 
bridge the gap between parties inside the firm and parties outside the firm 
(Marcuccio & Steccolini 2009).   
• IC have its own unique characteristics which make it mostly outside the regulatory 
requirements of the IAS and IFRS and this accordingly will give rise to the 
information asymmetry which creates more pressure on the management (the 
informed party) to share more information about IC to reduce the agency cost 
resulting from the information gap between agents and principals (Baboukardos 
& Rimmel 2014; Liao et al. 2013). 
• Information disproportionateness between executive management and the 
shareholders and other stakeholders will increase the agency cost because of 
implementing more resources for the sake of monitoring the executive 
management performance. Thus, voluntary disclosure will help in reducing the 
monitoring and supervisory costs (Scott 2014; Ishak & Al-Ebel 2013).  
• Investment in intangible and IC is normally long-term investment which increase 
the uncertainty and that will motivate the investors and analysts to demand for 
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higher level of disclosures about these items to lessen the severity of this 
uncertainty (Cordina 2014). 
All these points showed how the agency theory can provide explanations of the managerial 
choices when it comes to ICD. However, agency theory could not offer a comprehensive 
explanation of the transparency and voluntary disclosure in the corporate world and another 
causes may arise in the arena to explain why firms voluntarily share non-mandatory 
disclosures. (Hart 1995). 
3.2.2 Positive Accounting Theory 
The positive accounting theory (PAT), mainly developed by Watts and Zimmerman 
(1986) to explain why the agent (the executive managers) act in a particular manner or 
taking certain actions. The basic assumption of the PTA is that the relationship between 
the owner and the agent referred as a set of contractual agreements or set of contracts 
that specify and determine each party duties and expectations. However, this will incur 
extra cost they have referred to it as contract cost. The notion of the contract cost also 
implies the social and political cost that imposed on the management which 
management try to address by offering more information about firm’s operation and 
performance to legitimise management behaviour (Deegan and Hallam 1991).  
The main development of the PAT theory is based on “rational economic person 
assumption”, which assumes that managers are motivated particularly by self-interest 
and will behave opportunistically to maximize their own utility (Watts & Zimmerman 
1990). Thus, the self-interest assumption creates a need for organisations to establish 
alignment mechanisms to align principal and agent objectives and these must be 
through the proper corporate governance structure (Cerbioni & Parbonetti 2007). 
However, the explanatory power of the PAT for ICD is not very clear due to the 
overlapping with many other theories e.g. agency theory, political cost theory, 
legitimacy theory, and transaction cost theory. Thus, the PTA is still available choice to 
explain some accounting choices but it needs to consider many other notions to capture 
the full picture of corporate voluntary disclosure.    
3.2.3 Signalling Theory 
Signalling theory was developed and originated in biological and behavioral sciences to 
explain some aspect of animal and human behavior and evolution which underscore a 
theoretical framework for examining the communication between individuals, both 
within the same species and across different species. Many categories of signalling 
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introduced under biological and behavioural signalling model this include the sexual 
signalling e.g. hunter/gatherer human (mail) had used the food sharing with female as 
signal to sextually attract her and another example of signalling is among the peafowl, 
when the peacock uses its large colourful tail to signal the peahen (Debelle et al., 2017). 
Nevertheless, in the field of corporate communication signalling theory was first 
introduced by (Spence, M., 1973) in his widely citied article “Job Market signalling” 
which he authored based on his PhD project in Harvard University where he researched 
the Market Signalling. In that work signalling theory sought to more fully explain the 
information gap between the employers and the job seekers. Before hiring, employers 
can not properly assess how well the job seeker will fulfil the job requirements before 
appointment. On the other hand, the jobseekers will signal their skills and qualifications 
to the employers by applying to the job. The hiring process, according to Spence, looks 
like buying a lottery: there is always a margin of uncertainty associated with the 
decision. After the decision is made any adjustment needed from both parties, either by 
training and education from the employer or the cost of quitting by the employee is 
referred to as “signalling cost”.  Thus, researchers refer to this theory wherever there is 
information asymmetry in labour market (Morris 1986).  For example, where the 
managers who possess the information will voluntary use it to give signals to the outside 
parties who are interested to know the firm’s news (An et al. 2011). Under this theory 
managers are interested in sharing their achievements and the positive performance that 
their firms have actualized. Within signalling theory the notion has been developed that 
the managers intentionally provide such signals to market  themselves in the labour 
market as distinguished and successful leaders (Morris 1986). Sometimes, companies 
want to make their competencies visible and to offer the relevant information that 
investors and potential investors need for decision taking (Li, Jing and Mangena 2014; 
Kang & Gray 2011), allowing precise evaluation (Edvinsson and Malone, 1997).  An et 
al., (2011) stated that signaled disclosures to investors normally comes with good quality 
information and is helpful for decision making and reevaluating the company’s value. It 
gives numerous details about products, future plans, growth potential and expansion 
strategies (Morris 1986).  In addition, (Li et al. 2008) suggested that firms may try to 
signal their expertise and excellence to the market in the form of voluntary disclosure 
concerning the qualifications of management, and employees as well as business 
strategies and business lines. This point of view is also concluded by (García-meca et al. 
2005). Hence, signalling theory can give us some explanations for managers rationale in 
disclosing voluntarily financial and non-financial information.  
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3.2.4 Stewardship Theory 
Modern corporations’ goals, have been shifting from the owners’ wealth maximization 
towards  value maximization and sustainable growth. Thus, stewardship theory builds its 
arguments on the idea that there is no clash of interest between the managers and the 
owners as suggested by agency theory . Conversely, stewardship theory  assumes that the 
managers  behave like stewards for the organisation,  the owners and all other 
stakeholders (Fox & Hamilton 1994). Under this assumption, the managers are naturally 
motivated to take all decisions that are in the best interests of  the organisation and its 
owners, staff, and other stakeholders (Cohen et al. 2006). Hence, managers will seek to 
maximise  business performance and will take the necessary actions to achieve 
sustainable growth and a reasonable return on investment (Davis 2002).  These 
assumptions are built on the work of organisational sociology scholars (Mcclelland, 
1961; Herzberbery, et al, 1959) as citied in (Donaldson & Davis 1991).  They present the 
manager as the good-man  who will take care of the business on behalf of the owners 
opposing the arguments of  agency theory; the managers here will be driven by their 
latent need for achievements and success as they see the business prosperity as personal 
achievements for themselves. Also, they thrive and gain self-satisfaction through 
distinction and accomplishment by doing excellently in a challenging work environment; 
they present themselves as stewards seeking the opportunity to prove their leadership, 
accountability, and responsibility towards their institutions and their employers.     
3.2.5 Impression Managemnt Theory  
Impression management theory poses that the managers will try to influence audiences’ 
perceptions by information dessiminated about the firm’s performance, achievements 
and or managerial, operational success. Impression managemnt has it roots in 
psychology literature as it provides explination for individuals behaviour who aim to 
control the impressions of others (Brennan et al. 2009).  
Most accounting research of impression management are based on the postulation that 
managements are motivated by a latent desire to present a self-serving view of firms’ 
performance, this understood in nomerous ways: firstly, management intention to cover 
poor performance, or secondly, their desire to highlight their successes and highlight 
their accomplishments (Rutherford 2003).  
It is easy to connect the firms’ visual (graphs and pictures) and textual (narratives) 
disclosures to impression management notion, however, it is not easy to draw a consise 
conclosion that the disclosure is exclusively motivated by impression management 
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notion, due to overlapping between this notion and other notions provided by signalling 
theory and stewardship theory (Beattie 2014).  
Approaching volunatry disclosure from the impression management point of view take 
into considerition two goals that the managers want to achieve: firs to hide bad news so 
managers intend to distract the information users from accessing these bad news as 
palliative procedure or to mitigate any consequencies on share price, and the second goal 
is to signal or underscore a good news and make them more visiable to the information 
users (Davison 2014).  
3.2.6 Resource Dependency Theory  
The resource dependency theory is not common in voluntary disclosure studies. It was 
first proposed by Pfeffer and Salancik’s (1978) and has mainly applied  in the strategic 
management field to explain firms interaction with the external business environment. 
They state that “to understand the behaviour of an organization you must understand the 
context of that behaviour, and the ecology of the organization”. Thus, according to their 
argument the firm cannot be independent by itself as the firm’s success is contingent on 
the success and effectiveness of its supply chain which depends on the vendors and 
providers, distributers and customers etc., or as they referred it the state of 
interdependence, However, other scholars in management field have used this theory to 
explain merger and acquisitions decisions (Hillman et al. 2009).  
Resource dependency theory posits that the board of directors represent a critical 
resource for the firm and accordingly the board structure, size and composition are 
heavily depending on many factors including the external environment, firm strategy, 
and operational and financial performance (Pearce and Zahra, 1992). The board of 
directors will serve as an information channel to facilitate information flow from the 
company to the outside organizations and individuals (Williams & Ecker 2011). 
Moreover, and according to arguments by  Hillman et al. (2009) resource dependency 
theory will motivate  positive information sharing between the firm and the other 
interactive parties (Drees & Heugens 2013). Hence the providers, customers, investors 
who represent the relational capital for the firm will need information and the firm will 
be keen on providing information through different communication channels to satisfy its 
business-allies needs. Moreover, (Li et al. 2008; Haniffa & Cooke 2005) argued that 
resource dependency theory provides a foundation for the independent non-executive 
board member in facilitating the ICD. As those members be motivated to facilitate the IC 
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transparency , providing informative, wider, non-traditional and non-ritualistic 
disclosures. This argument is also supported by (Abeysekera 2010).  
 
3.2.7 Decision Usefulness Theory 
According to (FASB 2006) the objectives of financial reporting are to provide useful 
information that helps the information user in making informed investment and credit 
decisions; also it allows the information users to evaluate the business’ ability to generate 
cash flow. In addition, the financial reports will provide useful information about the 
firms’ resources, claims on these resources and any expected changes to these resources. 
Thus, the argument behind decision usefulness theory is very much in line with the 
objective set by the FASB as it states that  effective financial reporting should offer 
useful information for decision making from the investors point of view (Hooks and van 
Staden, 2004): this means information should be reliable, relevant, and timely (Al-
Hababseh, 2016).  Useful information according to Edvinsson and Malone, (1997) is that 
information that helps the information’s users to understand the difference between the 
book value and market value. Furthermore, decision usefulness theory  facilitates the 
understanding and gives insights into the usefulness of disclosures made by firms, which 
are also is contingent on many factors e.g. (context, industry, geographical and political 
context etc.,)  
Decision usefulness theory, to some extent, overlaps with signalling theory on the point 
of quality of information and with stakeholder theory and legitimacy theory in terms of 
considering the surrounding work environment and the relating parties need for 
information that facilitates their interaction with the firm (Ax & Marton 2008). However, 
this is not a strange or odd conclusion. Most theories used to explain  voluntary 
disclosure (Agency, Stakeholders, Stewardship, signalling … etc.) have more similarities 
than differences. Differentiation between them or choosing one rather than the rest of 
theories depends on the context of the study, and the discovered motivation of the 
phenomenon.   
3.2.8 Legitimacy Theory 
Legitimacy theory suggests that companies operate within a social and geographical 
boundary and  must obey the social contract that organises its relationship with the 
components in the neighbouring environment (Deegan 2002). Business firms have no 
interests engaging in any kind of conflict with the social environment as long as it is not 
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jeopardising its survival. Thus, we find that companies voluntarily share all the 
information that supports its image as a good citizen and proof its good deeds within its 
social boundaries. Legitimacy theory can to some extent explain the firms’ motivations 
to disclose some sorts of IC items - for example social connectedness, training of 
employees, establishment of apprenticeships, opportunities for the local communities to 
benefit from its infrastructure etc.: these all aid its appearance  as legitimate in the eyes 
of the surrounding society and help to avoid any possible conflict  arising from claims of 
illegitimacy (Guthrie & Boedker 2006). However,  IC can be a source of the legitimacy 
for companies ,especially when it comes in form of society-friendly operations e.g. 
creating new jobs, engaging surrounding academic and research entities in the 
companies’ RD activities and educational partnerships, especially in offering vocational 
training and professional internship opportunities: all of which allows the firm to build 
up its social and relational capital,  in addition to promoting its image as a good citizen 
and cooperative member of society.         
3.2.9 Stakeholders Theory  
Stakeholder theory is considered one of the key theories for accountability and CG 
(Solomon, 2010). Under stakeholder theory the general assumptions it posits is that the 
firm of business operates within a complicated multi-party environment, engages with 
this environment operations (Cots 2011). These parties, which are called stakeholders, 
are either affected by or affecting the business (Deegan 2009) Accordingly, companies 
will disclose information voluntarily to address the outside stakeholder’s concerns and 
to encourage their engagement in its different activities (Michelon & Parbonetti 2012).   
Each category of  stakeholders has their unique expectations from the business firms; 
for example, shareholders want continuous growth of wealth, governmental departments 
want  compliance, and the analyst wants information that facilitate their forecast and 
analysis. Accordingly the information requirements are varied and under the premises of 
stakeholder theory the companies are expected to satisfy all these information needs. In 
addition, companies communicate a different type of information via its annual reports 
to address a different type of stakeholders and in response to a varied and wide range of 
needs for information. Moreover, companies that adopt a responsive disclosure policy 
may find themselves in better communicative position which result in a better mental 
image and the ability to be more competitive than companies that  neglect stakeholders’ 
claims for information.     
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3.2.10 Political Cost Theory  
Companies operate under political pressure from different parties including but not 
limited to tax agencies, municipal and federal administrative agencies, environmentalists, 
labour unions and supervisory, regulatory and licensing bodies. Hence, under the 
premises of the political cost theory managers will report information voluntary to satisfy 
the regulators and governmental agencies or any other public sectors needs for 
information and to avoid the political cost of inspections form supervisory agencies or 
the political cost associated with disputes with environmental and labour activists 
(Rodrigues 2005). In addition, companies disseminate discretionary information to avoid 
governmental actions, or to benefit from incentives that government offers for 
transparent firms: this could be tax incentives, public subsidies or sometimes merely eo 
avoid public displeasure: this suggests that political and regulatory incentives will 
motivate and enhance voluntary disclosure (Healy & Palepu 2001; Suzuki 2005).  
3.2.11 Proprietary Cost Theory  
This theory postulates that managers on certain occasions try to hide information because 
they think that releasing that information to the public may harm their firms (Healy & 
Palepu 2001). However, this theory is sometimes, according to Julie et al., (2011), used to 
explain management behaviour in voluntary disclosure about non-financial sensitive 
information e.g. new products or future expansion plans. This kind of disclosure will be 
subject to the management’s perceptions and estimation of potential benefits of the 
disclosure; an example would be facilitating the access to equity capital or creditors 
assessment to lend the disclosing entity credit facilities (Botosan, 1997). The 
favourableness of the information will play a crucial role in incentivising or 
disincentivising the executive management to voluntary disclosure. Thus, the proprietary 
costs theory posits that  good news is more likely to be more disclosed by managers ,as this 
will pass information that will not affect their privileged position in relation to the 
informed party or will not harm their competitive advantage (Healy & Palepu 2001; 
William 1994). Another explanation for  voluntary disclosure under the proprietary cost 
assumption is that the company will find itself needing to disclose information if  peer 
companies in the market have disclosed such information; this is especially true when it 
comes to sensitive types of information i.e. new products, patents, and new market entry 
etc.,  (Healy & Palepu 2001; Singh & Mitchell Van der Zahn 2008; La Rosa & Liberatore 
2014). 
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Table 3.1 Theories Comaprison 
Theory 
 
Notion Targeted Audiences  
Agency Theory  Principal-Agent Relationship Share-holders 
Debit-holders 
Other interested parties like 
government, regulators etc.,  
Positive Accounting 
Theory  
Set of contracts between of the 
owners and the executive 
management  
Stakeholders  
Stakeholders theory  Accountability and putting 
executive management against 
responsibility  
Companies wide range of stakeholders 
(Employees, tax department, analyst)  
Signalling Theory  Information asymmetry  
Communicating Success   
Market 
Legitimacy Theory  Social contract between the 
company and the society  
Firm’s citizenship 
Society as whole  
Stewardship Theory  Benefits and goals alignment 
between management and 
owners 
Owners and potential investors  
Impression 
Management 
Control the audiences’ 
impressions by hiding bad 
news and highlighting good 
news  
Information users  
Decision Usefulness 
Theory 
Firms should provide 
information to that timely 
Information users 
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 reliable and useful for decision 
makers.   
Resource Dependency 
Theory  
How the external resources of 
organizations affect the 
behaviour of the organization. 
Other Organizations   
Political cost theory Compliance with regulators 
requirements  
Governmental and tax agencies  
  
Proprietary cost 
theory 
Cost-benefit analysis of 
disclosure 
Market  
 
3.3 Theoretical Perspective of the Intellectual Capital Disclosure 
A researcher can not assume one direction for the relationship or the driver of the ICD.  It is a 
debatable and multi-faceted issue, involving many determinants, relationships and many engaging 
parties. This study approachs the ICD as a dependent variable while the independent variable is 
basically the corporate governance (board structure, management structure and ownership 
structure). Hence, the basic theoretical foundation for the relationship between the study variables 
is agency theory. However, due to the overlap between theories and conflicts of interpretations, 
some researchers may suggest other theories to explain the motivation and determinants of 
voluntary disclosure: currently there is no consensus among researchers concerning one 
comprehensive theoretical framework to explain the disclosure phenomenon.     
Regarding the Intellectual Capital Disclosure, the situation is the same: there is a no consensus 
between the scholars on one theory or certain theoretical framework to explain this phenomenon 
(An et al. 2011).  Thus, An, et al., (2011) have introduced a suggested theoretical framework to 
explain the motivation of the ICD.  
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Figure 3.1 Suggested framework for ICD. 
Credit to (An et al. 2011) 
Hence, An et al., (2011) as mentioned before assumed that these four theories are complementing 
and supporting each other rather conflicting in explaining corporate behaviour in voluntarily 
sharing information about its IC. However, An et al., have suggested that this framework can not be 
completely perfect to interpret the ICD. Thus, they suggested that more theories could be 
empirically tested to further development of a comprehensive theoretical framework to ICD.   
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3.4 Summary 
This chapter has discussed the theoretical framework for the study and presented all conflicting 
theories in the area of voluntary disclosure.  
Many theories are suggested by accounting literature to explain a firms’ voluntary disclosure 
motivations and its disclosure choices. These theories include, but are not limited to,  agency 
theory, signalling theory, stewardship theory, resource dependency theory, decision usefulness 
theory, legitimacy theory, stakeholders theory, political cost theory, and proprietary cost 
theory.  
 The current chapter presented some suggested theoretical frameworks in literature for the sake 
of understanding and explaining the firms’ behaviour when they practice ICD. Furthermore, 
this chapter presented a clear definition of the research variables and how they will be 
empirically measured as well as the control variables and why they are incorporated into the 
current research model. 
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4 Literature Review    
4.1 Introduction  
Companies’ value maximization goal encourages companies to disclose more information to 
stakeholders (Jenesn, 2002). Hence, companies tend to voluntary disseminate information about its 
leadership, sustained competitiveness and it’s various aspects of performance to satisfy the 
different stakeholders’ needs for information, to signal the market,  and to enhance its ability to 
reach capital (Mangena et al. 2016; Li, Jing and Mangena 2014; Abdulkarim, 2012). This motivates  
companies to disclose information about their financial as well as non-financial assets, as that will 
improve the understanding of organizational performance perceived by audiences in markets 
(Mouritsen et al, 2004). Within this scope and according to Petty et al. (2008) financial information 
users still ask for higher levels of transparency because respondents think that the disclosure about 
IC can be very rewarding for the companies in terms of market value (stock price in the financial 
market) (Shalev 2009). Management, in order to reduce the agency cost, try to disclose more 
information about  operations, projects, future plans, and financial and nonfinancial activities. 
(Watson et al, 2002). In addition,  promoting the firm’s reputation in transparency,  will reduce the 
cost of capital. (Beattie & Smith 2012). 
This chapter considers the prior studies in the field of ICD and  discusses the relevant literature to 
this topic; it provides a critical review to the existing literature dealing with examining the 
relationship between the CG and the ICD.  
 
4.2 Prior studies 
4.2.1 Intellectual Capital; the concept and the measurements 
Intellectual capital comes with a high importance for business success, growth and long-term 
sustainability (Squicciarini & Voigtla 2015) and (Su, 2014). In addition, it gives the firms the 
momentum and energy to compete in the market (Bratianu & Orzea 2013). It is also considered a 
key value driver and strategic element to enhancing the competitiveness of the companies (Lerro & 
Schiuma 2013). Mouritsen & Roslender (2009) indicated that IC leads to development of new 
positive relationships between  staff, customers, technologies and the organization itself. Likewise, 
Murthy & Mouritsen (2011) in their case study of an Australian Bank (Bank of New South Wales) 
studied the relationship between the IC and financial capital. They find that IC has a positive 
impact on  financial capital and on the bank’s value as a whole. In addition, they find that the 
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investment in human capital results in the development of  organizational and relational capital and 
the other components of IC. IC is increasingly attractive field for academic and professional studies 
from different angles.  Many studies have addressed the subject of  Intellectual Capital either as a 
concept of intellectual capital, how it recognised within firms and the attempts to theorise the ICD 
e.g. (Guthrie, 2001, Edvisson and Malone 1997, and Kaplan and Norton 1992). Those in the early 
stages of IC research dealt with  IC as a concept, and its components were identified according to 
(Edvinsson 1997; Edvinsson & Sullivan 1996). Intellectual capital was defined as knowledge, 
properties and intellectual materials that have been obtained and leveraged by the entities. This was 
to produce more assets or to increase  value, (Lerro et al. 2014). According to these studies IC 
divided: firstly, into human capital, which included staff competences, capabilities, expertise, 
skills, and/or expertise that could be used by the entities to generate competitive advantages or 
deliver products and secondly, structural capital: this consists of policies, procedures, systems, 
infrastructures and/or patents that can be transformed into value. 
Sveiby (1997) (P. 9-11) provides a similar definition for  IC with one extra subcategory in which he 
defines IC as all intangible assets that enable the firm to achieve its goals: this includes three sub-
categories: employees’ competencies (Human Capital), internal structure which include polices, 
concepts, patents, administrative and technological infrastructures. Finally, the external structure 
which is identified as the relationships with customers, suppliers, and providers that affect the 
firm’s image and reputation in market. In addition, some professional and standards setting bodies 
introduced definitions for IC and its categories or components e.g. (OECD 1999) and (CIMA 
2003): they offered a generic definitions in addition to the one provided by IIRC (2012) for the IC. 
Quoting those definitions here provides a clear image of how the professional bodies and standards 
setters understand the IC: 
According to OECD (1999)“ “Intellectual capital” is of substantial and growing importance in 
innovation and productivity growth, enterprise competitiveness and economic performance. 
Intellectual capital comprises a number of components, including R&D, technology and 
intellectual property rights; human resources; organisational and workplace structure; 
marketing, customer and supplier networks; and software.” What we can learn from the above-
mentioned definition from a professional internationally-active body for spreading guidelines for 
the best practices, is the emphasis placed on the role of IC in productivity and growth. This is 
understandable as the organization itself (OECD) is devoted to raising awareness and helping 
nations especially less developed ones to grow. Hence, OECD divides IC into two  categories: - 
1. Organisational capital where they place structural capital under the umbrella of 
organisational capital;  
2. Human capital. 
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CIMA (2003) also offered a comprehensive definition for the IC: as the proprietorship of 
knowledge, practical experience, technologies, customer’s relations and specialised skills that 
provide the firm with a competitive advantage in the market. This broad concept of IC is further 
classified into three sub-categories of capitals: 
Human Capital: this is presented by CIMA as all intellectualities implied by the staff of the firm 
that leave it at the end of the working day. This includes all skills, experiences, tacit knowledge, 
professional training, creativity, innovation, staff loyalty, management competences and all 
attributes relating to good quality employees.  
Relational Capital: all useful resources that connected to external parties with whom firms have a 
relationship. This include customers, suppliers, research and development partners, and indirectly 
all relations that exist by dealing with these parties e.g. reputation, a firm’s mental image and the 
loyalty of customers.  
Organizational Capital: this is introduced as the tacit knowledge, which stays at the firm at the 
end of the working day, and includes systems, plans, IT infrastructures, copyrights, intellectual 
properties e.g. patents, franchises and trademarks. 
All the shown definitions are reliable as they are issued by International professional bodies. And 
give a clear picture and comprehensive understanding about IC, its components, and categories.   
A notable amount of research recognized the measurements, managements and recognition of the 
IC e.g. (Guthrie & Petty 2000; Tangles et al, 2007; Striukova et al. 2008; Zéghal & Maaloul 2011; 
and Wyatt 2008). This stage of study described as  “the ostensive” stage; according to (Mouritsen 
2006) or the first stage of IC research according to (Dumay & Garanina 2013). This stage is 
characterised by emphasise on the measurements and accounting treatment of the IC to generalise 
the findings to the other organisations (Cuozzo et al. 2017). In addition, it expatiated the 
determinants of ICD and practices associated with reporting IC items, e.g. (Beretta & Bozzolan 
2008; García-meca et al. 2005; Bellora & Guenther 2013). To measure IC many models have been 
presented and the following part will give a brief description of the most common: 
Skandia Navigator: Skandia is a Swedish assurance and financial services firm with multi-arm, 
sophisticated and high-risk business activities including general insurance, life insurance, pension 
and mutual funds management, hedging and investments management. Skandia, founded in 1885, 
was the first ever company to establish an independent department to assess, measure and report to 
the management the IC within the company. This was in a very early stage during the period from 
the late 1980s to early 1990s (Edvinsson 1997). The Skandia navigator model in measuring IC, 
groups the intellectual items into two main groups. The first group is  Human Resources which 
includes, knowledge, know-how, skills, and collective abilities to serve the customers or to solve 
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their problems. These can be evaluated according to its participation in generating income for the 
firm.  The second group is Intellectual Assets which includes, patents, productivity, policies, 
procedures, systems, software, computerised processes and knowledge stored in electronic devices 
or in written form. Evaluation of these items is based on their commercialisation value (Edvinsson 
& Sullivan 1996). The Skandia model shows the relationship between the tangible and intangible 
assets as a house where  today’s inputs (human capital) fuels the development of tomorrow. The 
figure below summarises the assumed relationships under Skandia model: 
 
Figure 4.1 Skandia Model. 
The source is Edvisson, 1997. 
 
Balance Scorecard: This measurement method belongs to the performance based measuring 
group. It was developed by Robert Kaplan and David Norton in 1992 for processes re-
engineering; the balance scorecard has many applications and one of these applications is  IC 
measurement and reporting (CIMA 2003). The balance scorecard takes into account both 
financial and non-financial measures to evaluate the progress of performance of the firm and 
its subunits (Bose & Thomas 2007). The evaluation of IC using the balance scorecard 
methodology will be on both a strategic level (the growth aspects e.g. market share, assets, 
goodwill …etc.) or on short-term aspect eg. ROI, ROE, (Sydler et al. 2014).  
 
Ericson Cockpit: Ericson is a Swedish telecommunication company and it has developed a 
special version of the balance scorecard to measure and report its IC (CIMA 2003). Their 
51 
 
model was customised to five groups of IC items which are: innovation, 
employee, process, customers and finance. Thus, Ericson’s model in IC measurement is 
affected by the company paradigm as a cutting-edge technology and communication firm:  the 
model is web-based and run on a top-down system i.e. starting from corporate vision and log-
run strategy then moving down to the executive procedures that intend to actualise these 
visons and strategies taking in consideration all the KPIs and key success factors (Gogan et al. 
2014).  
 
Market to Book Value: This model is the easiest and simplest one, and the most used by 
investors and analysts, as it simply refers the value of IC as the difference between the book 
value and the market value as the difference will attributed to the intangible assets and other 
intellectuals.  A very much similar model developed by James Tobin known “Tobin’s q” 
where instead of taking the difference between the book and market values, Tobin’s q takes 
the percentage of the difference to the replacement value of the assets (CIMA 2003). 
 
Benchmarking: was introduced to give a competitive edge for the companies’ IC needs to be 
measured and analysed in the context of comparison with rival companies (Sydler et al. 2014). 
Thus, under this model the IC items are evaluated based on comparing the firm’s IC to 
outstanding practices offered by peer companies anywhere  around the globe  (Marr 2004).  
 
IC index:  this model relies on the idea of dividing and grouping the IC items into main value 
drives. Then these groups are evaluated based on their ability to create value for the firm 
(Grimaldi et al. 2013). The figure below summarises the IC index model hierarchy to measure 
the value of each of the aspects in IC. 
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Figure 4.2 Intellectual Capital Index 
 Grimaldi et al. (2013) 
The second stage of IC research focuses on the benefits of IC to business, including its role in value 
creation to business and its role in enhancing firm’s performance. This stage which according to 
Mouritsen (2006) is the “performative” stage or the second stage of IC research according to 
(Guthrie et al. 2012; Dumay 2014b).   
The third stage of studying IC is the critical approach (Dumay & Garanina 2013). This stage began 
to evolve when a stream of researchers started to think beyond the barriers of grand theories15 and 
accounting treatment or measurement and started digging deeper towards exploring the way firms 
practiced or utilized these resources to create value. Also, this stage is characterised by offering 
critique of the previous mainstream literature in the IC field (Schaper 2016; Chiucchi & Dumay 
2015; Dumay 2014a; Marzo 2014; Baboukardos & Rimmel 2014). Moreover, according to Dumay 
(2012) researchers in this stage have to dirty their hands in practice and not keep looking down to 
the concept from their academic ivory-tower.   
On a separate note, the importance of  IC for the business firms has been well-identified in the 
literature. As such, (Burgman & Roos 2007) highlighted the importance of  ICD for companies and 
                                               
15 According to (Dumay 2012) there are two main grand theories in IC the first is the book to market value as 
indicator of the IC value. And the second is how the ICD participates to increase in profitability. Dumay’s 
point of view. These two theories are not empirically proved. Thus, the research must be critical to these 
theories.   
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for communities, as providing leadership and advancement mechanisms for the companies and 
facilitating transparency and enhancing the decision making process for  investors and other 
stakeholders. Henceforth, they suggested that  ICD should become mandatory and a prerequisite 
for listing in European countries. Further, reporting on IC can positively help in giving a full 
picture for the business’s real value and the potential growth opportunities. (Guthrie et al. 2007). 
Additionally, Sullivan (1999) assumed that IC participates in firm’s goals actualization effectively 
and on a timely basis. Thus, IC becomes a profitable investment for the firm as well as giving the 
firm abilities to benefit from its investments in intangible assets or intellectuals in two dimensions. 
The first one is in value creation: as according to this study, firms can utilise the existing intangible 
assets to provide new knowledge and provide new technologies, and commercial and business 
solutions. The second dimension is value extraction which refers to an enhancement of proficiency 
and effectiveness that will enable the companies to convert those intellectual properties into cash. 
Other researchers tried to introduce acceptable framework for studying the IC e.g. (Petty & Guthrie 
2000; Abeysekera 2006; An et al. 2011; Vlismas & Venieris 2011). Unfortunately, the previous 
efforts failed to reach a consensus or introducing a united theoretical framework to study IC and 
this would encourage more studies in this aspect. 
Connecting the IC with the firm’s performance was also examined in different contexts, e.g. 
(Vishnu & Gupta 2014; Sydler et al. 2014; Lu et al. 2014; Sharabati 2013; Sharabati et al. 2010; 
Mouritsen 1998). Vishnu & Gupta, (2014) studied the IC and Performance in pharmaceutical firms 
in India and they concluded that there is a positive relationship between the performance proxied 
by (ROA) and the ICD in pharmaceutical industry. Sydler et al (2014) conducted their study in 
Europe and found a positive relationship between  IC and performance: and this was also the case 
with the remaining studies. Moreover, normally higher levels of intellectual capital within the 
companies are associated with better performance, lower costs of production and higher financial 
efficiency. This will encourage companies to report more information about its IC within its annual 
report to emphasise this role of  IC and to draw the attention of the information users for this in 
order to reflect this in the market value, (Melloni 2015; Anwar 2014) Chen et al, (2005), applied 
the value added intellectual coefficient (VAIC) technique and developed a regression model to 
examine the relationship between the IC and a firm’s market value and its financial performance 
using a sample from Taiwanese listed companies. Their results indicated a positive relationship 
between the IC and the market value of the firms and its financial performance. A very interesting 
point raised by Alcaniz et al. (2011)  suggesting that  IC, as a set of resource,s needs to be properly 
managed not only of the firm’s  business levels but on the wider level of macroeconomics. As 
according to their study the development of  IC is heavily dependent on the regulatory environment 
and technological and educational infrastructure which in turn rely on the state collective effort to 
offer such environment or infrastructures.  Similarly, (Handzic et al. 2016) examined the 
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relationships between  intellectual capital and the business success. The have surveyed 603 project 
managers for this purpose. They found that there is a positive effect for  IC on business success in 
different ways: in terms of processes they found it become more efficient and timely. Staff were 
also affected by enhancing the team-work and knowledge sharing. And finally, the customers were 
also positively affected by IC as they found that an increase in IC will bring more value to 
customers: in the form of better products or services or as better support for  commercial activities.  
4.3 Intellectual Capital Disclosure (ICD) 
ICD is a very important focus to tackle the ambiguity that surrounds  intangible assets. According 
to the current IFRS most intellectual capital items are invisible in  financial statements; this 
intensifies the problem of information asymmetry (Yu et al. 2017; Alcaniz et al. 2011). Recently, 
(Dumay 2016) has distinguished between two separate terms; IC disclosure and IC reporting. 
According to that study “the revelation of information that was previously secret or unknown 
“while reporting is a “detailed periodic account of a company’s activities, financial 
condition, and prospects that is made available to shareholders and investors”.   
The first documented corporate disclosure about the IC was in the Swedish corporation Skandia;  in 
the early 1990s it started to release its IC statement that covers its human capital and intangible 
resources (Edvinsson 1997). Voluntary disclosure literature has documented many benefits for 
ICD. This include lowering the cost of capital (Botosan, 1997). Also, ICD is found to  directly 
affect the perceived risk by external auditors (Demartini & Trucco 2016) as according to their 
comparative study of a sample of  191 listed companies (164 UK companies and 27 Italian 
companies) they found that the audit risk assigned by external auditors indicated by the audit fees is 
lower in the case of  companies that have a higher ICD level. ICD is voluntary as it is not required 
by either IFRS or regulations, apart from South Africa where the IR is a listing requirement and 
under the <IR> the company needs to provide information about  all its capitals including IC. 
However, it is worth mentioning that Dumay & Guthrie (2017)  provide another type of 
information which is not mandatory nor voluntary, they call it “involuntary disclosure”.  This type 
of disclosure is the information that is provided or triggered by outer-parties i.e. either stakeholders 
(employees unions) or stake-seekers  (rating agencies).  
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4.4 Determinants of Intellectual Capital Disclosure in the annual 
reports 
A few studies have explored the determinants of voluntary disclosure generally (Raffournier 1995) 
and likewise there are studies dedicated to examining the determinants of IC voluntary disclosure, 
these studies have examined the conditions and factors that are expected to direct voluntary 
disclosure behaviour and to explain why companies disclose IC despite it  not being mandatory. 
The following section will summarise the relating prior studies that have explored or examined the 
determinants of  ICD but not the CG factors:  this will be discussed in independent part later.   
Many reasons can motivate  companies to voluntarily disseminate information about  IC. One 
reason is to bridge the information asymmetry between the insiders and other information users. 
Other reasons may be to access capital and/or credit facilities, or to legitimise its business within 
the social boundaries which reflects positively on the relations with employees and other  
stakeholders. Finally, disclosure can be a marketing tool to either signal the market, or to provide 
the reassurance to the existing customers or affecting its share market value.  
A study by Brüggen et al. (2009) in a sample of 126 Australian  companies to explore the factors 
affecting  voluntary ICD using content analysis methodology they examined four factors:industry, 
size, leverage, and information asymmetry16. In that study the researchers  found that  out of the 
examined parameters only the industry type and the size have a direct positive effect on  ICD.  
Sudibyo & Basuki (2017) examined the determinants of ICD within Indonesian listed companies 
using the same methodology (content analysis). They empirically tested the effect of industry, 
company size, profitability and market capitalization; this study also found that the factors which 
have a significant effect on the ICD are the industry type, the firm size and market capitalisation. 
Moreover, Al-hamadeen & Swaidan (2014) have explored the effect of some determinants (size, 
profitability, leverage, company age, ownership structure, and audit firm size) on the ICD. They 
have used content analysis to extract information from the annual reports of 60 Jordanian 
manufacturing companies listed in the ASE. Based on their test they have concluded that firm’s 
size, capital structure, profitability, ownership concentration, institutional ownership, company’s 
age, and the auditor’s type have a significant effect on  ICD. A meta-analysis study by (Eddine et 
al. 2015) to explore 19 published papers from ICD literature to assess the effect of  certain items on  
ICD: the  items which were covered in their study were namely profitability, size, age, leverage, 
and industry type.  They  found that the factors that affect ICD are size, profitability and industry.  
                                               
16 Information asymmetry, indicating the shares that are not owned by the top twenty shareholders of a 
company’s capital.  
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4.5 Intellectual Capital Disclosure Patterns 
Studying phenomena patterns will help to understand that phenomena, its components and what is 
actual happens in the practice concerning that phenomena. Also it will help in identifying the 
categories, trends and the directions of that phenomena (Schwindenhammer 2013). A few prior 
studies examined the patterns of  ICD e.g. (Andr, Paul, Andrei Filip 2016; Wagiciengo & Belal 
2012; Kvaal & Nobes 2012): these studies tried to describe the patterns of ICD in different contexts 
based on data collected from different industries. However, studying the patterns of a certain 
phenomenon is a detailed comparative analysis that focuses on describing its forms, categories, 
contents, components, trends and developments, regularities among these components/categories 
and trying to draw a conclusion about its importance, role and the expected future of that 
phenomena.   
Identifying  IC in the accounting and financial context as the available resources started with the 
efforts of Skandia in very early of 1990s which is agreed among the pioneering researchers in the 
IC field e.g. (Sveiby 1997; Edvinsson & Sullivan 1996). Sullivan (1999) identified two general 
patterns of IC that companies which benefited from them would share in information: these two 
broad categories are  Human-based capital and  Paper-based capital. According to his model, 
firms will be interested in externally reporting information about these resources to serve the 
strategic goals of value creation and value extraction. The OECD report (1999) has used the term 
intangible to refer to IC. The report emphasised the importance of comprehensive reporting of 
information about IC in companies:  a lack of this information would be risky to both insiders and 
the outside parties. For the inside parties, including the management, insufficient information about  
IC will lead to uninformed or distorted decisions and poor planning in the long run.For outside 
parties the lack of, or insufficient information about IC can be a source of distortion for  public 
policy makers and inaccurate evaluation from  analysts.  According to the report, the shortage of 
information about the IC will affect the proper evaluation of the  fixed assets. Guthrie & Petty 
(2000) examined the patterns of  ICD in  annual reports among the Australian companies. They 
have adopted the OECD framework for reporting IC items. The data they have collected related to 
the 19 largest Australian companies and by analysing the contents of these companies’ annual 
reports, they have found that the items reported by the sample covers the broad three categories of  
IC. These are the Structural capital and they  identify eleven items within this category:  the most 
reported item was “the management processes” and the least reported was the “IC infrastructure”. 
Likewise, with the Customer capital where they counted nine items within this strand and  found 
that the most reported item within this strand was “Customers” and the least reported items were 
“the franchises and favourable agreements”. Finally, they have observed seven items under the 
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human capital strand. The most reported item was the “entrepreneurial spirit within the staff” and 
the least reported item was the “vocational training”.   
Bontis (2002) has led a UN supported mission to explore and evaluate IC in the Arab region to 
develop an index for national IC in the Arab countries. That report has identified the following 
items of national intellectual capital among the (21)17 Arab countries that were covered in that 
survey.  
He has identified the following categories of the IC: 
1- Human Capital: this include individuals’ competencies, education, knowledge, team-work, 
and communication skills. 
2- Process Capital: this includes IT, IT infrastructures, information and communication 
systems, laboratories, databases, software and hardware, organisational structures, and 
embedded knowledge including written policies.  
3- Market Capital: this includes “the intellectual capital embedded in national intra-
relationships. Market capital represents a country’s capabilities and successes in 
providing an attractive, competitive solution to the needs of its international clients, as 
compared with other countries. A country’s investment and achievements in foreign 
relations, coupled with its exports of quality products and services, constitute a significant 
component in its development of market capital, which is rich in intangible assets” 
However, despite the above report being designed to provide guidelines for the policy maker on the 
governmental level, it can still give us an insightful look into  IC patterns and components on the 
pan-Arab countries level. According to that report, Jordan and Kuwait held the highest levels of 
national IC. Jordan and Egypt were doing the best in terms of growth in the national IC.  In 
Portugal, (Branco et al. 2010)  examined  ICD patterns within the annual reports of 24 companies 
listed in the Lisbon stock exchange (Euronext) over a period of three years. They found that for 
Portuguese companies focusing most on the human capital and within human capital, the most 
reported item was  training. The second reported IC category was  external capital  focussed on  
customers, consumers and certification. The internal structure capital came in the third place and 
the most frequently reported item was the information systems.  
A study by (Abeysekera & Guthrie 2005) to examine the patterns and the trends of the ICD among 
the listed companies on the Colombo Stock Exchange, Siri Lanka over the period 1998/1999 to 
1999/2000  have found that an increasing trend in the level of IC information in  corporate annual 
                                               
17 These countries are: Algeria, Bahrain, Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, 
Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Palestine, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, UAE, Yemen.   
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reports over the study period. Moreover, they  found that the focus of information is on  external 
capital followed by  human capital and lastly  internal structural capital.  Among the external 
capital items the brand building was the most reported item followed by  corporate image. On the 
other hand, the “employees’ relations” was the most reported item among the human capital 
category. Regarding the internal structural capital components, the concentration was on the 
internal processes as it was the most reported item, followed by the information systems, IT 
infrastructures and management philosophy.  In the UK (Striukova et al. 2008) also have examined 
the patterns of the ICD by connecting the ICD practices to a certain corporate characteristics. They 
found that  larger firms provide a higher level and better quality disclosures. Retailer companies 
and pharmaceuticals were the top sectors in terms of level of disclosure. Retail companies obvious 
focus of disclosure was on relational capital items while pharmaceutical, software/IT companies 
were almost having a balance of information across all three IC subcategories.  
In the emerging markets context a study by Singh & Kansal (2011) conducted over a sample of 20 
pharmaceutical fully listed companies in India, they  concluded that the pharmaceutical sector in 
India is not keen on sharing IC information in the annual report and this conclusion was based on 
the low average score for the selected sample. According to their scale  the average score was 18%. 
However, the ranking of the sub-categories of  IC placed the relational capital first,  human capital 
was the second and the last was the structural capital.  Disclosure was narrative in nature and  
numbers and figures were rarely presented in the annual reports. The previous humble ICD profile 
for Indian corporations is also supported by another study within the Indian context but focusing on 
identifying the ICD patterns within the IT sector companies. The study was conducted by Bhasin 
(2009); he applied his examination on 16 IT listed companies to find that only 18 items of IC were 
reported in the selected sample annual reports. The most reported category was  human capital and 
the most frequent item within this category was the number of employees. The second was  
structural capital and within  structural capital  business knowledge was the most reported item. 
Finally, he concluded that  ICD among the Indian IT companies was weak, partial and negligible.  
In the New Zealander context De Silva et al. (2014), in their 10 year longitudinal study of  ICD 
patterns, examined  intellectual capital reporting of five traditional product-based companies and 
five knowledge intensive companies all listed on the New Zealander Stock Exchange; the study 
was based on data extracted from the corporates annual reports and the supplementary reports 
(Semi-annual reports, press releases etc.,). They  found that ICD covered each of the three 
categories: human capital, external capital, and internal capital. Also, they  found that  internal 
capital was mostly reported in a general and discursive way. Numerical and monetary information 
were associated with the internal capital items like brands and business partnerships. While the 
human capital items were covered in qualitative information mostly. They  noticed that the range of 
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items reported  increased over time during the study period. However, they did not find differences 
in disclosures patterns between the two types of firms (traditional and knowledge based) which 
indicates no industry effect on the ICD in New Zealand.  
Recently, a study by Giacosa et al. (2017)  explored  ICD practices within Italian firms: they  found 
that there are mainly three channels for ICD: the traditional (annual reports and periodic and term 
bases reports), websites and modern disclosure channels (social media e.g.(Facebook and twitter) 
and professional networks e.g. (LinkedIn and Quora ). Moreover, they found that there is no 
conflict in the contents of any of these disclosures; however they did find that  websites offer more 
timely information for the investors and that annual reports remain the essential source of 
information for the investors and the analysts. Social media disclosure is participating in 
connecting the audience to the company and building a modern interactive relationship between the 
companies and their stakeholders.  
Another Inter-European study, has analysed the typology of IC  based on a survey covering five 
European countries divided into two groups: firstly, developed and long established market 
economies which  included Italy, Finland, Spain and secondly, developing and moving toward the 
free-economy with a long-centralised economy heritage. That study which was conducted by 
Inkinen et al., (2017) surprisingly, reported that, subtle differences between the perceptions of the 
IC categories among the respondents. A special feature of the Finnish IC construct was the treating 
of  Trust Capital (TC) as a component of IC. TC which is referred to as stakeholders’ attitudes 
toward the firm which are established based on assumptions that the firm will act and behave in 
their best interests and will not do them any harm. Another interesting feature of IC was discovered 
in the responses  from Serbia: this is the Entrepreneurial Capital (EC) defined as managerial 
behaviour taking the initiative and starting change for a better situation. They explain that occuring 
within the Serbian context as the country is moving speedily to the free market model and thereby 
fulfil the requirements of full membership of the European Union (EU).  Moreover, the researchers 
introduced the concept of super-culture which referres to the set of perceptions, beliefs, attitudes, 
values, and general accepted set of norms and behaviours in certain society. This will affect the 
institutional/organisational perception to the IC model. This indicate a kind of structural and 
configurational differences in IC among the countries based on cultural and soci-political 
differences.      
4.6 Corporate Governance and Intellectual Capital Disclosure 
Studies reporting  the determinants of  ICD level and quality are rare; they are even fewer when it 
comes to examining the effect of CG on the ICD (Baldini & Liberatore 2016). Even though it is 
indicated in the literature that there is a linkage between corporate governance mechanisms and 
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ICD (Bellora & Guenther 2013; Abeysekera 2010). For instance, Rodrigues & cia Lima (2017) 
have examined the influence of boards of directors on listed companies' voluntary disclosure of 
information concerning intellectual capital. They have studied the annual reports of 15 listed 
Portuguese companies over a period of five years, using content analysis and  regression 
techniques. They  found that  ICD  increases with company size, dual corporate governance 
models, industry, listing on sustainability indexes and increases in board size up to a maximum 
point (beyond which disclosures decrease). ICD are reduced by CEO duality and by a higher 
proportion of independent directors on boards. Likewise, Li et al. (2008) studied the relationship 
between CG variables (board independence, role duality, and ownership concentration) and Audit 
Committee characteristics (size, frequency of meetings) on the levels of ICD among firms listed in 
London Stock exchange. They found a positive relationship between all these variables and ICD 
except for CEO duality.  
 Ho & Williams (2003), conducted a comparative international study to examine the efficiency of 
the value added by firms from physical capital and intellectual capital resources. Capturing the data 
from annual reports for listed companies in three different countries [UK 108, Sweden 94 and 
South Africa (SA) 84] they then applied multiple regression tests to examine the relationship 
between the Governance features and the performance indicators (physical and intellectual capital). 
Their results showed that there is some significant association between the board features and 
corporate performance but not consistently in the three countries. Likewise, Hidalgo et al (2011) in 
a study examining the influence of corporate governance on IC, considered the effect of board size, 
board independence, role duality, insider’s ownership, ownership concentration and institutional 
ownership, building on  agency theory premises to test the relationship between the corporate 
governance mechanisms and the ICD. The results show that board size has a positive and 
significant impact on the disclosure of intellectual capital. In addition, Li et al. (2012), concluded 
that the “Audit Committee” influences the extent of firms ICD practices and reduce the acute 
information asymmetry associated with the value creation capabilities of IC assets. Fulikhatun et al 
(2011), empirically examined the effect of the corporate governance proxied by: board size, 
ownership structure, management ownership and independent directors within the board and its 
impact on  ICD.  
Applying  regression analysis to test the data they captured a sample of the annual reports 
belonging to the banking sector operating in Malaysia; They concluded that based on the results of 
their study there is no evidences supporting the effect of  board size, institutional ownership and the 
independence of the directors on  ICD. Meanwhile, they found that  management ownership  
negatively affects the quantity of disclosed information about  Intellectual Capital items. Still 
within the Malaysian context, Taliyang et al. (2011) explored the relationship between  ICD and 
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the CG ((1) board composition, (2) role duality, (3) size of audit committee and (4) frequency 
meeting of audit committee.) They used the content analysis to collect relevant data from the 
annual reports of 150 Malaysian listed companies from five different sectors for one year (2009). 
They  found that only the frequency of the audit committee meetings positively affects  ICD: any 
effects from other governance mechanisms were not supported. This conclusion concerning the 
positive effect of the audit committee on the ICD is consistent with other researchers’ findings e.g. 
((Li et al. 2012; García-Meca & Martínez 2007; Cerbioni & Parbonetti 2007)). Furthermore, 
Hidalgo et al. (2011) They analysed the effect of internal mechanisms of  corporate governance 
(board of directors’ independence and ownership structure) on the voluntary disclosure about 
intangibles (intellectual assets) within a sample of Mexican companies. They found that there is a 
positive effect for the large board size on the amount of transparency that companies deliver. In 
addition, they found that large size for the board of directors enhances the surveillance role of the 
board. They also found that  ICD is positively affected by the existence of  institutional investors 
within the ownership structure. That was very interesting because the analysis was based on 
companies operating in a developing country (Mexico). On the other hand, in the context of 
developed countries and when considering biotechnological companies in six European countries, 
Cerbioni & Parbonetti (2007) investigated the impact of the board size, composition, and structure 
and CEO duality as elements of CG on type and amount ICD. They concluded that  CG plays an 
important role in orienting the amount of ICD provided by the European companies operating in 
the biotech sector. However, there is a negative association between  size and  role duality with 
levels of ICD. While the amount of IC information disseminated is positively relate only to the 
percentage of independent directors within the board. Likewise, Damayanti (2009), in his study of 
Islamic banks in Asia, examined the effect of ownership diffusion on  ICD, controlling for bank 
size, role duality, auditor and ROA. The researcher found that there is a positive effect for the 
diffused ownership on  ICD, he theoretically supported the idea that scattered ownership will put 
more pressure on the managements to disclose more information to the stockholders through the 
annual reports. This comes into line with the agency theory doctrines.  
Another study by Li et al. (2007), thexamined the relationship between  ICD in knowledge rich 
firms and the impact of market (Market-to-Book value, price volatility) and  governance (board 
composition, ownership structure, audit committee size and directors’ shareholding): the study was 
conducted over a sample of 100 listed companies in LSE. They used word-count technique to 
measure the quantity of the ICD and applying  OLS regression to test the relationship between  
ICD and the independent variables,  they concluded that there is no significant relationship between 
board composition and  ICD. However,  ownership concentration  negatively affects  ICD. In 
contrast,  large audit committees are associated with more ICD. Lim et al. (2007) conducted their 
study over 181 Australian listed companies, using a two-stage regression test to examine the 
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relationship between the board independence and the different types of voluntary disclosure. They 
concluded that there is a positive and significant relationship between the board of director’s 
composition and voluntary disclosure. An identical conclusion was reached by Abraham & Cox 
(2007). They examined the effect of the board independence on the risk disclosure in the annual 
reports for all UK Listed companies that have a listing in NYSE: they concluded that there is 
significant relationship between the board’s independence and the size of information disseminated 
in annual reports by companies in the study.  
In addition, Cheng & Courtenay (2006) studied the effect of non-executive independent directors 
within the board of directors and the voluntary disclosure.  A recent study published in this area 
was by Rodrigues, L. et al., (2016) who examined the effect of the dual CG model, board size, role 
duality, women within the board and board independence. They also used CA and pooled data 
regression to process the data of (15) Portuguese companies over a period of five years. Their 
findings proved that  IC disclosure is positively associated with a dual CG model and an increasing  
board size up to the maximum recommended number by the local CG code. Also they found that  
board independence and role duality  negatively affect the level of information disclosed about IC. 
Finally, they found that  gender composition of the board has no effect of the IC reporting.  
Despite the fact that the aforementioned studies were limited to particular aspects of voluntary 
disclosure items, it can give us some insights about the importance of the board independence in 
disclosing more information. Not too far from Portugal, this time in Italy Baldini and Liberatore 
(2026)  examined the effect of some CG internal mechanisims on  ICD: these were namely (board 
size, board independence, role duality, ownership concentration, audit committee size) and 
controlling for the industry if high-tech or not, firm’s size, and leverage. They  used content 
analysis methodolgy to examine the annual reports for 172 listed companies. Their findings 
indicated that among the studied companies only  board size, board independence and if the 
auditors are one of the big four have significant positive effect on  ICD.  
The most recent study to examine the effect of the CG on  ICD was in the Spanish context  
(Tejedo-Romero et al. 2017). This was a five year longtiudinal  study over 23 listed companies. It 
used an unweighted disclosure index of 53 items and content analysis methodlodgy to check these 
items presence or absence in the corporates annual reports. The CG factors were  board size, board 
independence, role duality and ownership strucutre; the control vairbales were the firm size, market 
to book value and the industry. They concluded that among the tested CG factors  board size, 
CEO/Chairman seperation, and directors ownership are positively affecting  ICD. Conversely, 
board independence has negative effecton the ICD.  
In developing countries, some studies examine the relationship between corporate governance and 
ICD practices. For instance, Madhani (2016)  studied the effect of  CG on  disclosure practices with 
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a focus on  ICD within a sample of 18 Indian knowledge based assets intensive companies using 
content analysis methodology. In that study, he  found that a strong correlation between the score 
of CG and the score of ICD. Still in developing countries and in a neighbouring country to India, 
Bangladesh,  Muttakin et al. (2015) studied the relationship between  corporate governance and  
intellectual capital disclosure within companies registered in Dhaka Stock Exchange. They took 
board independence, CEO duality, family duality, family ownership, foreign ownership and the 
presence of audit committee as governance mechanisms to examine the effect of these variables on 
the variance of ICD controlling for  firm size, age, leverage and performance. That study found that 
there is significant and positive effect for  board independence, foreign ownership and audit 
committee on the level of  ICD. On the other hand, the study found that there is a significant non-
linear relationship between  family duality and family ownership on  ICD.  
Moeifar et al., (2013) explored only the effect of board structure and board ownership 
concentration on the amount and quality of ICD in Iran. The results indicate that only the board 
size has a significant correlation with the quality of ICD. Likewise, and in the same Iranian context, 
Alizadah, et al, (2014) examined the effect of CG on the levels of ICD in  pharmaceutical listed 
companies on the Tehran stock exchange. The study takes the board size and independence and 
audit committee independence as  proxies for CG. Controlling for the performance (ROA), 
leverage and annual sales, interestingly, they failed to prove that there is a significant relationship 
between the CG variables and the variation in  ICD.  
In Malaysia, Zahra Moeinfar, Nasrollah Amouzesh (2011) did not find a significant relationship 
between the percentage of directors’ ownership and the extent of ICD, controlling by other 
variables in the model such as firm size, age, profitability, leverage and growth. In Jordan; Al-
hamadeen and Swaidan,  (2014) studied the determinants of  ICD in Jordan by examining the effect 
of firm size, profitability, capital structure, company’s age, audit firm and the ownership structure 
on the levels of ICD using the 40 items dichotomous disclosure index. They used, for the purpose 
of that study, a sample of 60 manufacturing listed companies and captured the data relating to 
intellectual capital for one year (cross-sectional). They concluded that among the independents 
variables the most significant on the ICD process were firm size, ownership concentration and 
audit firm type (if one of big four or not). The above study is a good indicator about the ICD 
practice in Jordan but it is subject to the limitations of considering one sector and limited sample 
number. It is also a cross-sectional study which  does not give any insights about the phenomenon’s 
development over time. Another study, examining IC, by Sharabati et al. (2013) was carried out on 
Jordanian Telecommunication Companies  business performance. They surveyed a sample of 
managers working at different levels in Jordanian Telecommunication companies to explore the 
effect of IC on the performance of the these companies. They concluded that based on the views of 
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the respondents, IC has a significant role in Telecommunication companies in Jordan. However, the 
study  surveyed a limited number of mangers in one sector. In addition, they did not justify  using 
the internal mangers’ views and evaluation of the firms’ performance based on qustionanairs’ 
question without incorporating proper quantiative measures; this may affect the generalizability.  
The table below summaries the studies that examined the relationship between the CG and ICD: 
Table 4.1 Summary of the prior studies on CG and IC. 
The Author 
(s) 
The journal Methodology & 
Studied variables 
Theoretical 
framework 
Finings 
Keenan, J. & 
Aggestam, 
M. 
Corporate 
Governance 
International 
Review. 2001 
Conceptual paper  Not specified  Considering the effect of the 
CG mechanism including  
Board System 
Salient Stakeholders 
Ownership Concentration 
Dependent Executive 
compensation: 
 On the IC and the 
interrelationship between them, 
the researchers concluded that: -  
There are important connections 
between the concept of 
intellectual capital, which 
focuses on forming and 
leveraging an organisation's 
intangible capital, and corporate 
governance, which focuses on 
patterns of stakeholder 
influences that affect 
managerial decision-making.  
 
Fabrizio 
erbioni and 
European 
Accounting 
Content analysis, 
where the sentence 
Agency theory  The effects of board leadership, 
size and composition on 
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Antonio 
Parbonetti 
Review, 2007 was coded with a 
score of 0 if it 
provided no 
information; with a 
score of 1 if it 
provided qualitative 
information; with a 
score of 2 if it 
provided 
quantitative 
information.  
 
 
Governance-related 
variables 
executive directors 
or INDs 
Board size 
CEO duality 
Board composition  
 
Control variables 
SIZE 
ROE 
LISTING 
AGE 
disclosure are consistent with a 
complementary relationship 
between corporate variable and 
disclosure in monitoring 
managers. 
On the other hand, board 
structure shows a negative 
effect on the intellectual capital 
disclosure. 
The empirical results shown 
that higher proportion of 
independent directors enhances 
the quantity of information 
disclosed. 
Jing Li , 
Richard Pike 
& Roszaini 
Haniffa 
Accounting 
and Business 
Research 
2008 
Content analysis was 
used to collect the 
necessary 
Data.  Including 
Agency theory  Results based on multiple 
regression models for 
the three intellectual capital 
disclosure measures 
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 Text Numbers 
Graphs/pictures.  
 
 
The independent 
variables cover CG 
items:  
Board composition, 
ownership structure, 
audit committee size 
and frequency of 
audit committee 
meetings, and CEO 
role duality. And the 
control variables are 
the listing age, 
performance, and 
firms’ size.  
indicate that, with the exception 
of role duality, all 
corporate governance variables 
together with firm 
size, profitability and listing age 
are associated with one or more 
of the intellectual capital 
disclosure measures. 
 
Indra 
Abeysekera
 
  
 
Journal of 
Intellectual 
Capital,  
2010 
content analysis 
methodology and the 
independent 
vairbales are: 
Board size, Board 
independence, audit 
committee 
independence. 
Controlling for the 
firm’s size, industry, 
and the year of data 
collection.  
Resource-
dependency 
theory.  
 
The number of independent 
directors on audit committee is 
highly correlated with disclose 
more human capital. 
Boards with larger number of 
independent directors in 
committees is significant for 
firms that disclose more tactical 
human capital resources 
Board size can be a “resource” 
to companies that inform 
investors about future earnings 
through intellectual capital.  
Ruth L. Journal of 
Business 
Content analysis. 
the varibales are: 
Agency theory  Findings show that the size of 
the board of directors is a 
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Hidalgo, 
Emma 
Garcia  
Isabel 
Martinize  
Ethics (2011) board of directors 
and ownership 
structure. 
Controlling for the 
size, leverage, 
performance and 
industry.   
statistically significant factor in 
IC disclosure, i.e. the larger the 
board of directors, the 
greater its disclosure of 
intangibles. 
increase in shareholder 
ownership by institutional 
investors is a hindrance to  
IC disclosure 
Jing Li, 
Musa 
Mangena  
Richard Pike  
 
The British 
Accounting 
Review  
(2012) 
Content analysis  
 The variables 
exmined are: Audit 
committee size, 
frequency of 
meetings, the audit 
committee 
indepence, director’s 
shareholding, board 
independence, and 
share ownership 
concentration.  
The controle 
variables are size, 
performance, and 
listign age.   
Not specified AC size and frequency of 
meetings to be positively 
related to IC disclosure. 
AC directors’ shareholding is 
negatively related to IC 
disclosure.  
Except for AC size, the results 
are mixed for the components 
of IC disclosure: human capital, 
structural capital and relational 
capital disclosure.  
Surprisingly, no significant 
relationship between IC 
disclosure and AC 
independence and financial 
expertise.  
Rahmat 
Alizadeh  
Seyed Ali 
Nabavi  
Asghar 
Jahani 
Bahnamiri
Management 
Science Letters 
(2014) 
Content analysis 
The independent 
variables of the 
corporate 
governance: board 
size, , Role duality,  
The relative extent 
Not specified 
 
Researchers found that there is 
a positive association between 
the number of independent 
directors in the board and the 
levels of the ICD  
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of nonexecutive to 
executive directors, 
the auditing 
committee). 
 
Mohammad 
Badrul 
Muttakin  
Arifur Khan 
a 
 Ataur 
Rahman 
Belal  
Advances in 
Accounting,  
2015 
Family ownership, 
Foreign investors 
ownership, Board 
independence, Role 
duality, Audit 
committee presence.  
Controle variables: 
firm’s size, firm’s 
age, Leverage and 
Performance.  
Agency theory  That family duality has a 
negative and significant effect 
on the extent of ICD. 
However, no significant 
association between CEO 
duality and the extent of ICD 
was found. The results of this 
study suggests that a significant 
non-linear relationship exists 
between family ownership and 
the extent of ICD and 
This study also found that a 
positive and significant 
relationship 
exists between foreign 
ownership and the extent of 
ICD. The positive effect of 
foreign ownership implies that 
foreign investors demand higher 
ICD due to higher information 
asymmetry. 
It was also found that corporate 
governance attributes, such as 
board independence and the 
presence of an audit committee, 
have significant and positive 
effect on the ICD. 
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Lucia Lima 
Rodrigues 
Francisca 
Tedjedo-
Romero 
Russel Craig 
 
International 
Journal of 
Disclosure and 
governance  
January, 
2016.   
Content analysis  
This paper examines 
the effect of certain 
governance 
attributes on the 
variance of IC. 
These variables 
include: board size, 
role dulaity CG 
Model duality, and 
women directorship 
conroling for the 
firm’s size, industry, 
and  
 
Legitimacy 
theory and 
Agency theory.  
 
Dual governance system (Latin 
and Anglo-Saxon) Has no effect 
Board activity positively affects 
the IC reporting   
Board size significant 
relationship 
Role duality, has negative effect 
on the IC reporting  
Board independence negatively 
affects the IC reporting  
Gender has no effect of the IC 
reporting 
Maria 
Baldini  
And  
Giovanni 
Liberatore 
Corporate 
Ownership and 
control, 2016 
Using Content 
Analysis. The 
researchers 
examnied the effect 
of CG mechanisims 
(board composition, 
role duality, 
ownership 
concentration, audit 
type, size of the 
audit committee) 
Control variables: 
Size, Auditors firm, 
and high tech firms 
or not)  
Agency theory Among the studied varibales. 
The followign factors: 
Board size, board indepence, 
and audit (big4) were 
significantly positivly affectign 
the ICD.  
Francisca 
Tejedo-
Romero et 
Review of 
Business 
Content Analysis 
CG factros: 
Stakeholder and 
agency theories  
The have found that: 
board size, CEO/Chairman 
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al.  Management, 
 2017 
Ownership structure, 
board independence, 
board size, and role 
duality. 
Control variables: 
Firm’s size, sector, 
and market ot book 
value.  
seperation, and directors 
ownership are positively 
affecting the ICD. 
board independence has 
negative effecton the ICD 
the firm size is significantly 
affects the ICD in the firms 
operate in IT and 
Communicaion sectros.  
 
4.7 Summary and Identifying gaps in literature 
 
 
Figure 4.3 literature review process summary 
A thorough review of the current IC literature, identifies many critiques which can be made and 
many gaps. Some of these critiques concern the research methodologies and methods as well as 
71 
 
time-frame for the researches and their contexts. According to Mouritsen (2006) we still do not 
have a comprehensive theoretical framework for studying  IC. Moreover, IC research is skewed 
toward some specific countries rather than others. According to Dumay and Cai, (2014) out of 110 
published articles between 1999 and 2013 in the IC field, 50% of the analysed articles were 
conducted within contexts of (5) countries (Australia (17), the UK (13), Malaysia (9), Sweden (8) 
and the USA (8). This point of view supports the critiques raised by Sharabati et al. (2010) who 
stated that “IC research has been focusing on developing countries and specifically on 
Anglophonic and Scandinavian nations and ignorse the developing countries in general” Hence, 
there is a need to explore a new virgin context to gain more understanding of the practice and 
patterns of the subject phenomena i.e. IC in developing countries (Cuozzo et al. 2017) and those 
countries considered as emerging markets which have a potential economic impact on the world 
economy. Dumay (2014b) offers a valuable critique to the existing literature in the field of  IC. 
Some of the very important points he raises are: - 
1- The research methodology for the topic of IC is still repeating itself.  
2- Developing nations are often ignored in such studies.  
Mouritsen, (2006) suggested that a new approach for studying IC should go beyond the concept 
and its applications. Instead, it should be studied “as a boundary”. In other words, new researchers 
should address what IC can do for the company and how this can be related to value creation. 
In addition, the absence of consensus on a theoretical framework for studying IC is a big 
challenge for researchers. As according to Dumay (2009) currently, there is no synchronous 
measure which can moderate the vagueness between the interaction of IC and value creation at 
a particular point in time. (Andrikopoulos, 2010).  
With a quick survey of the above studies, it can be concluded that there is a lack of 
overwhelming theoritical framework, that explains the theoretical linkage between the 
corporate governance and IC disclosure practices, as well as integrating all dimensions of CG 
in one overarching model, in both developed and developing countries. In particular, those 
developing countries which have been overlooked by the research community. In addition, 
according to Tejedo-Romero et al. (2017)  longitudinal studies are still respectively rare 
compared to cross-sectional studies: this is condsidered one of the major critiques to the 
existing literature.  According Campbell & Abdul Rahman (2010) longitudinal studies are 
really required to strengthen the generalisability. This study fills in these gaps in the literature 
by undertaking a longitudinal, field study based on developing country, namely Jordan. 
Meanwhile, this study incorporates CG meachnisims in the one model more than any other 
prior study according to the researcher’s best knowledge. In addition it examines the effect of 
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new CG mechanisim (namely CG committee) which has not been tested before according to 
the researcher’s best knowledge. The study will come up with a finding applicable not only on 
Jordan but to the Arab countries as a whole based on their similarities in culture, historical 
background, economy, demographical aspects, and language.  
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4.8 Hypotheses development 
Considering the empirical researches findings in IC and the relationship between CG and ICD, 
this research will test the following hypothesis: - 
The board of director size: there is no consensus among scholars, professionals or regulators 
about the ideal number directors on the board. The prior empirical evidince is conflicting on 
the effect of  board size on  voluntary disclosure. Some prior studies suggest that larger boards 
could enhance the ability to carry on the monitoring function and enrich the variety of 
expertise of the directors: others have failed to find any relationship between  board size and 
voluntary disclosure.  
H01: No significant effect for the board size on the intellectual capital disclosure; Ceteris 
Paribus. 
Board Independence: Fama F and Jensen M.C. (1983) introduced the debate about the 
characteristics of that board that facilitate the best supervisory role. Board independence is one 
of the most debatable topics in CG literature (García-Meca & Sánchez-Ballesta 2010). Many 
studies suggested that more independent members within the board can positively affect the 
level of transparency.  
H02: there is no significant effect for the board independence on intellectual capital disclosure; 
Ceteris Paribus. 
Role Duality: CG principles as issued by OECD (2004) and all the following corporate 
governance codes and the worldwide-approved best practices recommend the segregation of 
duties for the benefit the firm as well as its investors: there should be more emphasise put on 
the separation of the role of CEO from the chairman. Moreover, literature suggests that the 
separation between the CEO position and the chairperson of the board can result in enhancing 
the transparency.  
H03: There is no significant relationship between the role duality and the intellectual capital 
disclosure; Ceteris Paribus. 
Family ownership: as mentioned before, ownership concentration has historically been family 
based and this definitly has its implications and affects  managemnt choices in information 
sharing and openess to other parties and other stakeholders (OECD 2014) .  
H04: There is no significant relationship between the family ownership and the level of 
intellectual capital disclosure; Ceteris Paribus. 
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Management’s Ownership: as indicated by the agency theory assumptions management and 
ownership sepration will lead to a state of conflict of interrests because mangers will be 
incentivised to maximise their own benefits at the expense of the shareholders et al., 2009). 
However, the mangers engagments as sharers and not only agents will give them additional 
motivation to do all that is possible to maximise the owners benefits as in this scenario the 
value creation for owners will be the managers’ value too.  
H05: there is no significant relationship between the existence of managerial ownership and 
the level of intellectual capital disclosure; Ceteris Paribus. 
Institutional Investor ownership: Institutional investros have a sophisticated mechanisms to 
evalute their investments and make prudential investment decisions. Thus, their presence as 
owners will introduce more pressure on the management to share more information to the 
shareholders and that will positively impact the disclosure choices for the firms.  
H06: there is no significant relationship between the existence of institutional investor 
ownership and the level of intellectual capital disclosure; Ceteris Paribus. 
The Foreign ownership: as they based in a geographically remote area the information 
asymmetry expected to be high. Thus, higher pressure for more information could be 
associated with the foreign investros ownership.  
H07: There is no significant effect for the foreign ownership and the intellectual capital 
disclosure; Ceteris Paribus  
Audit Committee Independence: accordign to agency theory assumptions, the AC 
independence will provide a better monitoring fuction for the committee and this will lead to 
better disclosure levels and transperant accounting choices (Samaha et al. 2015) 
H08: There is no significant relationship between the independence of the audit committee and 
the level of intellectual capital disclosure; Ceteris Paribus. 
Audit Committee Effectiveness: the frequency of AC meetings indicate an efficient committee 
which fulfils its duties. Thus, it is expected that more frequent meeting for the AC will be 
associated with better transperancy levels and better information quality. 
H09: There is no significant relationship between the AC frequency of meetings and the level 
of the intellectual capital disclosure; Ceteris Paribus. 
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Audit Committee Size: most CG codes suggest a minimum number of members to the AC. 
However, the ideal size of the AC that motivates voluntary disclsure is not precisely defined: it 
is dependent on firm’s conditions and context. Thus it worth  examining the effect of AC size 
as one of the CG mechanisims on  ICD levels and quality.  
H010: There is no significant relationship between the size of the AC and the intellectual 
capital disclosure; Ceteris Paribus. 
The existence of corporate governance committee: JCGC suggests that the firm’s board of 
directors should esablish among itself a specialised committees to handle the firms’ issues with 
foucs and concentration which will help to raise  efficiency of the supervisory role of the 
board. One of the comittees that the code suggests is a CG committee to evalute the 
governance strucutre in the firm and suggest any amendments or corrections and to develop 
and update the firm’s code of the CG. Thus, this study will examnie the effect of esalishing 
such a committee on the ICD either its level and the quality of the information.  
H011: There is no significant relationship between the existence of CG committee and the 
intellectual capital disclosure; Ceteris Paribus. 
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4.9 Summary 
The current chapter presents an up-to-date literature review summarising  prior studies and offering 
a critical review of the existing body of literature in mostly all areas that are relating to the present 
study.  
This chapter starts by presenting the literature that has dealt with the IC concept and the 
measurement of the IC. 
Definitions offered by both academics and professionals have been showed. In addition, a brief 
description of the IC measurements techniques or strategies have been presented in this chapter 
including Skandia Navigator, Balance Scorecard, Ericson Cockpit, Market to Book Value, and 
Benchmarking.  Then,  this chapter moves to define  ICD and its the disclosure channels and  
determinants. Studies that examine  disclosure patterns  have been presented to identify the 
differences between the disclosure choices and between the different contexts based on the 
available literature. After that, this chapter narrows the discussion to focus on the prior studies that 
have examined the effect of t CG on ICD. It includes a critical analysis of all these studies to 
highlight the current study contribution to literature and what the additions are that the present 
study will provide to fill the existing gaps in literature.  
   Finally, this chapter presented the hypotheses that will be tested, developed to address the 
identified gaps and to offer answers to the research questions.   
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5 Research Methodology 
5.1 Introduction  
This chapter will discuss and illustrate how the research is conducted in a manner that addresses the 
detailed process and the systematic approach required to answer the research questions and to fill 
the existing gaps in literature. Research’s methodology is defined as a set of philosophical and 
ontological principles that determine how to define logic, reality (as we consider it), values and 
what counts as knowledge which informs the research. Or it could simply refer to the ways of 
thinking that direct the research strategies techniques, processes and tools that are used by 
researcher to solve the research problem or to generate  new or incremental knowledge. 
Accordingly, research methodology provides the logical stance and rational justifications for the 
choosing of the research methods, data collection techniques, and the processing and analysing of 
data (Collis & Hussey, 2003, p.55). 
This chapter is organized in the following manner: the second section discusses the research 
reasoning and philosophy. The third section discusses the research paradigm. Followed by a section 
which presents the research methods and the research strategy. The fifth section discusses the data 
collection process and the data collection tools development and testing the tool for validity and 
reliability. The sixth section presents the importance of incorporating more than one research 
strategy and considers the advantages of using a mixed method approach.  
 
5.2 Research Philosophy 
Research philosophy is usually determined by the researchers ontological and epistemological 
perceptions to the reality which comes as a result of the researchers understanding of the theoretical 
framework for the relationships and phenomena  (Creswell 2009) pp 6-7. Crotty (1998) indicates 
that the systematic approach of research in choosing the research method(s) is a product of the 
methodological understanding the theoretical relations and boundaries of the philosophical 
ontology (reality perception) and the claims or hypotheses upon which the researchers build their 
perception. 
Two approches have been identified for research reasoning. The first one is the deductive approach 
which starts the research by assuming or hypothesizing a relationship between two or more 
variables based on a prespecified or predefined theory. Deductive approach uses an apporpriat 
methodology to test the hypothesis (Elizabeth C. Hirschman 1986). Under deductive approach the 
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researcher remains unbiased and does not interfer in the research settings to maintain the 
objectivity and impartiality. Thus, the results can be generalised to other smilir populations 
(Sekaran, U. and Bougie 2010).  
The second approach in research reasoning is the inductive appoach. Under inductive appoach; the 
researcher starts by observing phenomenon/phynomena and collecting data about that phenomena 
to develop or introduce the theory. Unlike the deductive appraoch, the researcher under inductive 
appoach is engaged with the research population and control or affect the research settign. Hence, 
the generalisability or wide application of the results is not a target for inductive research.  
Noramlly, the deductive approach associated with positivistic research paradigm, while the 
inductive appraoch associated with interpretivistic research paradigm (Sekaran, U. and Bougie 
2010).  
The present research is deductive as it empirically examines the causal relationship between the 
studied variables (CG and ICD) and it starts by hypothesizing a relationship between the studied 
varibales based on literature and pretested theory (agency theory) which assumes a positive effect 
for the CG on voluntray disclosure.  the table below summarises the differnces betweent the 
deductive and inductive appoarches in research reasoning based on Saunders et al (2007): 
Table 5.1 Deductiv, Inductive Approaches 
Deducive approach Inductive appraoch 
• Starting from theory  
• Testing causal relationship 
between variables 
• The researcher is objective and 
does not control research 
settings 
• Sufficient sample to be selcted 
to collect data and to facilitate 
generalisability 
 
• Startign by observing the 
phynomena and move to collecting 
data to generate the theory 
• Researcher’s engagement reprsents a 
part of the research 
• Generalisablity is not a target  
• The research is unstructured which 
gives more flexibility to change the 
research settings at any point  
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  The interaction between the elements of the knowledge can be presented as a stepwise process i.e. 
one elements leads to the other. Crotty (1998) summarise this relation between these elements in 
the following figure: 
 
Figure 5.1 Summary of the research methodology. Credit to Crotty (1998) 
  
5.3 Research Paradigm 
The research paradigm is referred to as the set of beliefs, assumptions, concepts, perceptions, 
considerations, and practices that govern individuals’ mind-set or form his/her/their views of reality 
(McGregor & Murnane 2010). Or simply we can refer it as the assumptions underlying the 
researchers perception of reality (Krauss & Putra 2005). It is the summary of a whole range of 
assumptions, research techniques, established results and methodologies that are used as theoretical 
framework or choice of paradigm defines the intent, motivation and expectations for the research. 
You place your own research within certain philosophical thinking patterns or arguments. Creswell 
(2003) defines four research paradigms:  
1. Positivism.  
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2. Interpretivism 
3. Pragmatism  
4. Advocacy   
in the following part a brief description of each one of these paradigms will be presented. 
Following to that; the current study’s paradigm will be defined accompanied by the justifications 
and rationalisation of choosing that research paradigm. 
5.3.1 Positivism  
Positivism is defined as the research paradigm that examines the causal relationships between the 
phenomena based on a theoretical explanation. This assumes the minimum engagement or 
interference from the researcher in the research settings. Essentially, it attempts to offer an 
empirical explanation for phenomena’s behaviour (Sekaran and Bougie, 2010).  
Positivism is one of the most popular research paradigms in business research (Alhababseh, 2016). 
Under the positivistic research umbrella, the aims will be deterministic to test the cause and effect 
relationship between the research variables. Moreover, a positivistic researchers is of their nature 
reductionist means always try to specify the variable(s) effect(s) to the least measurable unit. 
Positivism assumes that science is subject to test quantitatively and establish the assumptions based 
on already tested theory or established laws measuring independent facts about a single 
comprehensible reality (Healy & Perry, 2000). Positivisim is the research paradigm of the current 
study as it adapt a positivisitic stance in dealing with research project as it aims to empirically test 
the effect of the CG on the ICD based on the notion of the agency theory which states that the 
principal will always claims for more information and higher level and better quality of disclosure.  
5.3.2 Interpretivism 
The interpretive paradigm is the epistemology philosophical position that considers that the world 
around us is mentally constructed and it is therefore interested in understanding what is happening 
in people’s mind rather than searching for the objective truth (Sekaran and Bougie, 2013). Creswell 
(2009) described Interpretivism (social constructivism) as the research paradigm that relies on 
researchers seeking understanding of the universe in which they work and live. They develop 
subjective meanings of their experiences and meanings directed toward certain phenomenon or 
objective (Henderson 2011). These meanings are varied and multiple, leading the scientists or 
researchers to look for a wide interpretation of views rather than the reductionism  found in the  
approach of positivism. Thus, the researcher here starts by asking  very wide questions. Meanwhile, 
the researchers are subjectively involved in the researched environment and interfere and interact 
with people and society: it is from this that the name social constructivism derives.  Hence, under 
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this paradigm the researcher is concerned basically with  other people’s beliefs and perceptions 
about the phenomena rather than scientific laws or pretested theories. (Sekaran and Bougie 2010; 
Creswell 2009). This study can not be interpretivisitic as it does not aim to develop a new theory or 
to go through qualititive discription of the phenomena.  
5.3.3 Pragmatism  
Pragmatism as a research paradigm represents the practical seeking of knowledge or problem 
solving without the restraints of specific philosophical schools. Focusing on reaching the research 
goal, using all available techniques and implementing all accessible resources (Feilzer, 2009). 
Hence, pragmatism could be a mix of more than one philosophical stance and group more than one 
research methodologies together as long as the researcher thinks that combination will lead to 
problem solving or fact identification (Feilzer, 2009). Despite using mixed methods in this study it 
can not be descriped as pragmatist as it basically rely on the preesablished theory to test the 
relationship between the dependant varibal and the independent varibales and the interviews wil be 
used as validation technique and for seeking a explination of the empirical results not to provide a 
new evidences.  
5.3.4 Advocacy  
Advocacy or transformative methodology as (Creswell, 2003) refer it is defined as participatory 
knowledge which is a socio-political specific paradigm has developed recently during the period 
1980-1990 (Neuman, 2000).  Under this research paradigm researchers try to consider the views, 
feelings, requirements, and perceptions of the less represented or marginalised groups for example 
disabled people or the racial minorities. This research paradigm which is not common among 
researchers is mainly used in studies relating to controversial and socially sensitive aspects for 
example studies relating to feminism, or homosexuality which are considered within socio-political 
aspect of knowledge (Creswell, 2009). The present study is empirically examining the relationship 
between the CG and ICD in light of the agency theory thus it can not be classified under the 
advocacy paradigm.  
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The table below presents a summary of key differences between the above-mentioned paradigms: 
 
Table 5.2 Research paradigm comparison. 
                Paradigm  
Characteristics 
Positivism Interpretivism Pragmatism Advocacy 
Starting Point  Proved Law / Tested 
Theory  
Researcher’s 
concerns, General 
Issue or Question  
Could be a theory 
Law or general issue 
Societal concern and 
specific group 
problem 
Researcher’s 
Engagement  
No Engagement with the 
Research setting or in the 
minimum  
Complete or high 
degree of 
engagement  
Could be mix of the 
two previous 
scenarios but the 
researcher 
interaction remains 
less than in 
Interpretivism  
Participatory action as 
the researcher will be 
involved with the 
community  
Aims  Testing theory to assess its 
ability to offer explanation 
for new problem and 
develop generalised 
solution for similar 
situations 
Answering 
questions and/or 
offer explanation for 
certain problem or 
issue or ground a 
new theory  
Finding a solution 
for specific problem 
within specific 
conditions. 
However, the 
generalizability still 
targeted  
Mostly concerned with 
offering a solution to a 
problem existing in a 
specific community or 
group.   
Strategy of 
Inquiry  
Basically Quantitative but 
sometimes uses other 
qualitative techniques for 
validation or instrument 
development 
Basically 
Qualitative 
Mixed  Qualitative and some 
quantitative tools may 
be utilized  
Reasoning  Deductive  Inductive  Mixed  Mixed  
This summary is based on (Creswell 2009; M.T.Sedgley n.d.; Feilzer 2009; Creswell 2013; Hussein 2009) 
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5.3.5 The current study paradigm 
According to Lehrer (1966) the relation between epistemology and knowledge has been subject to a 
great deal of debate and controversy: theory can explain empirical fact only when there is a 
sufficient empirical evidences or empirical justifications of how that theory has been empirically 
deduced.   
This study aims to empirically examine the effect of the CG attributes on the ICD, building on 
premises of agency theory which states that the principle always claims for more transparency and 
a higher quality of disclosures to facilitate the monitoring role over the agent (management).  
Therefore, this study started by reviewing the literature to determine the possible relationship 
between the explanatory variable (CG) and the variance in the dependent variable (ICD levels and 
quality). According to (Stanley 1997) information relating to business unit represents an economic 
reality; thus, a preestablished reality is considered when hypothesising relationships under this 
study.  
The determination, measurements and empirical observations that leads to theory verification are 
the general characteristics of a positivistic approach in research which to some extent overlap with 
normative research paradigm as both expect the results based on the theory foundation (Hair, J. F., 
Celsi, M., Money 2016). However, the difference between the postive and noramtive approaches 
according to deegan & Unerman (2011) lays in  the researcher’s considerion of reality. Hence, if 
the researcher based his/her stance from reality based on theory then the research is positivistic, and 
if the researcher based his/her stance from reality according to her/his perception, then the research 
is informative. 
Therefore, as long as this research starts by hypothese that assumes relationship between the 
varibales based on the theory and extant literature which informs the research methodology. 
Consequently, all these characteristics make this research project positivistic in nature and the 
following illustration summarises the previous discussion: 
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Figure 5.2 Present Research Flow 
 
5.4 Research Methodology 
Research methodology is defined as the general principles and philosophical perceptions that 
informe and guide the researcher through the research process from determining the research 
problem and setting the research questions until final reporting of the  research results; passing 
through all the data collection and analysis research stages (Hair, J. F., Celsi, M., Money 2016; 
Lopes 2015; Cooper & Schindler 2014; McGregor & Murnane 2010).    
This study deploys a mixed method in order to achieve its goals.  The first stage of research starts 
by collecting data from the annual reports of the population (listed companies in ASE). Statistical 
tests (Panel Regression Test) will be performed to measure the effect of the independent variables 
(CG) on the dependent variables (IC). But, in order to get more understanding of the result of the 
statistical analysis the researcher may use qualitative technique (Semi-structured interviews) with a 
sample of financial analysts, professionals and stakeholders who normally follow the disclosure 
and are able to understand and differentiate various kinds of disclosures. According to Bryman and 
Bell (2011)  triangulation18 process can enhance reliability of the research findings. Mixing 
                                               
18 Triangulation is simply using more than one approach, methods, theories, data collection techniques etc. 
(Kock 2013; Hussein 2009) 
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methods offer a great help in the cross-checking the results from qualitative and quantitative 
methods. Mixing methods when first brought to social sciences by Campbell and Fiske (1959) was 
introduced as a strategy for results validation in the field of psychology.  
5.4.1 Why mix methods 
Mixed methods bring many benefits to research. This research strategy benefits from the 
advantages of quantitative and qualitative methods, (Jick, 1979; Modell, 2005). These benefits 
include but are not limited to: -  
I. Extend the results and findings farther than those observable using only one method. 
(Sekaran. U. and Bougie 2010). It also enhances the interpretation of the findings; in 
addition, incorporating qualitative methods in quantitative research will facilitate the 
researcher’s role in elaborating on the results and gaining insightful ideas from specialist to 
back the quantitative findings (Rebecca & Anthony, 2013) 
II. Improves the validity and credibility of the results and reduce the methodological bias 
(Sekaran, U., And Bougie, 2010; Modell, 2005). 
III. In certain cases, the research aims and questions stipulate that the researcher must 
implement more than a single method (Yin, 2006). For example, when the researcher tries 
to capture the perceived facts by audience and stakeholders in the results or if the research 
aims to offer explanation for human behaviour that participate in producing certain 
phenomenon.   
IV. Mixed methodology can support the strength of the research by the concurrent deployment 
of multiple data sets or multiple theories multiple methods (Brown and Bringnall, 2007) 
5.5 Time horizon 
Studies from a time horizon point-of-view could either be  Cross-sectional or Longitudinal (Cooper 
& Schindler 2014). This depends on the purpose of study, the research motivation and the goals the 
study tries to achieve.  Bothe longitudinal and cross-sectional studies are observational (Sekaran. 
U. and Bougie,  2010). This means the researchers is engaged only in documenting the observation 
without any engagement in the research environment or any intent to change the environmental 
settings of the population. However, each type of the above-mentioned studies has its own pros and 
cons. 
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The following table summarise the advantages and disadvantages of both types of studies: 
 
Table 5.3 Comparison between longitudinal and cross-sectional studies 
 Longitudinal studies  Cross-sectional studies  
Advantages 1. Provide more insightful findings 
2. Ability to capture the trend of 
phenomena overtime.  
3. Get ride over the CMV19 bias. 
1. Time efficient  
2. Cost effective 
Disadvantages  1. Time consuming  
2. Costly  
3. Respondent bias (Halo effect, or 
participant drop the experiment)  
1. The results may be affected 
by CMV bias. 
2. Fail to capture the trends of 
phenomena.  
 
                                               
19 CMV Common methods variance bias results from method failure to precisely capture the effect or the phenomena that 
the researcher try to measure (Rindfleisch et al. 2008)  
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5.6 This study 
This study is longitudinal from the point view of the time horizon: it will collect data from the 
corporates’ annual reports over an extended period of seven years. The research instrument is 
documenting the date of annual reports year by year; each year will be associated with the captured 
information where each piece of information will have its unique ID connected to the year and 
company. 
5.7 Research strategy 
Research strategy is defined as a technique or set of techniques that implemented by the researcher 
to achieve the research goals. According to Saunders (2003) research strategy is an action-plan 
implemented to help the researcher to answer his/her/their research questions in a scientific and 
systematic manner (Hair, J. F., Celsi, M., Money 2016) p 463. The effective strategy will help the 
researcher to specify the research data, the suitable instrument to collect the data and how to refine 
the data to fit the research purposes (Saunders, 2003). According to Badek, (2012) we have six 
commonly used strategies in social science research. These are: 
5.7.1 Case Study 
This is a close and deep descriptive examination on the research unit (an individual person, group 
of people, organization, group of business firms etc.,) and the researcher tries to offer 
comprehensive and detailed description to that specific research unit, using varying qualitative 
research techniques including document review, interviews, etc. Under this strategy the researchers 
do not prescribe what theories should inform the study or what method(s) should be utilised for 
data collection as this will be determined by the research problem and the research questions 
(Cooper, And Morgan,  2008). The advantages of case study vary including opening a new research 
themes in accounting and discovering new interesting areas for academic research. Furthermore, it 
helps in providing deep understanding of some complex phenomena (Cooper, and Morgan, 2008). 
However, the generalizability of the findings remains a challenge for researchers using case study 
techniques as the data are very specific to certain entity or group of individuals subject to inquiry: 
this is referred to by  (Flyvbjerg 2006) as the Black-Swan problem - the data is very specific and 
methods and analysis are connected to a very specified context. This strategy is not fit the current 
study as the current study will survey a relatively large number of firms focusing on the empirical 
examination of the relationship between the CG and ICD based on the published data in the 
corporate annual reports.  
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5.7.2 Survey  
The survey is perhaps the most popular and flexible research strategy used in the social sciences. A 
survey defined as an analytic research strategy that is designed to produce statistical inference 
about specific issue depending on data collected from a specific population or a representative 
sample out of that population (Fowler 2012). Surveys mostly recognise quantitative data. However, 
using quantitative and qualitative data is not mutually exclusive. Hence under such strategy, a 
researcher can utilise both type of data to achieve the research goals, collecting the relevant data 
from a representative sample to move forward in generalising the findings to the whole research 
population (Sekaran. U., and Bougie 2010).  This study will use the survey strategy to collect the 
relevant data from the corporate annual reports in order to conduct the statistical tests to examine 
the relationship between the CG and ICD.  
5.7.3 Interviews 
For interpretivists, whose research’s paradigm is purely qualitative; interviews are the most popular 
research strategy. Interview is a detailed discussion between the researcher and the researched 
individual or group. However, when it happens between the researcher and the researched group it 
known as focus group. Interviews can be conducted face to face, or over telephone. Moreover, the 
rapid advancement in telecommunication technology has hugely facilitated this strategy as it could 
be delivered by internet-based communications methods for example: Skype, FB Messenger or 
video conference call (Cooper & Schindler 2014). Interviews will be used in this study as a 
validation technique for the secondary data test results and to seek deeper understanding of the 
results indicated by the statistical tests.    
 
5.7.4 Grounded Theory (GT) 
Under this strategy, the researcher seeks to developing a new theory to explain a certain social or 
behavioural phenomena by asking questions: the answers are used to develop an integrated 
insightful theoretical model of the GT which offers an explanation to the researched phenomena 
(Holland 2005).  Thus, the GT strategy in research will incorporate a series of highly structured 
methodological approaches to draw the theoretical conclusions about the subject of study or to 
provide a comprehensible description of the phenomenon/ phenomena being observed (Langley, 
1999).  As this study have no aim to ground a new theory in the field of ICD accordingly the GT is 
not used in this research project.  
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5.7.5 Action Research 
 This kind of research strategy is developed to enhance practitioners’ practical knowledge during 
their course of work. For example, doctors, teachers and engineers need to do this kind of research 
to facilitate their roles or to develop their practice or to take informed action (Stokols 2006).  
Action research is not fit the design of the current research project thus it was not used.  
5.7.6 Ethnomethodology 
This research strategy is not popular: it is used by researcher who interested in addressing specific 
behavioural and social aspect for certain groups of people. For example, examining the 
consumption behaviour for native American: understanding this behaviour; within its social context 
involved  qualitative description and quantitative analysis. (Trace 2016).   
 However, when choosing one strategy and rejecting others, researcher must make sure that the 
selected strategy is good fit with the underlying research objectives and will lead feasibly, 
effeciently, and effectively to answer the research questions (Saunders et al., 2009; Yin, 2009; 
Creswell, 2003).  
This study is utilising two strategies in order to achieve its aims of examining the effect of the GC 
on the ICD quantity and quality. Also, it measures the patterns of ICD over the studied period since 
Jordan adopted the CG code. The first strategy is the survey. As the corporates’ annual reports of 
the research sample will be carefully examined to identify all information relating to IC quantity 
and quality. Simultaneously, the captured information will be dichotomously quantified and posted 
into the disclosure index. In the same manner, the information relating the CG will be processed as 
a check-list of the CG mechanisms prepared which will document the status of each item for the 
researched firms as eventually the regression model will be run between the explinatory variables 
and the dependant variable. Moreover, in the second phase of the study interviews strategy will be 
implemented to dig deeper in the phenomena and to cross check the quantitative results against the 
perceptions of the specialist and professionals in the financial market.  
5.8 Research Methods 
The first phase of the study will start by collecting data relating to the IC from the corporates’ 
annual reports as well as information pertaining to  corporate governance mechanisms and 
structure. Therefore, the annual reports of the top 100 listed companies in the ASE will be surveyed 
to collect the relevant information either for explanatory variables i.e. (CG factors) or for the 
dependent variable i.e. ICD. Thus, the content analysis method will be the used to collect the 
secondary data form the annual reports for the period from 2009 until 2015 i.e. seven years. (The 
90 
 
starting date is the year after enacting the CGC and the ending (cutoff) date is the latest availbale 
annual reports when the researcher decided to start data analsyis).  
According to Krippendorff ( 2013) content analysis is a research method producing an analytic 
review of documents and text with the intent to make a consistent, systematic and reliable 
interpretation and inference from specific data in a specific context: this data is then presented in 
another context with a valid and reliable explanation.  
Beattie & Thomson (2007) define content analysis as a research method which is mainly used by 
the researcher to analyse, reproduce quantitative information and categorise themes to identify the 
patterns of subject phenomena. Alternatively it may assess the depth and/or breadth of the 
information and provide a reliable and understandable reflection on that phenomena based on the 
researcher’s perception of the reality. Another definition considers content analysis as a technique 
implemented by the researchers for the purpose of data collection, analysing, codifying and 
categorising into pre-established categories in order to identify the patterns of the information’s 
presentation. This process should be conducted transparently,  systematically, and reliably (Guthrie 
et al. 2004). Another definition by (Neuendorf 2011) who describes content analysis as a procedure 
of documents and/or records carefully examined documents with a systematic, objective, 
quantitative analysis of the message characteristics out of that documents.  
Content analysis could be run either manually or by using one of computer aided techniques. Each 
one of them has its advantages and disadvantages (Sekaran. U. and Bougie 2010). For large sample 
numbers the automotive content analysis is recommended (Hussainey et al. 2003) Furthermore, 
computer aided or automotive content analysis enhances the consistency and reliability as it 
involves less judgment. However, judgment sometime is necessary to evaluate the piece of 
information and determine into which category to put it. Moreover, in certain situations the 
computerised content analysis software for example, Nvivo and MAXQDA need precautions and 
some settings applying for documents to be analysed for example pdf files are  preferable as is 
English language its efficiency is very limited within Arabic language. In addition, the computer 
aided techniques of content analysis are still not able to recognise and codify the images and tables 
and most importantly it’s not able to evaluate the tone of narrative and it is not technically capable 
to judge the intuitive nature of the text. Additionally, computer aided content analysis techniques 
are not all fully automated as they still need human intervention especially in the coding process 
and creating the nodes and themes. Moreover, the researcher’s close monitoring is needed during 
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the process as the system could malfucntion at any point for a range of reseaons: it therefore 
requires the close presence of the researcher20.   
The table below summarise the advantages and disadvantages of each one of both techniques:  
 
Table 5.4 A comparison between manual and computerised CA. 
CA method  Manual CA  Automated or Computer Aided CA 
Advantages 
1. Flexibility of process. 
2. Human ability to recognise the 
tone and intuitive in the text. 
3. Under manual CA researcher 
masters all content of the 
documents including the pictures 
and graphs.  
1. It may offer higher level of 
consistency.  
2. Time and effort effectiveness 
especially when the sample 
size is too big.  
3. Computer aided processes are 
normally associated with 
higher level of reliability and 
less subjectivity.   
   
Disadvantages  
1. Subjectivity and avoided inherent 
human bias.  
2. Time and effort consuming.  
3. When more than one researcher 
involved with the content 
analysis process it is hard to 
maintain the consistency 
especially in cases where some 
judgment is needed.  
1. The Computerised CA is not able 
to recognise the intuitive value of 
the text.  
2. It needs a certain setting to be able 
to handle the text i.e. language 
constraints, pdf, etc.,  
3. Little capacity to deal with table 
pictures and graphs.   
 
                                               
20 This study did content analysis manually due to limitation relating to Arabic language processing in Nvivo, also, Nvivo 
inability to codify pictures, tables or images. In addition, some annual reports cannot be accessed as pdf as the only 
available version is image in JSC database.  
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5.9 Measurement And Coding 
Coding remains as the bedrock of the content analysis process. Coding is an analytical procedure 
for rearranging information and representing it in a meaningful manner to fit the research’s purpose 
(Sekaran. U. and Bougie 2010). ( Hair, J. F., Celsi, M., Money 2016 ) define coding as a procedure 
of giving logical and meaningful numerical values or names that reduces information from a large 
quantity of indistinguishable text to a much smaller number of relevant and representative piece of 
data. The purpose of coding is to enable the researcher to simplify and focus on meaningful 
characteristics of the data. However, coding itself as a part of content analysis depends heavily on 
the objective and the ultimate goal of study or project.   
The current research aims to examine the effect of the CG on the level and quality of ICD. 
Accordingly, a technique is required to measure the level and quality of the ICD. Extant literature 
suggests that the voluntary disclosure can be measured by disclosure indices (Beattie et al. 2004; 
Hussainey & Mouselli 2010; Li et al. 2007; Rutherford 2003; Cormier et al. 2005; Satta et al. 2015; 
Botosan 1997). Thus, a disclosure index has been developed to measure the level of the ICD. 
According to Li et al. (2008). Disclosure indices are a widely used method to study the level of 
voluntary disclosure. Moreover, this is considered an effective research tool as it introduces ratios 
that reflect the actual level of disclosure in comparison with the maximum possible level. 
5.10  ICD Quantity and Quality 
The ICD imply two dimensions the quantity or the level of disclosure and the quality of disclosure. 
These two dimensions together will represent the disclosure whole picture within the studied 
sample.  
• In this study ICD quantity means: the volume, level or the amount of information that 
corporates share or provide in its annual report about its IC either in terms of narrative or 
numerically. This could be a general description of the IC components, categories or 
breakdown of the firms’ intellectual assets (Beattie & Thomson 2007). The ICD quantity 
will be measured by using a dichotomous disclosure index (0/1) formed of 44 items each 
item represents a component of IC and the aggregate score of the index for each company 
will represent the company score in ICD quantity.   
• In this study ICD quality means: the variety and richness of information about the IC items 
and its ability to help the information users to develop an informed decision about the firm 
(Beretta & Bozzolan 2008; Jensen et al. 2006). For the purpose of this study ICD quality 
will be captured by using a disclosure index and each company will be assigned a score 
from 0-4 based on the following criteria:  
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1. A Score of (0) if the item in the disclosure index is not mentioned in the firm’s annual 
report.  
2. A Score of (1) if the information in the annual report narrative mentioned but do not give 
sufficient discussion of the IC categories and items and did not introduce the firms plans to 
develop the IC. 
3.  A score of (2) will be assigned to the company that introduces general information about 
the IC and its categories associated with numbers, financial and non-financial information. 
4. A score of (3) will be assigned to the company that discloses information about the IC its 
categories supported by numerical, financial and non-financial information in addition to 
graphs and images. 
5. A score of (4) will be given to the company that discloses a combination of the all 
previously mentioned information; associated with information about future-plans or 
forward-looking information. 
5.11 Construction of Disclosure Index 
One important decision under content analysis methodology is the choice and development of 
categories: these will be based on the content or information which will be traced in the source 
document and then transferred to the developed research instrument i.e. the disclosure index 
(Haniffa & Cooke 2005). Thus, a disclosure index has been developed based on prior ICD 
literature e.g. (Li et al. 2008b; Beattie & Thomson 2007; Beretta & Bozzolan 2008; Cerbioni & 
Parbonetti 2007; Beattie et al. 2004; Beattie & Thomson 2010; Mouritsen 2003; Sveiby 1997; Petty 
& Guthrie 2000; Guthrie et al. 2004; Edvinsson & Sullivan 1996; Edvinsson 1997) based on these 
studies about 180 items of IC have been identified and allocated over the three IC sub-capitals i.e. 
structural capital, relational capital and human capitals. However, not all these items are relevant to 
all contexts.  
The following criteria have been taken in consideration in developing the index:  
1. A check list made with all identified IC items in the extant IC literature. This was 
by referring to the top ranked journals and also those journal that focus on IC and 
intangible assets e.g. Journal of Intellectual Capital, Journal of Knowledge 
Management, and The Learning Organization journal. These journals normally 
have been publishing the papers of the key authors in IC field e.g. Richard Pike, 
James Guthrie, John Dumay, Abeysekera, Edvinsson and Nick bontis. 
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2. The known disclosure indices have been retrieved especially those developed or 
adopted by extant literature for example: (Edvinsson 1997; Guthrie et al. 1999; 
Petty & Guthrie 2000; Guthrie & Petty 2000; Li et al. 2007; Li et al. 2008; Dumay 
2014). 
 
3. All items mentioned in literature based on the previous two rules have been 
summariesd and the results was the referred table number 5.5.  
4. To make sure that there were not any items been neglected or overlooked a thorough key 
words research have been conducted over Google scholar and all major scientific databases 
including ScienceDirect, Emerald and EBSCOhost etc.  Examples of the used key words 
(e.g. Intellectual capital, intangible asset, human capital, knowledge infrastructure) 
The study disclosure index has been developed to fit the Jordanian context. The refined disclosure 
index to fits this study’s context and to allow it to achieve its goals. Many steps have been taken by 
the researcher to make sure that the developed disclosure index is suitable to measure the 
intellectual capital within Jordanian companies the following criteria have been taken into 
consideration: 
 
1. excluding rules that been applied in this case were the item will be considered irrelevant 
and not included in the index if it opposes the social and/or legal norms in the context 
country e.g. transformed gender equality or homosexual equality as such items in Jordan 
still illegal. If the item is outdated or been replaced due to technological advancement e.g. 
computer literacy as this has been mandatory in primary schools. Also, some overlapping 
items been removed e.g. adaptability and flexibility, innovation and innovation-capacity, 
connectivity and networking etc.  
2.  After developing and finalising the disclosure index it was sent for evaluation to 
professional and academic experts who have extensive experience in disclosure and are 
familiar with the Jordanian financial markets: subsequently it has been further amended 
based on their views which suggested elimination of items that firms can’t share 
information about e.g. child labour, HIV/AIDS positive people engagement and ethnic 
minorities empowerment etc. 
 In practical terms the following steps have been followed to develop construct the disclosure 
index:  
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First step: a check list made with all identified IC items in literature and some of the disclosure 
indices have been retrieved especially those developed or adopted by extant literature for example: 
(Edvinsson 1997; Guthrie et al. 1999; Petty & Guthrie 2000; Guthrie & Petty 2000; Li et al. 2007; 
Li et al. 2008; Dumay 2014). The table below summarises the IC items mentioned in prior studies 
and widely accepted amongst the scholars. 
Table 5.5 Summary of IC items 
Structural Capital  
Or as referred 
organizational capital 
Relational Capital, 
sometime referred as external capital 
Human Capital 
Corporate culture 
Explicit knowledge 
Business process capita 
Organizational routines 
Management processes 
IT 
innovation 
Systems and Databases 
Patents 
Tarde marks  
 
            Description of existing information 
technology systems 
Software assets held or developed by the 
firm 
Description of intellectual technology 
facilities (e.g. buildings) 
Information technology expenses 
           Information and communication within the 
company 
Efforts related to the working environment 
Working from home 
Internal sharing of knowledge and 
information 
External sharing of knowledge and 
information 
Measure of internal processing failures 
Measure of external processing failures 
Discussion of fringe benefits and company 
social programs 
Outline of environmental approvals and 
statements/policies 
            R&D expenses.  
Ratio of R&D expenses to sales 
R&D invested into basic research 
R&D invested into product design and 
development 
Details of future prospects regarding R&D 
Details of existing company patents 
Number of patents and licenses etc. 
Information on pending patents 
 Description of new production technology 
Statements of corporate quality 
performance 
Information about strategic alliances of the 
firm 
Objectives and reason for strategic 
alliances 
Comments on the effects of the strategic 
alliances 
Description of the network of suppliers 
and distributors 
           Statements of image and brand 
Corporate culture statements 
Statements about best practices 
Market assets 
Brands 
Customers relationships 
Market information 
Company’s name 
Distribution channels 
Network partners. 
New cooperation form. 
relationship capital 
Number of customers. 
 
Sales breakdown by customer. 
 
Annual sales per segment or product. 
 
Average purchase size by customer. 
 
Dependence on key customers. 
 
Description of customer involvement in 
firm’s operations. 
 
Description of customer relations. 
 
Education/training of customers. 
 
Ratio of customers to employees. 
 
Value added per customer or segment. 
 
Absolute market share (%) of the firm 
within its industry. 
 
Relative market share (not expressed as 
percentage) of the firm Market share (%) 
breakdown by country/segment/product. 
 
Repurchases by customers 
Reputation 
Customer Knowledge 
Supplier Knowledge 
Licensing agreements 
Customer satisfaction 
Business collaborations 
Market share 
Respect for privacy 
Animal welfare 
Livestock and crop exotic disease controls 
Natural resource management and 
biodiversity. 
Favourable contracts 
Franchising agreements 
Negotiating capacity with financial entities  
Research collaborations 
Stakeholders 
Employees’ relationship 
Tacit knowledge employee’s minds.  
Ability 
Employees’ values 
Work related knowledge 
Vocational qualifications 
              Employee breakdown by age 
Employee breakdown by seniority 
Employee breakdown by gender 
Employee breakdown by nationality 
Employee breakdown by department 
Employee breakdown by job function 
Employee breakdown by level of 
education 
Rate of employee turnover 
Employees health and safety 
absenteeism rate 
competency development 
competency development programmes and 
activities. 
Education and training expenses 
Recruitment policies 
Job rotation opportunities. 
Career opportunities. 
              Remuneration and incentive systems 
Pensions 
Insurance policies. 
               Statements of dependence on key 
personnel 
Revenues to employee. 
Value added to employee 
Human value 
Expert team 
Employee productivity 
Employee know-how 
Employee Expertise  
Diversity and opportunity 
Non-discrimination 
Child labour 
              Strategy and management of human rights 
Compensation 
Employee Benefits 
Community Involvement 
Union activity 
Black Economic Empowerment 
Race 
Gender 
Disadvantaged 
Staff with HIV/AIDS 
Religion 
Disability 
Creativity 
Development 
Employee satisfaction 
Friendliness 
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Organisational structure of the firm 
Utilisation of energy, raw materials and 
other input goods 
Investment in the environment 
Description of community involvement 
Information on corporate social 
responsibility and objective 
Description of employee 
contracts/contractual issues 
Corporate culture 
Management philosophy 
Financial relations 
Quality Standards 
Copyrights 
   Best practice 
Intensity 
Image 
Environmental activities 
Customer loyalty 
Client profile 
Competitor names 
Ethical matters 
Market intensity 
Negotiation 
Customers trust 
Customers feedback 
No. of customers 
Customers segment 
Supply chain 
Business network 
Development new stores across regions. 
Delivery system. 
Marketing and advertising. 
Carry out market research. 
Online selling. 
Catalogues 
Promotion activities/strategies. 
Liaison office 
Network of suppliers and distributors 
Dependence on key customers 
Sales breakdown by product or business. 
Identification 
Motivation 
Perceptions 
Sensitivity 
Entrepreneurial spirit 
Employee commitment 
Employee communicative activities. 
Employee attitude 
Dependence on key employees and 
replacement policy 
Proactive and reactive abilities. 
Changeability.  
(Andreas Andrikopoulos 2010), (Singh & Mitchell Van der Zahn 2008), (Brüggen et al. 2009), (Guthrie et al. 2007), 
(Wagiciengo & Belal 2012), (Beattie & Thomson 2007), (Campbell & Abdul Rahman 2010), (García-Meca & Martínez 
2007), (Whiting & Miller 2008), (Li et al. 2008), (CIMA 2003), (Bontis 1998), (Spender 2006), (Petty & Guthrie 2000), 
(Abeysekera & Guthrie 2004), Guthrie, 2001) (Abeysekera 2007) 
 
Second step: a sample of annual reports across all sectors of Jordanian companies (20 companies 
for year 2014) to check their intellectual capital disclosure practices. Based on this review the 
irrelevant intellectual capital items have been eliminated i.e. transformed gender equality or 
homosexual equality as such items in Jordan still illegal and another example is computer literacy 
as this has been mandatory in primary schools. Also, some overlapping items been removed e.g. 
adaptability and flexibility, innovation and innovation-capacity, connectivity and networking etc. It 
is worth mentioning that this index is developed based on thorough exploratory review that is an 
extensive review of the top-twenty companies from each sector in the ASE annual reports for the 
year ending 2014 totalling 20 “annual reports” this step aims to explore the current practices of 
ICD. Such methodology is widely used in the literature e.g. (Cooke 1989; García-meca et al. 2005; 
Bontis et al. 2006; Li 2009; Uyar & Kilic 2012).  
After the relevant data is collected over the study period21 the scores are collapsed vertically and 
horizontally. Thus, the firms score for one item will reflect its average score over the seven years. 
And the total score will reflect the average scores of the items listed in the disclosure index 
collapsed over two stages: first stage to produce the average quality of information of the sub-
                                               
21 Due to the manual data collection process, the period to survey the whole sample (700) annual reports took 9 months 
from the researcher to finish this phase of research.  
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capital i.e. HC. The second stage the average of sub-capitals i.e. (HC, RC, and SC) to produce the 
average quality score assigned to the total quality of (ICD-Quality). This methodology present an 
extension to the methodology used by (Botosan, 1997; Beattie & Thomson 2007; Husin et al. 2012) 
and provide a genuine contribution to the methodology of measuring the ICD quality longitudinally 
as prior studies applied their examination to one year only.  
This index score’s and weights are verified by a group of investors including three institutional 
investors and seven individual ones. They have been asked to list the index items based on its 
importance and usefulness to them. In both the above mentioned cases the disclosure index was 
considered a very useful research instrument to capture either the levels of disclosure or the quality 
of information disclosed (Botosan, 1997), despite it being described as questionable from the point 
of view of its reliability and validity (Beattie & Thomson 2007).   
Thus, to avoid subjectivity these indices were judged by a panel of academics and professional 
experts with detailed discussion of the index validity and reliability provided in the dedicated 
section later. In addition, they have been developed after an extensive literature review and after 
conducting an exploratory review of the current ICD practices in Jordan. As mentioned before, a 
representative sample of annual reports was surveyed to gain a comprehensive understanding of the 
disclosure practices in Jordan and Jordanian companies. Following the methodology of Abeysekera 
& Guthrie (2005a) and Beattie & Thomson (2007) the sentence that carry a full and meaningful 
piece of information will be adopted to measure the disclosed information about the intellectual 
capital.  
The final vresion of the disclosure index is in the table below which summarises the IC items that 
compses the insex and a discreption of these items: 
Table 5.6 The disclosure index 
Structural Capital 
Corporate Strategy This covers the vision and mission of the corporate its core values, business 
model and long run goals and any other information relating to this item. 
Excellence All methods, possibilities and techniques deployed by business to adhere to 
the best performance and achieve higher level of customer’s satisfaction.  
attitudes towards long term success and the Practices in maintaining and 
improving quality standards of products and & improvement services  
Certification and Any kind of disclosure about the company if it has any national and/or 
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Accreditation international accreditations, and disclosure about alignment with the any 
international standards (ISO, UKAS, HACCP etc.), or applying specific 
standard to gain trust and the how this help it to achieve its objectives. Prizes 
and awards  
Intellectual 
property 
this refer to all disclosures made about intangibles that include but not 
limited to patents, innovations, copyrights, trademarks, trade secrets, 
licenses, commercial rights and other related fields owned by firm and its 
assets which is protected by law this may include also Concessions and 
favourable contract (Singh & Mitchell Van der Zahn 2008; Li et al. 2008a) 
Research & 
Development: 
This refers to future-oriented, longer-term activities in business practice, 
which development (R&D) can achieve higher levels of knowledge and 
improvement in business practice, allowing the organisation to exploit 
competitive advantages. It includes, e.g. R&D policies, programmes, 
planning, progress, budgets. R & D plans projects budget and expenses 
dedicated for quality improvements (Merkley 2014). 
Online 
environment 
This include the services that firm provide via its website, its email, mobile 
applications and other technological channels. Also, the description of the 
services in narrative or providing statistics for such services. (Mouritsen 
1998) 
Systems Any information disclosed about the interrelated elements, structures and 
subcomponent of the company that used by company to facilitate either 
producing its products or rendering services or to facilitate delivering these 
to its customers or helping the management to achieve the corporate’s goals.  
information 
technology systems 
A collection of, software’s, technologies and/or techniques, which combine 
resources to produce desired products or helping in making the quality of 
service better, or to solve problems, fulfil needs, or satisfy wants. It includes 
machines IT (e.g. computer hardware and software), IS (e.g. programs, 
applications, database), technical methods, and techniques. Also this 
includes Investments in information technology and reasons for investment 
in IT Description of existing IT and IT systems expenses and the MIS and 
utilization of systems and technologies system integration and information 
system security. 
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Management 
philosophy 
The way leaders in the firm think about the firm and its employees’ i.e. the 
way a firm’s managed. Leaders thinking about their company and its 
employees. For example, management philosophy can be Kaizeni 
(continuous improvement), Total Quality management, or 
Empowerment, (Brooking, 1998). 
Corporate culture Organizational disclosure about its mind-set, including its values, beliefs, 
attitudes and understandings shared by its people and groups within an 
organisation, which controls the way members of the organisation interact 
with each other and with other stakeholders.  
Policies, 
Procedures, And 
Procedures (PPP) 
Any disclosures that describes the policies and procedures that approved and 
used to govern the operations and practices within the company and show 
how the company is run. Also, disclosures about its organisational norms 
and operations for utilizing resources, routines, and documentations which 
enables the company or employees to follow.  Indicators are, e.g. efficiency, 
effectiveness, and productivity. (Li et al. 2008a) 
New Products, 
and/or Plans for 
new products 
Any information disseminated by company about developing a new products 
and a plans for new products/ new business lines. 
Knowledge 
Management 
This includes information relating to knowledge sharing any information 
relating to know-how-transfer, educating employees/customers/suppliers and 
sharing experiences with local societies (Bratianu & Orzea 2013). 
Risk Management Any information that describe the company’s attitude in dealing with risks 
including risk management policy and risk appetite statement, risk profile, 
hedging techniques and the  measurements of internal and external 
processing failure, this may include any pre-established criterias for 
measuring the failure, near-miss incidents and etc. 
Organization 
structure / reporting 
lines  
Organizations hierarchy, reporting lines, governance structure within the 
organization and the authorities and responsibilities allocation within the 
company. 
flexibility Information reflect the company’s ability to cope with changes in economy, 
operation circumstances and how it’s able to face challenges in order to turn 
100 
 
the threats into opportunities. This may include information about energy 
alternative,  
or shortage of raw materials, failure of specific supplier and business 
continuity planning  
Tacit Knowledge This covers information about the company learning ability taking in 
consideration the feedback company acquired, experience build-up. 
Knowledge-based 
infrastructures 
It includes, e.g. documented materials (e.g. shared database) that a firm 
shares infrastructure amongst employees, facilities or centres (knowledge 
centres, laboratories) (Merkley 2014) 
Relational capital 
Networking and 
Connectivity 
Any information disclosed about the channels utilised by company to 
connect and communicate with its customers and suppliers e.g. internet, 
mailbox voice-mail, social media channels and professional networks. 
Groupware and corporate intranets, personal digital assistants, and 
newsletters. Also, networks of distribution, such as distribution centres. It is 
what a company owns and forms a very essential part of the business supply 
chain. (Hassan & Marston 2010; Campbell 2004) 
Market presence The geographical area that the company is serving or covering including the 
selling points representative office or branches  locally or internationally, 
targeted markets and ability to satisfy all expected demands 
Market share Information about the market share statistics, competition in market growth 
in sales, sales per segments and per business line major customers and long 
term contracts with customers sales forecast etc.  
Customer 
relationships 
Information covers include principles, practices, and guidelines that an 
organization follows when interacting with its customers. (E.g. customer 
loyalty schemes, customer satisfaction survey and the initiatives taken for 
improvement, complaints management). Also, this covers company’s 
channels to obtain feedback form customers such as hot-lines call centres 
etc. (Li et al. 2008b; Li 2009) 
Customer retention: Disclosure made about the activities company takes to 
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prevent customers from switching to alternative companies.  
Customer 
involvement 
this include the strategy that identifies and develops ways to involve 
customers in the business and product development process, such as design, 
marketing, sales, customer service, etc. The degree of involvement can be as 
far as to make the customer a part of the product, experience, and delivery. it 
focuses on customer consultation on product or services development, which 
could also include customer and company connectivity. 
Company image Information disclosed about reputation (goodwill) and how the customers 
and all other stakeholders perceived the company and how they look to the 
company and to what extent this affect the company policies and its 
reactions toward this mental image (Li et al. 2008a) 
Strategic alliance 
and Business 
collaboration 
partnership with other companies joint effort products and/or joint venture 
and any joint effort in research for developing products Collaborations 
established with other business partners, moreover, this include relationship 
with subsidiaries and sister companies and/or parent companies. 
Distribution 
channels and 
Intensity 
Defined as appropriate mechanisms of getting products and services into the 
market (Brooking, 1996). It refers to various third party distribution channels 
e.g. distributors, agents, dealers knowledge of suppliers, relationships with 
them (such as suppliers reliance on key suppliers, bargaining power against 
suppliers, support of suppliers, and payment terms). Intensity also covered 
by information about company’s position in the market and its ability to 
cover the local market and ability to reach markets abroad. (García-Meca & 
Martínez 2007; Whiting & Miller 2008) 
Business 
agreements 
It includes such as licensing and franchising agreements, any agreement that 
company think it empower its competition in the market. 
Diffusion Is the process by which a new idea or new product is accepted by the 
market? The rate of diffusion is the speed that the new idea spreads from one 
consumer to the next 
 Human Capital  
Number of Information about employee’s count of a firm, employee breakdown by, e.g. 
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employees market (business operation or geographical segments). 
Staff’s breakdown Disclosures covering qualifications and by role of employees within the firm 
Employee’s 
benefits 
what benefits offered by firm to its staff including fringe benefits and other 
benefits e.g. education support career mobility 
Recruitment policy is there any approved policy for hiring/ firing employees in place, the 
qualification should be in the employee to be hired job discerption for each 
vacancy in the firm 
Employee diversity Diversity is defined as the division of classes among a certain population. 
The item refers to the mix of, e.g. ethnicity, gender, and colour, and 
nationality. Relevant disclosures include employee diversity policy, the mix 
and breakdown of employee by race, religion, and culture. 
Employee 
education 
And Skills/know-
how 
Education of directors as well as other employees diversifications of the 
employees according to the level of education and certifications held by 
them also, practical knowledge on how to accomplish something Disclosures 
can be description of knowledge, know-how, expertise or skills of directors 
and other employees. Matrices could also be shown indicating number of 
employees with such skills, vocational qualifications etc. (Li et al. 2008b) 
Employee work-
related 
competences and 
work related 
experiences  
The knowledge and skills that can be useful to accomplish jobs. It refers to 
competences e.g. current positions held outside the company by directors, 
professional recognition/qualification, awards won (external), and employee 
publications. Also information that is acquired during the job in terms of 
tacit, explicit and implicit knowledge including employees’ previous 
working experiences.  
Employee equality  
and Genderism 
Disclosures cover written policy or any mechanism to ensure equal treatment 
of staff irrespective of social and cultural differences. Related disclosures 
include employee equality policy and initiatives taken for enforcement, 
senior management by gender, and percentage of disabled employees 
irrespective of social and cultural differences (Li et al., 2008). 
Training including training policy, budget and training expenses also types of training 
its implications on the firm’s future and key employees replacement policy 
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(Succession-plan) 
Work environment Firm’s attitude toward offering supporting work environment discrimination 
free and challenging to the employees’ abilities. Providing safe workplace 
and safety initiatives  
Employee 
relationship 
The acknowledgments and recognition of importance of employees, 
employee appreciation, dependence on key employees, employee 
satisfaction, loyalty, Health & Safety and working environment. It also 
includes initiatives to build and improve employee relationship, e.g. trade 
union activities, promotion in share ownership and employee contractual 
relationships 
Employee attitudes 
and commitments 
Information that reflects how employees are working and how they attached 
to their work. Relevant disclosures could be, e.g. behaviour employee 
friendliness, welcoming, hardworking, optimism, enthusiasm, and 
identification of individuals with company’s goals 
Employee 
motivation 
Policies, initiatives and evidence of motivation of directors and other 
employees. It includes reward (internal) and incentives systems, e.g. 
employee explicit recognition, performance psychometric occupational 
assessment, and indicators of such as employee turnover, stability, absence, 
and seniority (Li et al. 2008a; Campbell 2004; Hassan & Marston 2010) 
Employee 
capabilities 
Other employee abilities apart from the above discussed, e.g. communication 
ability, interpersonal ability, sensitivity (e.g. thoughtful), flexibility, and 
management quality (Guthrie 2007) 
Employee 
teamwork 
Teamwork is the concept of people working together cooperatively. It covers 
information about culture of teamwork (expert teams and networks, 
teamwork capacity), programmes that enhance relationships between 
employees within/across departments22 
 
 
                                               
22 Full discerption of the disclosure index is listed in appendix D   
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Concerning the corporate governance, a check-list of the CG mechanisms is produced based on the 
CG mechanisms that have been  adapted by the Jordanian corporates as indicated by the 
exploratory review and based on the corporate governance code issued by the government i.e. 
Jordan Securities Commission taking in consideration limitations of statistical model.  
5.12  Research’s Sample  
The research population is formed of all companies listed in Amman stocks exchange at the end of 
December 2014 (265) companies. These 265 divided into 4 sectors which are namely (Banking, 
Insurance, services, and manufacturing).  The top 100 companies have been chosen to be the 
study’s sample as purposive sample which fulfill the condition of being listed over the study period 
(2009-2016). Thus, the surveyed annual reports are 700 annual reports (100X7). 
 
The selected sample represents 78% of the market capitalization and the sectorial allocation of the 
sample is as the following: 
Table 5.7 Sample Breakdown 
Sector Number of companies 
Banking 15 
Insurance  15 
Services 34 
Manufacturing  36 
Total 100 
A detailed list of the sample provided in the appendix A at the end of this thesis.  
 
5.13 Annual reports as a source of data 
Annual reports have been serving as a very important communication means for the corporates 
themselves and for their audiences (Plung and Montgomery, 2004). Annual reports are studied 
from many different points of views (Mobasher et al. 2013). Some studies have examined the 
annual reports as a voluntary disclosure tool (Chakroun & Hussainey 2014; Lang & Stice-
Lawrence 2015; Absar 2016). Also, some studies have looked into the annual report to assess 
certain contents e.g. graphs and images (Davison 2014; Husin et al. 2012) and others have examine 
the CSR disclosures in  annual reports (Schwindenhammer 2013; Lys et al. 2015; Jamil et al. 
2002). Some studies are dedicated to assess the readability and the understandability of the 
information in  annual reports (Merkley 2014; Liao et al. 2013; Smith and fofller, 1993) and the list 
can be very much longer. Thus, all these go to show the importance of  annual reports for  
accounting studies and the reports’ legitimacy as a source of data for  studies in the accounting and 
financial context.  According to Stanton & Stanton (2002)  annual reports, in addition to being a 
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legal document,  serve as a marketing tool, communication channel, corporate strategy 
visualisation mechanism,  and accountability means.   
The importance of  corporate annual reports for the stakeholders’ community is well documented in 
literature. Moreover, corporate annual reports remain a crucial communication tool and rich source 
of information for different types of users due to the variety information posted in the reports. This 
is  especially true in  management analysis and discussions which normally offer information about 
the firms achievements, performances, plans and strategic orientations and directions (Cooke 
1989). In addition, and according to Yuthas et al. (2002) surveying the views of US investors 
indicated that the most important portions of the annual reports are the President’s Letter and the 
Management Discussion and analysis MD&A and these are the most important source of 
information for evaluation of the firm.  
Annual reports narratives are the primary source of information about  IC (White et al. 2010). 
Despite some information about companies’ intangible assets which can be found on company 
website, its press releases and for a few companies in IC independent reports, the general practice 
among the corporates is to provide the information about its intangible assets through the narrative 
in the annual reports. Thus, we find most research conducted in the IC field relies on the  annual 
report as a source of data e.g. (Dumay & Cai 2014; Mubaraq & Ahmed Haji 2014; Liao et al. 2013; 
Abdifatah Haji Ahmed & Nazli A Mohd Ghazali 2013; Ramanauskaite & Rudzioniene 2013; Haji 
& Ghazali 2012; Aryani & Prabowo 2011; Phusavat et al. 2011; Beattie & Thomson 2010; White 
et al. 2010; Brüggen et al. 2009; Sonnier et al. 2008; White et al. 2007; Vandemaele et al. 2005; 
Abeysekera & Guthrie 2005b; Li 2009). Hence, the feasibility of such source of data for studying 
the ICD is well documented among the extant literature although they vary in terms of economic 
conditions, regulatory frameworks, and geo-political contexts. In addition, the narrative in annual 
reports is a very important source of information for  investors’ and analysts’ judgment:  it offers 
concurrent debate about the matters that happened during the previous accounting period with 
details and justifications from the management and the chairman. They also provide information to 
facilitate the understanding of the numbers, figures and items in the financial statements, as 
sometimes the financial statements appear too complicated to non-specialised people so extra 
information will make them easier to understand  (Beattie 2014).   
In Jordan, this study’s context, the annual report is mandatory and must  be prepared and posted to 
the all shareholders;   it should also be available for anyone who request it. According to the 
Jordanian corporate law and the JSC disclosure instructions a hardcopy of the annual report should 
be sent to the JSC and made availble to the public in the company premises within three months of 
the end of the financial year. Should the company fail to do this  there will follow disciplinary 
actions from the JSC including  a  fine and it could even result in the the suspension of trading in 
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the ASE. Moreover, as mentioned in  part one, the basic contents of the annual report have been 
specified by the disclosure directives.  
5.14  Follow up Interviews 
As mentioned in the methodology section above, this study is using a mixed research method to 
achieve its goals due to the justifications mentioned previously under section (3.4.1). As specified 
in the research aims, the ultimate goal of the present study is to provide a deep and thorough   
understanding of the relationship between the CG and the level and  quality of  ICD. It aims to 
provide an insightful explanation of the existing relationship between the studied variables. This 
notion emphasised by Cupchik, G., (2001) who provides the ontological reasoning for 
implimenting both quantitative and qualitative research methods to compliment each other. 
According to his argument, in order for researchers to gain a  comprehensive understanding or 
detailed explination for the relationships between the researched variables, they need to take a 
further step after conducting the statsitical tests on the quantatative data and identify if the 
relationship is statistically significant or not. This further step is incorporating  qualitative research 
strategies to yield deeper undersanding and comprehensiveve explanation for the relations between 
variables and this will facilitate the generalisability of the findings. However, before we move to 
the description of the interviews used in this study it is worth  defining the interviews and how they 
generally used in social research. This will include a consideration of the types and strategies 
associated with interviews, the need for interviews and how they are to be conducted.  
5.14.1 Interview 
Interviews as known to us today were developed by Socrates two thousand and a half years ago. he 
In his work with his students Socrates initiated this type of dual-dialogue  between one individual 
who asks and another one who answers. However, the present concept of the interview utilised as 
data collection in the scientific research context is a two-way systematic examination between the 
researcher and the informant or expert.  It originated to gain specific information to address one or 
more of research objectives. Interviews can be face to face, and also, can be conducted over the 
telephone, or  can be executed over any one of the modern communication channels i.e. Skype, FB 
Messenger, etc., Also, they can be structured (guided) or unstructured or sometimes it could be mix 
of the two,  known as semi-structured (Iacono et al. 2016). Interviews can be used as main source 
of data or they can be used to provide supplimentary data or further explanation for one or more of 
research aspects (Satyaprasad and Himalaya, 2010) Pp 99-100. 
Another definition of the interview offered by Cooper and Schindler (2014) is an informed 
conversation between a trained researcher and individual or group of people who have  certain 
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experience, knowledge or information. In the interview the researcher (interviewer) will ask 
questions to elicit  specific  information. The respondent (interviewee(s)) will provide replies and 
answers to the researchers based on their real self-experience (e.g. patient in hospital) or based on 
knowledge developed overtime (e.g. consultant, academic).  
5.14.2 Types of Interviews 
Interviews vary based on many aspects: some research methodology references classify them based 
on the questions types (structured, unstructured, semi-strucutred) and other classifications use the 
interview settings  (face to face interview, remote interview, computer-aided interview).  
However, in one piece of research,it is quite posible for the researcher to mix all these together: for 
example a  researcher may use  structured interviews, some conducted some face to face and the 
remainder remotely on a real-time basis e.g. over telephone or CA interviews (Skype, Face-time, 
Facebook Messenger) (Iacono et al. 2016).  Or it could be done on a non-real time basis (Email 
interviews of Chat-Boards interviews) (Iacono et al. 2016; Janghorban et al. 2014; Trier-Bieniek 
2012). Below I will introduce each one of these classifications and the advantages and 
disadvantages of each of them: 
1. Unstructured interview: in this type of interview researchers are interested in collecting as 
much detail as they can about the phenomena by asking open questions to elicit a detailed answer. 
Or as referred to sometimes – “the juicy details”. For example, when researcher want to know the 
rituals of certain ethnic group and are keen to know all the details, the  researcher will ask general 
question and listen and record or take notes of all details provided by respondent(s) (Anon 2017).   
2. Structured interview:  in structured interviews  the researchers have prepared the questions and 
will stick to the questions already prepared. Under this kind of interviews the researcher is 
interested in specific themes relevant to the study hence he/she will focus on these themes (Cooper 
2013; Sekaran. U. and Bougie 2010).  
2. Semi-structured interview: here the researcher decides to look for  specific information but is 
also interested in acquiring any other relevant information the respondent may provide. In this case 
the interview will be a mix of structured and unstructured questions  (Cooper & Schindler 2014).    
5.15   The present study interviews  
The present study deploys the semi-structured interview to collect  primary data seeking further 
explanation and deeper understanding of the subject phenomena. The interviews questions are  
designed, based on the quantitative analysis results, to dig deeper into the factors that may affect 
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the ICD. The sample for interview is selected based on the researcher’s judgment about those 
individuals who can provide helpful ideas which will leverage the research contributions.   
The interview’s questions were sent to experts for review and to ensure that they can elicit the 
information needed; furthermore, it has been piloted with an expert who has both professional and 
academic backgrounds and based on his feedback the interview’s questions were amended for the 
best ability to elicit the relevant information which will enrich the quantitative results  
The intended sample was divided into three categories to cover all the stakeholder’s spectrum. 
Hence, the researcher investigated the views from representatives of annual reports preparers, users 
and from the regulators and supervisory bodies. There are difficulties involved with running an 
academic interview with high profile professionals and investors: it requires patience; furthermore 
there is an inbuilt reluctance amongst Jordanian people  to share their ideas with researchers23 as 
they worried about the end use of information they will give. This is especially true when the 
process is recorded. Hence, with extensive follow-up; with honest reassurance form the researcher 
to the participants that no recording will be carried out; that names will be anonymous under all 
circumstances and with a guarantee that any information provided will be solely used for  research 
purposes, the researcher successfully conducted eight interviews.   
According to Hair, J. F., Celsi, M., Money (2016) the age of information technology has an 
impacton business research in different ways: firstly, matters matter less as the attention goes 
towards the intangibles and soft assets. Secondly, the distance matters less as the globe is turned 
into a small village and communication technology makes the relationship flow  more easily . 
Thirdly, time matters more as in the current business environment time is the most important 
resource. Due to these factors and other considerations mentioned early before  the present study 
has utilised the remote interview techniques to access the interviewees. Such kind of interviews 
give the researcher  flexibility and facilitate the access to intended individuals without interruption 
to their work-time, or any of the discomfort of the formal face to face interview. In addition there is 
the economic advantages of saving time and resources (Hanna 2012).  
 
The table below summarise the advantages and disadvantages of the remote interviews comparing 
to face to face interviews.   
                                               
23 Most developing countries including Arab countries which run as a Polizeistaat (Police state) have poor records of 
human rights and freedom of speech, this unpleasant history affect people’s perception regarding speaking to researchers 
in the presence of recorder machine.   
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Table 5.8 Comparison between face to face and remotely administered interviews. 
Interview Face to face  Remotely Administered  
 Advantages  
1. Elicit more details and comprehensive 
answers  
2. Capturing the body language of the 
respondent  
3. The researcher can modify and clarify 
the questions based on the response  
1. Flexibility  
2. Resources saving 
3. May gain more response  
Disadvantages  
1.  Time consuming to recruit and conduct 
2. Physical presence of the interviewer can 
put some pressure on interviewee and 
generate biased answers. 
3. Ecological side-effects  
1. The interviewer will lose the 
opportunity of eye contact 
with the interviewee. 
2. Will not gain details as much 
as under face to face one.   
 
5.16 The Interviewees sample design  
The purpose of the interviews in this research is to offer explanatory information for the results 
derived from the secondary data analysis. Thus, careful selection of the interviewees is needed 
to make sure that the respondents will satisfy the research purposes of results validation. 
Different strategies are available to select the respondents out of the targeted population 
(reports’ preparers and users) and in such circumstances probability-sampling will not help. A 
specific respondent with a certain level of knowledge and credentials will be required to fulfil 
the requirements of selecting the interviewees (Cooper & Schindler 2014; Sekaran. U. and 
Bougie 2010).  A non-probability sample was sought to listen to well-informed individuals who 
can provide expert views based on their personal experience, close monitoring of the stock 
market or based on their engagement as executive management members, who prepare or 
participate in preparing the annual reports and who know the details of the narrative provided in 
them.   
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5.17  Research Tools validity and Reliability 
As previously mentioned in this study a mixed methods approach was adopted for data 
collection. Thus, each one of these two different types of data collection tools must undergo a 
test for validity and reliability.  
▪ Content Analysis: 
The validity of the data collection tool (disclosure index) was achieved by taking certain 
precautions to make sure that the present disclosure index will fulfil its aim and aid the 
researcher by collecting the relevant data for the study. These precautions are:  
1.  Adopting a disclosure index from literature and customising it to the study context by 
removing irrelevant items or those not applicable to the research context based on preliminary 
review of the annual reports as mentioned in the section dedicated to the research instrument 
development. (item irrelevant/not applicable e.g. Child labour, Black Empowerment, Race, 
HIV/AIDS Positive staff etc., these items are either culturally not acceptable to discuss, or 
political-correctness suggests them to be inappropriate: sometimes items disclosed by western 
companies may touch on political or religious taboos e.g. staff sexual orientation, LGBTC 
rights, etc., ).  
2.  After developing and finalising the disclosure index it was sent for evaluation to professional 
and academic experts who have extensive experience in disclosure and are familiar with the 
Jordanian financial markets: subsequently it has been further amended based on their views. 
3.  A pilot study was carried out to evaluate the index’s ability to achieve the intended role of 
capturing the data.  Satisfactory results were reached in the pilot study.  
Reliability: the reliability of the disclosure index, referred to as the degree of trust, demands 
that it will give the same results if it is replicated either by the same researcher at a different 
time or simply by another researcher(s). However, when we talk about  reliability there are three 
concepts associated with the reliability: 1. Stability, 2. Reproducibility, and 3. Accuracy 
(Krippendorff 2013).   
Stability: refers to getting the same result on the index when the coding process is carried out 
by the researcher on the same element in two different periods. In this research the researcher  
did this exercise on five companies  already done in the pilot study. When  recoded the results 
were absolutely the same.  
Reproducibility: means the ability of other researcher to reach the same results if applying the 
same methodology in coding (Beattie et al. 2004). It is acceptable if the agreement between the 
two coders was above 81%. Moreover Hayes & Krippendorff,  (2007) stated that agreement 
111 
 
level above 80% will be modestly acceptable. To validate the research from this standpoint the 
researcher have asked another colleague (fellow PhD student) to do the coding for one company 
and then applied the KAPPA24 test using Stata14 to evaluate the agreement: the results of the 
test showed below reflect a very good percentage.  
 
Table 5.9 Tool consistency test 
Expected 
Agreement Agreement Kappa Std. Err. Z Prob>Z 
96.43% 96.43% 0.0000 0.0000 0.00 0.5000 
Accuracy as defined in the context of “content analyses refer as the evaluation of the 
researcher’s (coder) performance based on the pre-established measurements either by 
group of experts or comparing prior studies. (Krippendorff 2013; Milne and Adler, 1999). 
However, Milne and Adler (1999) stated that reliability can be achieved without the need 
to apply the reproducibility test if the researcher undergoes a sufficient training.    
 
▪ Ordinal Scale validity: 
Sekaran, & Bougie (2010) identified several types of validities for the scale measures. These 
include: 
• Construct validity: or the concept validity which refers to the scale’s ability to 
measure the intended phenomena without bias. This must be supported by theory as the 
relationship between two or more phenomena that are measured should be supported 
by theory should have a valid relationship (Westen & Rosenthal 2003).  
• Content validity: this type of validity sometimes used as synonym of face validity 
indicates the degree of logical construction of the scale and its relevance for measuring 
the phenomena. Content of the scale can be validated for undergoing assessment from  
professionals or experts in the field sometimes if the scale measures behavioural 
aspects it need to be judged by psychologists and behavioural scholars to make sure of 
the scale ability to capture the subject phenomena (Sekaran. U. and Bougie 2010).    
• Criterion validity: this type of validity indicates how closely the outcomes match with 
the proposed hypothesis or as expected in relation to the construct validity. For 
                                               
24 The literature suggests also other measurements for inter-rater reliability e.g. Krippendorff’s alpha, Scott’s 
piand Leigh’s lambda (see Milne & Adler, 1999).  
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example, job satisfaction is directly affected by the payment or salary (Hair, J. F., 
Celsi, M., Money 2016).  
 
▪ Reliability: According to Hair et al (2016) reliability can be achieved by two strategies: 
firstly the test and retest, and  secondly through an internal-consistency reliability test.  
While the first requires going through the process of coding from another coder and then  
measuring the degree of consistency in the process between the two coders: the second 
strategy is measured statistically as indicated by the value of Cronbach’s Alpha or the 
correlation between two test measuring two constructs (Hair, J. F., Celsi, M., Money 2016; 
Sekaran. U. and Bougie 2010) the Cronbach’s alpha for the current index was 0.87 which 
is statically acceptable as  values falling between 0.70 and 0.95 are acceptable (Hair, J. F., 
Celsi, M., Money 2016). 
  
▪ Interviews: There is no formal technique to assess the interviews validity. However, 
extant literature suggests some precautions that researcher can take to assure 
interviews validity.  
1. The interviews questions’ development; these should be able to illuminate the respondent’s reply 
and elicit the useful information. This could be achieved by proper validation of the questions from 
a panel of experts in the study field25.  
2. Choosing the right informant and knowledgeable interviewees will help in securing valid 
answers and saving the researchers time and resources.  
3. Doing the right number of interviews. This point is very debatable in accounting research and 
merely there is no consensus among researchers about how many interviews is enough. The 
number of interviews depends in the study’s nature, purpose, interviews’ position in the researche - 
either as a main data collection tool or complementary data collection tool. However, (Dai, N., and 
Free, C., 2014) after reviewing 641 published papers in accounting for a period of 15 years from 
2000 – 2014; have concluded that it is a subjectively judgmental decision how many interviews the 
researcher should do. Based on their review the accounting research studies range in interviews 
from one interview to 36 interviews26.  
                                               
25 The interviews questions have undergone a validation process by experts and have been piloted with one expert and 
amendments have been done to assure the validity of interview’s questions.   
26 National Centre for Research Methods organised an academic event attended by 19 academics to estimate the proper 
number of interviews that deemed to be enough and what they have agreed on “is that is depend” the proceeds of that 
event titled with How many qualitative interviews is enough? You can access more detail about this on: 
http://eprints.ncrm.ac.uk/2273/ accessed on 16/05/2017.   
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5.18  Measurements and variables operationalization  
CG varies according to its system: it may be (single layer or double layer) and also according to the 
geopolitical map (Anglo-American, Germanic or East-Asian) it can vary according to the guiding 
virtue (rule-based or principle-based) system(s) (Judge 2010). 
CG mechanisms also  vary in their efficacy, importance and   feasibility. These  mechanisms are 
developed in accordance with the economic and socio-political changes. Moreover, these 
mechanisms are not static overtime and across countries and their importance  change according to 
the socio-political context. For example, in Nordic countries, the social pressures are the most 
important CG mechanism; here, the social norms and values are held in  a supreme standing 
amongst business leaders and they need to obey and strictly comply with them. On the other hand, 
a very different  socio-political context would be China: here state ownership remains the most 
important CG mechanism due to the level of central government interference in the economy. 
Finally, the importance of the CG mechanisms can depend on the theological system of countries: 
for example, in countries like Iran, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia  Sharia-Law are the most regarded 
CG mechanism (Solmon, 2013; Judge, 2010).  This study, due to statistical model limitations, will 
focus on the CG mechanisms that are mentioned in the CG code and those generally adopted by 
Jordanian companies based on the information gained from the annual reports. Thus, the CG 
mechanisms or the control variable are the following: 
I- Board size: Board size is one of the key CG mechanisms. As the board size, will reflect 
the level of expertise diversity of the board, assuring certain level of representativeness 
of the shareholders and the firm’s underlying environment (Beiner et al. 2004). This is 
measured as indicated in the annual reports by the total number of directors forming 
the board. As the literature suggested, there are two main issues associated with the 
board of directors size (1) coordination and communication and (2) the control 
function efficiency (Cerbioni & Parbonetti 2007; Eng & Mak 2003; Liang et al. 2011). 
The first issue is positively affected by the board size, as the larger boards are expected 
to allocate more time and resources to discussion of the firms’ conditions and 
operations; similarly, in the second issue a larger board is expected to form sub-
committees that specialise in monitoring the day-to-day operations, and supervising the 
executive management performance. However, other points of view suggest a negative 
effect for the large board on the efficiency of the board duties (Huther, 1997). Thus, 
this study will consider examining the effect of the board size on the ICD extent and 
quality as one of the CG mechanisms. Board’s size will be measuered simply by the 
number of the memebrs of the board as specified in the annual reports.  
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II- Board independence: Jordanian CG code has differentiated between the independent 
board member and non-executive members. According to the Jordanian CG code 
independent member is: A member of the board of directors who is not tied to the 
company or any of its upper executive management, affiliate companies, or its external 
auditors by any financial interests or relationships other than his shareholding in the 
company that may be suspected to bring that member benefit, whether financial or 
incorporeal, or that may affect his/ her decisions or lead to exploitation of his/ her 
position with the company. The board member loses his independence in any of the 
following cases:  
1. If he or she is, or has been, employed by the company or any of its affiliates during the last three 
years preceding his nomination for membership of the board of directors.  
2. If any of his or her relatives are employed, or have been employed in the executive management 
of the company or any of its affiliates during the last three years preceding his or her nomination 
for membership of the board. 
 
3. If he or she, or any of his/ her relatives has direct or indirect interest in the contracts, projects and 
engagements signed with the company or any of its affiliates to the value of JD 10,000 (ten 
thousand Jordanian Dinars) or more.  
 
4. If the member or any of his/ her relatives is a partner of the company's auditor, or if (he or she) is 
or has been a partner or employee of the company's external auditor during the last three years 
preceding his nomination for membership of the board. 
 
5. If the member has a control in the company of more than 10% of the company's 
capital.  
This study will use the above-mentioned code definition of independent member despite some 
studies used the independent member and non-executive member as synonyms. It will measure the 
percentage of independent members within the board out of the total number of the board. 
Literature suggests that there is a positive relationship between the board independence and the 
level of transparency (Cheng & Courtenay 2006; Lim et al. 2007). Also, the independent members 
within the board are likely to recognise other stakeholder’s need for information and this will 
positive effect on the voluntary disclosure (Patelli & Prencipe 2007; Haniffa & Cooke 2005). 
Moreover, the literature has suggested that independent directors serve as a reliable instrument to 
overcome the agency conflict between the owners and the firm’s executive management. (García-
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Meca & Sánchez-Ballesta 2010). This will be measured as the number of independent memebrs 
within the board as specified in the annual report.  
 
III- Role Duality: Combining the roles of the chairman and CEO may lead to a state of 
authority concentration, conflict of interests and possibly position abuse either by 
avoiding the responsibility or by taking advantage of huge access to the information. 
Therefore, the separation of the two roles is recommended by most CG codes. Doing 
so will definitely facilitate accountability and award tangible authority to the board  
bringing rational debate to the board. This is particularly important in the wake of a 
major financial crisis that result from poor governance and/or aggressive management 
risk abietite (Allegrini & Greco 2013; Huafang & Jianguo 2007; Cheng & Courtenay 
2006). This variable will be measured if the separation of the roles between the 
chairman and the CEO exists. If the CEO is not the same as the chairperson, then (1) 
will be assigned to the company and (0) otherwise.  
IV- Family ownership: Currently, most economic giants in the world (Wal-Mart, Ford Motors, 
Samsung, Porsche, PEUGEOT SA, IKEA Group, TATA, and The Kingdome 
Holdings) are family businesses.27  Likewise, in Jordan (the current study’s context; 
40% of Jordanian financial market capitalization is owned by families and about 75 % 
of the Jordanian companies are founded initially by families or started as a family 
business28. 
Literature is not categorical about the effect of the family ownership on voluntary 
disclosure and corporate transparency: some studies suggest that the presence of family 
ownership supports  transparency (Cascino et al. 2010; Hutton 2007; Ali et al. 2007). 
There may also be a better quality of disclosure as the family investors have longer 
investment horizons. In addition, they will try to maximise their wealth by pushing up 
the share price in the financial market  through releasing good news  (Ghosh & Tang 
2015). Moreover, family investors will be more likely to bear the proprietary cost. In 
addition,  their involvement in management will lower the information asymmetry 
(Chen et al. 2008). Nevertheless, some studies do not share this point of view about 
family ownership’s effect on voluntary disclosure: they claim that the existence the 
family ownership increases the information asymmetry and discourages transparency 
                                               
27 For more details see: http://familybusinessindex.com/#table accessed on 17/12/15.  
28 Details available on the securities depository centre:  
https://www.sdc.com.jo/english/index.php?report_type=3&option=com_public&Itemid=28  accessed on 12-12-15.  
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in general (Chau & Gray 2010; Chen et al. 2008). This occurs as family concentrated 
ownerships leads to a family dominated board, which allows  family members to 
access the information from insider sources: this will lessen the importance of public 
disclosure channels like the annual reports and company websites (Chau & Gray 
2010). This controversy concerning the effect of family ownership makes it 
worthwhile examining the Jordanian context. This will be measured as a percentage of 
the total common stocks controlled by one family(s) at the end of each year of the 
study period.  
V- Management Ownership: based on the work of Jensen & Meckling (1976) the presence 
of managerial ownership participates to decrease the board of directors monitoring role 
over this executive management. Hence, literature suggest adverse relationship 
between the managerial ownership and the disclosed information (Li et al. 2008a; 
Donnelly & Mulcahy 2008). However, it is argued that the sizable managerial 
ownership will reduce the agency cost as a result of the manager-owner 
engagement.(Ahmed Haji 2015). However, the lower agency cost does not mean that 
the information asymmetry between the insiders and outside parties will be abolished 
actually it maybe worsen with this combination of management ownership which 
requires the appointment of independent directors within the management team to 
ensure proper CG (Deegan 2002). In the context of this study management ownership 
refers to the direct ownership by the CEO, or any equivalent individual who occupies 
the top management position e.g.  (General Manager or the Managing Director). This 
will be measured as a dummy variable taking (1) if there are common stocks owned by 
the CEO either directly or indirectly (through his family). Alternatively, it takes (0) 
otherwise.    
VI- Institutional Investors ownership: According to a survey study conducted by (OECD 
2011) institutional investors have a positive role in enhancing the corporate governance 
and re-enforcing the good practices and empowering the board of director monitoring 
role over the executive management. In addition, Scott (2014) found a significant 
relationship between the presence of institutional investors within the ownership 
structure on the amount of resources invested in R&D this was especially true when 
information asymmetry existed as it a matter of fact that the institutional investors 
demand timely and regularly updated financial statements and operational reports 
(Khiari & Karaa 2013). Moreover, the literature suggests a positive relationship 
between the existence of institutional investors’  ownership and the increase in 
voluntary disclosure (Lang & Stice-Lawrence 2015). They usually bring 
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professionalism and well-informed directors to the board and they normally have 
resources and infrastructures, which are not available to the individual investors (Eaton 
et al. 2014). However, some researchers found a little or no effect from the presence of 
institutional investor’s ownership on the voluntary disclosure and the quality of 
disclosure e.g. (Wang & Hussainey 2013). This study assumes that institutional 
investors have a positive role in diminishing the information asymmetry (Shhadat & 
Abdeljaleel, 2011). This variable will be measured as a dummy variable where it takes 
(1) if the institutional ownership exists or (0) otherwise.  
VII- Foreign ownership: It is expected that the foreign investment brings many benefits to 
the investee companies as well as to the economy on a macro level. One feature of 
foreign investment in the companies’ level is the bringing of expertise and knowledge 
transfer in addition to  opening new channels for exporting companies to access new 
markets or opportunities.  Some studies ((Albawwat et al, 2015; Alhazaimeh et al. 
2014; Liang et al. 2012; Haniffa & Cooke 2005)) suggest that there is a positive effect 
from foreign ownership on the disclosure in two ways: firstly, the foreign investors 
will be demanding and will ask for more information due to the fact they will be 
remotely monitoring their investment and  secondly, the motivation for voluntary 
disclosure, which is associated with  foreign investment, is internally from the firms 
themselves:  they will try to provide more and better information to signal the foreign 
market and draw the attention of the foreign investors towards their more visible 
presence. Consequently, in this study, it is expected that foreign ownership will 
positively affect ICD. This factor will be measured as the percentage of the total 
common stocks controlled by non-Jordanian29 individuals or entities, to the total 
common stocks of the subject company at the end of each year of the study period.  
 
VIII- Corporate Governance Committee: The Jordanian CG code encourages companies 
to establish strategies and assigns sufficient resources to ensure consistency and 
compliance with the CG code and international best practices regarding the 
transparency and sound internal control practices. Hence, some companies have within 
its board of directors a committee that is engaged with preparing the CG manual for the 
company itself and monitoring the adherence of the company to the CG code and the 
                                               
29 According to the ASE and SDC statistics 46% of the listed companies stocks are owned by non-Jordanian 
see: https://www.sdc.com.jo/english/index.php?report_type=10&option=com_public&Itemid=28 Accessed 
on 17/12/15.  
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internally developed CG manual. In this study, I will try to examine the effect of 
having such committee within the board on the variance of the ICD.  Measurement of 
the Corporate Governance Committee will be as a dummy variable as it will take (1) if 
the committee established within the board and (0) otherwise.  
 
IX- Audit Committee Size: The audit committee has a pivotal role within the control system 
of the company especially in enforcing the monitoring role of the board and 
empowering other internal control functions, like internal audit and in enhancing the 
level of transparency. Jordanian CGC recommended that the audit committee be 
formed of three members at the minimum and this was the same for The Cadbury 
Committee report (1992), the Smith Committee (2003) and Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 
2002. The main   role of the audit committee is to ensure the integrity and fairness of 
financial reporting and the soundness of the internal control system that will produce a 
financial statement that free from misstatement. It is still the audit committee’s 
responsibility to make sure that financial statements are understandable. This allows 
them to make requests to the management to provide further disclosures and explain all 
aspect of the financial statements (E.Y. 2002). The prior literature e.g.  (Samaha et al. 
2015). Li et al. (2012) indicated a positive relationship between the audit committee 
size and the level of disclosure. This variable will be measured by the number of audit 
committee members as stated in the annual reports.  
X- Audit Committee Effectiveness:The frequent meetings of the audit committee indicates 
that the committee is active and allocating sufficient time and effort to discuss the 
firm’s affairs:  this will have a positive implications on the internal control system in 
the firm (Ho & Wong 2001). The literature suggests that there is a positive relationship 
between the frequency of the audit committee meetings and the levels of  voluntary 
disclosure (Li et al. 2012; Li 2009; Hidalgo et al. 2011). However, the frequent 
meetings is not  necessarily a proper indicator for audit committee diligence and 
commitment as it may be an indicator of  weaknesses in the internal control (Hoitash, 
U., et al., 2009). This will be subjected to empirical examination in this study which 
takes the frequency of meeting as indicator of the audit committee effectiveness 
following the mainstream of literature.  
XI- Audit Committee Independence: the AC is preferably to be formed from independent 
members, which will give them the ability to be fairer and less biased in carrying out 
the role of monitoring  financial reporting and of enforcing  transparency. Also, this 
will keep the committee out of any possible influence that the executive management 
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can exercise. According to the literature e.g. ((Samaha et al. 2015; Michelon & 
Parbonetti 2012; Khan 2010; Hoitash, U, Hoitash & Bedard 2009)) the independence 
of the audit committee  significantly affects voluntary disclosure. when it comes to the 
context of the ICD (Li et al. 2012; García-Meca & Sánchez-Ballesta 2010) find a direct 
and significant effect for the independence of the audit committee on the levels of ICD. 
Accordingly,  this study will measure the effect of the audit committee independence 
by the percentage of the independent non-executive members in the AC. This variable 
will be measured as the percentage of independent members out of the total committee 
size.   
 
5.19  Control Variables 
According to the prior literature, many variables are expected to have a significant effect of the 
ICD, building on the prior studies this study is controlling for the following variables: 
I- Firm’s Size: size is well regarded as a determinant of the voluntary disclosure and 
accounting policy choices. Large companies are likely to be more visible in the capital 
market and better known to the investors and analysts; they are also, likely to catch the 
attention of the information users (Abhayawansa & Guthrie 2016; Uyar & Kilic 2012; 
Cormier et al. 2005). Moreover, large companies are expected to be long established in 
business practice more familiar with the regulator requirements and this expected to have 
positive implications on the firm’s internal control system. This variable will be the 
logarithm of the total assets. Furthermore, different theoretical argument proved a positive 
effect for the size on the voluntary disclosure; e.g. agency theory assumes higher agency 
cost will be incurred due to the wider information asymmetry in case of larger firms thus, it 
will try to disclose more information to narrow this information gap between insiders and 
outside parties (Jensen & Meckling 1976; Cooke 1989). In addition, signalling theory also, 
suggests more voluntary disclose will be given by larger firms (alnajjar and Hussainey, 
2011). Political cost theory also, provide some explanation for the positive relationship 
between the voluntary disclosure and the firm size as the larger firms will be subject to 
higher level of follow and monitoring from the governmental and civil society 
organisations (Milne 2002; Watts & Zimmerman 1990). Thus, firms will be motivated 
under this political pressure to extend its disclosure to minimise its political costs 
(Raffournier 1995). As showed in the above discussion. The firm’s size is wildly proved 
either theoretically and empirically to significantly affect the corporate disclosure patterns 
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and choices. Thus, for the purpose of this study the firm’s size will be incorporated as 
control variable and will be represented by the natural logarithm of the firm total assets30.     
II- Profitability: Firms’ performance can be measured in different ways and by different 
indicators (Martin & Patterson 2009; Zhu 2000; Roos & Roos 1997). Amongst these 
measurements, profitability remains the most applied in the research community, especially 
when examining the voluntary disclosure in their studies. Profitable companies will be 
interested in providing a detailed discussion about their plans, investments, profitable 
segments and markets (Li et al. 2008). Thus, a distinguished financial performance will 
lead to better disclosure choices and this is expected to enhance the quantity and quality of 
information shared by firms (Meek et al. 1995; Ho & Wong 2001). Theoretically, 
signalling theory suggests that  voluntary disclosure is directly and significantly affected by 
the firm’s profitability in the case of  profitable firms (Rodrigues 2005; Morris 1986). On 
the other hand Haniffa & Cooke (2005) suggest legitimacy theory can provide  
explanations for disclosure patterns in both  profit and loss: the managers will disclose 
information to legitimise their position and performance under both conditions. Profitable 
firms always try to share information about their performance (Taliyang & Jusop 2011).  
Managers in the profitable companies definitely want to share their excellence in running 
the business, the good performance achieved, and their ability to reward  stockholders and 
information users in the market (Abhayawansa & Guthrie 2016; Eddine et al. 2015; 
Raffournier 1995). Return on assets (ROA) will be taken as an indicator of the profitability 
for the subject companies. 
III- Leverage: Financial gearing brings  companies many benefits including  tax-shielding, 
lower cost capital than  equity capital and flexibility in access and repayment.   Leverage’s 
effect on corporate disclosure is debated in literature (M. Griogore, Tefan-duicu 2013). 
Some prior studies indicate a positive and direct effect for  leverage on  disclosure 
(Huafang & Jianguo 2007; Raffournier 1995). Some studies found negative effects on the 
voluntary disclosure (Eng & Mak 2003) and other studies found no effect (Nekhili et al. 
2012; Cerbioni & Parbonetti 2007). However, agency theory argues that companies with 
higher levels of debt undergo pressure from debt holders to release more information: this 
is explained under the agency theory as the debt holder acting as principal (Jensen & 
Meckling 1976). Another argument under  agency premises is introduced by Jensen (1986) 
who suggested that the increase in leverage will be associated with an increase of  agency 
                                               
30 Firms total assets, total liabilities, profitability, leverage and the comparable information for the last ten 
years relating to all the listed companies are ready prepared and available for public on the security 
depositary centre www.sdc.com.jo.  
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cost (the debit-holders here represent the principals). This cost also will include the cost of 
bankruptcy risk and anti-hostile takeover costs (Hostile takeover defence).  For the purpose 
of this study the leverage ratio will be taken for each company as it is published by the 
security depository centre31 
 
 
 
                                               
31 The methodology implemented by the security depository centre for calculating the leverage ratio is basically plane 
leverage Total Debt / Total Equity   
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The below diagram  summaries the research’s model which shows the study’s variables and 
propose relationship between them.  
 
Figure 5.3 Research Model 
 
5.20  Research Models 
As in the previous section the research varibales discussed in detail an how these variables will be 
measured in this section the research models that incorporate these variables in order to examine 
the effect of the CG on the ICD quantity and quality will be shown: 
The model that measure the quantity or the level of ICD 
ICDL = β0+ βBrd_size it + βBrd_Independence it + βRole_Duality it   + βFam_Ownership it + 
βForeign_Ownership it     + βManag_Ownership it   + βInstit_Ownership it   + βCGC it    + 
βComm_size it    + βComm_Independence it    + βComm_Meetings it    + βsize it    + βLeverage it    + 
βPerformance it    + ε 
Where: 
Variable nature  Variable  Definition 
DEPENDENT V. ICDL is the ICD level which refer to the variance of quantity of IC 
information based on the change in CG factors.   
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INDEPENDENT 
V. 
Brd_size Board of director size (number of members)  
 
Brd_Independence Board independence (number of independent members 
within the board 
Role_Duality if the CEO and the chairman occupied by same person 
Fam_Ownership if two or more members of the same family maintain a 
membership(s) in the board 
Foreign_Ownership non-Jordanian owners represented in the board 
Manag_Ownership executive management have outstanding ownership of the 
company’s shares 
Instit_Ownership institutional Investors’ ownership 
CGC if the company has a CG committee within its board. 
Comm_size Audit committee size 
Comm_Independ Independent members within the audit committee 
Comm_Meetings frequency of audit committee meetings 
CONTROL V. Size company size total assets reduced to the natural log. 
Leverage total liabilities divided by the owners’ equity 
Performance company financial performance and referred as ROA 
 
• The model that measure the quantity or the level of ICD: 
ICDQ = β0+ βBrd_size it + βBrd_Independence it + βRole_Duality it   + βFam_Ownership it + 
βForeign_Ownership it     + βManag_Ownership it   + βInstit_Ownership it   + βCGC it    + 
βComm_size it    + βComm_Independence it    + βComm_Meetings it    + βsize it    + βLeverage it    + 
βPerformance it    + ε 
Where: 
124 
 
Variable nature  Variable  Definition 
DEPENDENT V. ICDQ is the ICD Quality or the variance in the ICD that referred to 
the change in the CG factors 
INDEPENDENT 
V. 
Brd_size Board of director size (number of members)  
 
Brd_Independence Board independence (number of independent members 
within the board 
Role_Duality if the CEO and the chairman occupied by same person 
Fam_Ownership if two or more members of the same family maintain a 
membership(s) in the board 
Foreign_Ownership non-Jordanian owners represented in the board 
Manag_Ownership executive management have outstanding ownership of the 
company’s shares 
Instit_Ownership institutional Investors’ ownership 
CGC if the company has a CG committee within its board. 
Comm_size Audit committee size 
Comm_Independ Independent members within the audit committee 
Comm_Meetings frequency of audit committee meetings 
CONTROL V. Size company size total assets reduced to the natural log. 
Leverage total liabilities divided by the owners’ equity 
Performance company financial performance and referred as ROA 
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5.21 Summary 
This chapter has presented an overview of the research methodology, providing a summary of the 
research philosophy, paradigm, research method choices and justification of such choices. 
Moreover, this chapter has presented how the data is collected and what tool used to collect that 
data.  
The data collection instrument development, piloting and validity and reliability have been 
discussed in details. Also, this chapter has elaborated on the importance of incorporating qualitative 
data in order to validate and explain the results of the quantitative data as this study incorporating 
both quantitate and qualitative data the current chapter has provided the justifications and the 
advantages that are brought to the study by implementing a mixed method approach.  
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6 Data Analysis and Discussion  
6.1 Introduction 
 This chapter shows the process of analysing the data and presenting the statistical and qualitative 
techniques used by the researcher. It explains how these are used  to analyse the data  to 
statistically test the hypothesis and show how the qualitative data collected from interviews will 
support or explain the results of the quantitative data analysis. This chapter starts by showing the 
results of the descriptive analysis of the disclosure index output.  Then, the patterns of  ICD have 
been discussed to highlight the current practices and disclosure choices made by Jordanian 
companies: these include the visual disclosure patterns which reflects some information quality 
aspects. Regression models analysisis  presented in detail for both the ICD levels (quantity) and 
quality of information.  
6.2   Descriptive Analysis 
As mentioned above this part of our study will focus on the patterns of ICD within the Jordanian 
companies. Hence, we started with the frequencies of each component of IC.  
The summary of the results of the disclosure index on the sample level highlighted the score of 
each component of the IC 
Table 6.1 Descriptive analysis 
The item Average 
Score for 
the 
sample  
Mini 
Score  
Percentage  
% 
Max 
Score  
Percentage 
% 
Mean Standard 
deviation 
Structural 
capital 
9.34 0 2.43% 18 2.86% 9.54 4.94 
Relational 
Capital  
6.70 0 2% 11 3% 6.6 2.66 
Human 
Capital 
8.3 0 1% 15 6.14% 8.30 3.91 
Total IC 24.5 0 1% 44 0.57% 24.5 10.7 
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As indicated in table 6.1. the highest level of disclosure about IC was associated with structural 
capital followed by human capital: relational capital was the least disclosed. The indicated results 
are similar to those indicated by Ramanauskaite & Rudzioniene (2013) who conducted their study 
in Lithuania. However, a study conducted in Siri Lanka over companies listed in Colombo stock 
exchange  (Abeysekera & Guthrie 2005b) found that Siri Lankan companies reported  human 
capital as the most important sub-components of IC. This could be justified: it has been observed  
that Siri Lanka tries to market its qualified, skillful and low-cost employees in order to attract 
foreign direct investment (FDI). Interestingly, a longitudinal study over Marks and Spencer, a UK 
highstreets retailer by Campbell & Abdul Rahman (2010) indicated that the most disclosed 
component was  relational capital; this can be understood within that specific context as the studied 
firm is essentially a retailer and the relationships with customers and providers are  crucial to its 
success. However, the prevalence of structural capital information in ICD is confirmed by literature 
in different contexts e.g. China vide (Liao et al. 2013)  and in Nigeria (Mubaraq & Ahmed Haji 
2014).  
Referring to the results indicated by this study. The most frequent score for this component of IC 
i.e. within structural capital was the corporate strategy. This reflects the level of awareness of the 
managements in the Jordanian companies of the importance of  IC and the information relating to 
the corporate strategies and companies’ plans for future. In an interview with a GM of one of the 
best performing companies on the index he justifies revealing the information about  future plans 
and strategies by trying to give the audience of mainly analysts and potential investors, the relevant 
information for the expected growth and the expected gains from investment in the company.  
Within the Jordanian context, where the financial market still can not be described as close to the 
efficient market, investors generally, including the institutional invesors, will try to anticipate the 
potential gains from their investment based on the available historical information (Hussein, Ala 
Albawwat, Bandar Barunilai 2015). Introducing the forward looking information in  annual reports 
will facilitate the analysis function and will engage the stock in analysts’ and brokerage houses’ 
debate (Hassanein & Hussainey 2015). It is empirically acknowledged in the literature that IC  
positively affects business success, growth and long-term sustainability (Squicciarini & Voigtla 
2015) so the investment in IC will give the firms the momentum and energy to compete in the 
market (Bratianu & Orzea 2013). Moreover, it is considered a key value driver and strategic 
element for the competitiveness of the companies (Lerro & Schiuma 2013). However, (Mouritsen 
& Roslender 2009) stated that most studies examine the IC as “one boundary”. Thus, they 
suggested that more attention should be given to the components of  IC, certain IC components or 
items could be different from firm to firm and from sector to sector. Hence in the next step  will 
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shed the light on the details of  IC disclosure practice amongst the sectors which clarifies the 
picture.  
Table 6.2 ICD Banking Sector  
IC component Banking Sector 
Average Minimum % Maximum % Mean Std. Dev. 
Structural 
capital 
15.97 13 11.4% 18 9.52% 15.97 1.55 
Relational 
Capital 
9.6 7 1.9% 11 20% 9.58 1.08 
Human 
Capital 
12.98 10 6.7% 15 20.9% 12.97 1.56 
Total IC 38.5 31 4.76% 44 3.8% 38.5 3.7 
 
Clearly, the banking sector places itself in a leading position in IC information disclosure with the 
highest mean of the disclosure index and the lowest standard deviation from the mean. The 
indicated numbers suggest that the banking sector generally is really interested in sharing more 
information about its intangibles and intellectual capital and places a strong emphasis on structural 
capital (SC): this still remains the common case among all sectors. The second sub-component of 
IC was  the human capital (HC). As about 20% of the examined sample has achieved 100% on the 
index i.e. (15/15) and this is similar to the findings of (Wee & Chua 2016) who conducted their 
study in Singapore. Within the SC the most frequent items were the corporate strategy, systems and 
IT infrastructures and future plans. Regarding HC, the number of  employees and employees’ 
breakdown in addition to staff competencies and education were all  discussed in the annual report 
with details including the distribution of the employees according to the level of education and 
professional credentials. The information disseminated also include information about the future 
plans of hiring, training and preparing of  staff to match  developments in the industry or to reach 
new professional standards. In the interviews, the researcher probed why this happened in the 
banking sector. Respondents’ views  agreed mainly on the high demand of information by 
regulators especially in  the sector and region in which they were active: this will make these banks 
subject to other foreign supervisory agencies and governmental bodies requirements. This is in 
addition to the international standards set by Basel Committee on Banking Supervision.  The 
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adherance to these standards are prerequisits for local banks to esablish business or banking 
relationships with internationally active banks and the coresspondents banks nomination process. 
Moreover, the Jordanian banking sector is historically well established as according to the ASE 
database the first listed company in the market was a bank. These results are consistent with the 
results of Brown et al. (2016) who studied a selected sample of the service companies in Botswana. 
They  applied in-depth case studies over the selected companies. Their results indicated that the 
regional banks were the best firms in terms of IC reporting with an emphasis on the human  and 
relational capital. 
Table 6.3 ICD Insurance Sector  
IC component Insurance Sector 
Average Minimum % Maximum % Mean Std. Dev. 
Structural 
capital 
8.95 4 4.76 15 5.71 8.952 3.02 
Relational 
Capital 
6.9 3 4.7 9 21% 6.98 1.53 
Human 
Capital 
7.8 4 1.90 13 4.76% 7.8 2.8 
Total IC 23 13 2% 37 3.81% 23.78 6.65 
As the above table indicates insurance sector comes in the second place after the banking sector 
which indicates a genuine interest from insurance firms to share more information about their IC. 
Insurance sector in Jordan is well organised and undergo a close monitoring from many 
governmental and nongovernmental agencies includes the (The Insurance Commission32, Jordan 
Security Commission, Companies Controle Dept., The Insurance Companies Union, Consumers 
Protection Association etc.). 
In Jordan insurance companies maintains a sound CG system as a result of the requirements of JCL 
and the requirements of the differnts agencies that oversight the operation of the insurance firms in 
the local market. 
                                               
32 This commission now works under central bank of Jordan umbrella since June 2017. Previously it was 
reporting to ministry of trade and industry.  
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Table 6.4 ICD Services Sector 
IC component Services 
Average Minimum % Maximum % Mean Std. Dev. 
Structural 
capital 
8.91 0 4.20 18 2.94 8.90 5.17 
Relational 
Capital 
6.2 1 8% 10 9% 6.2 2.46 
Human 
Capital 
7.58 2 2.94% 15 2.94% 7.58 3.98 
Total IC 22.7 
 
3 2.94% 41 1.68 22.7 10.29 
 
As the above table indicates the results of the descriptive analysis for ICD for the services sectors 
which to some extent very close to the insurance sector results. This can be explained from 
different angles as in addition to the effect of sound CG system, Jordanian economy is service 
based generally as more than of 75% of the GDP comes from services. Service sector in general are 
HC intensive e.g. hotels, hospitals, universities and other educational firms and also IT based e.g. 
telecommunication industry, energy, and software development firms).  
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Table 6.5 ICD Manufacturing Sector   
IC component Manufacturing 
Average Minimum % Maximum % Mean Std. Dev. 
Structural 
capital 
7.7 0 2.78 18 1.19 7.71 4.11 
Relational 
Capital 
5.7 0 5% 10 11% 5.75 2.8 
Human 
Capital 
7.3 0 2.78 15 5.56 7.23 3.52 
Total IC 21 0 2.78 43 1.19 20.69 9.73 
 
The Manufacturing sector did not preform well in terms of IC information voluntary disclosure it 
ranked surprisingly fourth. Normally, the manufacturing sector is associated with intensive reliance 
on technology e.g. Japan, South Korea and Germany. However, there is no need for further 
enquiries to identify the reasons behind these results. As the manufacturing sector in Jordan is still 
traditional with emphasis on mining, clothes and garments, and a small portion of transformational 
industry. The manufacturing sector contribution to the national GDP is marginal,  according to the 
official statistics about 16% compared to 74% come from services sectors (CBJ monthly bulletin, 
October, 2016). One of the interviewees who serves currently as investments analyst with CFA 
qualification and extensive experience in the manufacturing sector when  asked  about how he can 
explain the current situation of the sector stated that: “industry in Jordan suffers from the lack of 
a government strategy to promote it, the lack of applied research and collaboration with 
universities to enhance innovation, unstable and high energy prices compared to the region, and 
a small domestic market that does not allow economies of scale”. 
 
132 
 
6.3 Visual disclosure patterns 
        English idiom says: “A picture is worth thousands of words”. Thus, visualising information in 
the annual reports can serve a great job for companies who want to give clear details about their 
business and what they have achieved and for the information users who can find the pictures, 
photos, figures and tables more helpful in understanding and supporting the other narrative parts 
of the annual reports. Jordanian companies to some extent practice the visual disclosures in their 
annual reports. Such disclosures include pictures and photos, tables, figures and, drawing. Such 
items can facilitate the understanding and give more credibility to the narrative.   
In this section, a sample of the visual disclosures will be presented even though they are already 
coded and quantified in the index: it is still interesting to present some of these disclosures to 
help in understanding the disclosure patterns and current practices with the Jordanian 
companies.  
 
 
 
Picture 6.1:  This picture is taken from the Royal Jordanian airlines annual reports (2014) this was presented in with a 
narrative about the training and human resources development part. 
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Picture 6.2: This picture captured form the Arab Bank group annual report (2012) was associated with a narrative about 
the achievements for that year.  
Jordanian firms due to the limited size of the local market, struggle to get such international certifications and credentials 
to facilitate their entrance to regional and internatinal markets.  
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Picture 6.3: This picture taken from the annual report of the Jordan pharmaceutical company (2014) R&D part.  
 
 
 
Picture 6.4: This photo captured form the HIKMA company annual report (2015) was associated with the market share 
narrative.   
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Picture 6.5: This picture is taken form the annual report of the capital bank year (2015) associated with a short narrative 
about the relational capital i.e. partnership with SMEs. 
 
Picture 6.6: This photo is taken from the annual report of the Capital Bank year (2014) associated with narrative about 
developing a product to match the customer’s businesss’ needs. In addition some narrative about partnership with 
customers also was added.  
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This table captured from the annual reports of the Arab Bank (2015) which published in the training and 
human development section. 
 
Picture 6.7: Training programs summary Arab Bank (2015).  
 
 
 Picture 6.8: this picture was extracted from the Jordan insurance company’s annual report (2014) 
they published this photo as a proof of their achievements . 
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As a general conclusion about the visual presentation of the IC in Jordanina corporates annual 
report we can notice that the focus is on the structural capital items, for example: certifications and 
accridations, R&D, and future plans. However, the realtional and HC are represented in the visual 
disclosure patterns but mainly in relation to especially training and employees allocation. The 
present practice of the visual disclosure can be inferrred within the premises of the impression 
management theory as the message delivered by these items (photos, graphs, tables) are 
highlighting a good news about the firms and its achievements.   
However, the general impression based on the thorough review of the current practice is that the 
visual disclosure still needs further development to add more information and to facilitate the 
undersanding of the financial and operational situation of the companies.  
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6.4 Regression Model 
In this part of the current thesis the regression model results will be discussed. Meanwhile, 
Justification and advantages of using a panel data regression model and the assumptions that been 
considered before running the model will also be presented. Furthermore, a justification of 
choosing the fixed effect model rather than the random effect model will be included. Then the 
regressions models for ICD levels (quantity) and ICD quality will be shown. Finally, the hypothesis 
testing results will be discussed in detail.  
6.4.1 Panel data  
Panel data as defined by (Baltagi & Lechner 2015) as “a cross-section or group of observations 
that are surveyed periodically over a given timespan and for many empirical applications, panel 
data are essential for the credible identification and precise estimation of causal effects” 
 Advantages of Panel data: 
• Panel data regression leads to more accurate interpretation of model parameters. Panel data 
typically have more degrees of freedom and more sample variability than cross-sectional 
data which may be viewed as a panel with T = 1, or time series data which is a panel with 
N = 1, hence improving the efficiency of econometric estimates (HSIAO 2003) 
• More ability for capturing the complication of behavioural phenomena than single 
cross-section or time series data. Including the patterns and trends of that phenomena. 
(HSIAO 2003; Jeffrey M. Wooldridge 2013).  
• Mitigating the effect of the omitted variables and allowing for more accurate predictions. 
Because panel data pooled the gathered data and that will give the model the ability to read 
the omitted variables form the data available (Wooldridge 2002). 
• Simplifying calculation and statistical interpretation. Panel data is normally associated with 
two dimensions: a cross-sectional dimension and a time series dimension. Under normal 
circumstances it would be expected that the calculation of panel data 
estimator or interpretation would be more complicated than cross-sectional or time 
series data but when it comes to some statistical complications panel data will easily 
overcome the problems of nonstationary time series and measurement errors. (HSIAO 
2003). 
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6.4.2 Regression Assumptions 
With panel data regression, as any other regression models Certain assumptions must be fulfilled to 
derive a valid conclusion from the regression model according to (Hair, J. F., Celsi, M., Money 
2016) These assumptions are: 
6.4.2.1 Normality 
According to Wooldridge (1995) the most important assumption for panel data regression is that 
the data should be normally distributed. Data are normallay distributed when they represent a 
continuous curve that labels all conceivable values of a variables. The normal curve is symmetrical, 
bell shaped, and nearly all (99%) of its values are within minus or plus 3 standard deviations from 
the mean There are many functions and tests offered automatically by the statistical packages that 
allow researchers to test data for normality.  These could be the (Skewness Kurtosis test, Plotting 
the residuals graphically (KDensity) and if it looks bell-shaped or nearly bell-shaped that confirm 
normality.   
Normality test: Testing data for normality can be carried out in different ways. This can be by 
numerically using tests like Skewness/Kurtosis test, Jaraque-Bera test or Shapiro-wilk W Test for 
Normal Data. Or it simply can be done using graphs (plot) methods offered by statistical programs. 
Below is the test of normality numerically using S/K test.  
Table 6.6 Skewness/Kurtosis test 
Skewness/Kurtosis tests for Normality Joint 
Variable       Obs   Pr(Skewness)  Pr(Kurtosis) adj chi2(2)    Prob>chi2 
Residuals          700 0.0066        0.000        . 0.0000 
As indicated in the above results Skewness is 0.006 which between -0.5 and 0.5 which means 
that the data are symmetric or normally distributed.  
Here also, another numerical test for normality i.e. Jaraque-Bera test 
Table 6.7 Jaraque-Bera test 
Jarque-Bera normality test 
 P-value  Chi2 
31.29 1.6 
Null Hypotheses Ho: normality: Cannot reject the null means the data are normally distributed  
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Graph Methods for testing data for normality 
Using Stata, after running the regression analysis, in order to check the normality, the researcher 
needs to predict the residuals (observations deviation for the predicted values). After that, the 
“Kdensity” command is applied to produce a Kernel density plot with the normal density. The 
graph below shows the normality 
 
 
Figure 6.1 Kdensity 
Both the Skewness/Kurtosis and the plot tests for Normality indicate that there is no any breach to 
the normality assumption in our dataset.  
Box Plot Method. 
The last exercise for testing the normality here is the box plot as the box will indicate the range of 
data: 
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Figure 6.2 Normality test 
  
As indicate by the test the box is not shifted to the upper quartile or toward the lower quartile this 
means the data are normally distributed.  
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6.5 Homoscedasticity  
This assumption implies that the variance of observations around the regression line is the same for 
all values of the predictor variables. To make sure that your data are homoscedastic, the researcher 
needs to test for the absence of heteroskedasticity. The following test has been run to make sure 
that the current dataset are free of heteroskedasticity.  
 
Table 6.8 Test for heteroskedasticity 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity 
 
Ho: Constant variance 
 
Chi2  Prob > chi2   
Variables: fitted values of ICD 
 
0.649     0.0109 
 
Data are free of heteroskedasticity 
 
6.6  Multicollinearity  
Multicollinearity (also known as collinearity) is a situation in which two or more independent 
variables in a multiple regression model are correlated: this means that one of the two variables 
can be linearly predicted from the others with a substantial degree of accuracy. The existence 
of multicollinearity between the explanatory (independent or control variables) will disqualify 
the resluts (Belsley 1982). Like other assumptions many tests can help the researcher to 
examine the variables for collinearity and these include applying the variance inflation factor 
(VIF) as it will be acceptable if the VIF value is less than 10 which indicates there is no serious 
effect on the results due from multicollinearity ( Gujarati, 2003; Curto & Pinto 2011). 
Alternatively, Pearson’s test for correlation can be applied and this also will be shown below:   
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Table 6.9 VIF test 
Variable VIF       1/VIF  
Comm_Independ 2.05 0.487711 
CGC 1.77 0.565515 
Comm_Meetings 1.76 0.568607 
Size 1.71 0.583613 
Leverage 1.52 0.656800 
Fam_Own 1.37 0.731195 
Brd_size 1.28 0.781771 
Foreign_Own 1.28 0.783661 
Duality 1.24 0.803214 
Manag_Own 1.12 0.891183 
Brd_Independ 1.10 0.907560 
  Mean VIF  1.47  
However, it is worth mentioning that the Pearson coefficient indicates an acceptable level of 
correlation between the independent variables if it less than 80% (-/+) (Gujarati, 2003). Other 
statisticians provide more conservative thresholds for acceptable correlation as according to (Hair, 
J. F., Celsi, M., Money 2016) a coefficient of 60%(-/+) may indicted possible multicellularity 
between the independent variables.  However, this will not be a concern for this study due to the 
following reasons: 
1. The panel data is naturally rule out the multicollinearity  
2. The results of VIF test indicate a very relaxing mean for tolerance. 
3. The threshold indicated by Gujarati, (2003) is 80%. 
 
         The tables below show the coefficients of Spearman test for the datasets of this study. Both 
tables indicate a relaxing coefficient. 
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As already discussed the Panel data analysis is used to examine the possible effect of the CG on the 
ICD. Panel data analysis is used for studying a particularly targeted phenomenon within multiple 
spatial (entity, individual, country) regularly and periodically by observation over a specifically 
identified time-horizon (Yaffee 2003). However, there are two types of analytic panel data regression 
i.e. fixed effect and random effect.  
Fixed effect model FE: is linear regression model and represents a useful tool for econometric analysis 
which have a constant slopes but intercepts that differ according to the cross-sectional group (spatial) 
(Ai et al. 2014; Wooldridge 2002).  
Random effect model RE: is a panel data regression model where the error outcome variable and the 
heterogeneity of certain variable(s) is specific to a particular  observation as the intercepts and the 
slopes parameters vary randomly around a common mean. (Baltagi et al. 2013; Clark et al. 2010; 
Wooldridge 2002)  
6.7 Random or Fixed Effect Model; how to choose? 
Bothe models have their proper use and certain conditions will direct the researcher before he/she 
decides which model to chose. However, each model has its own pros and cons and choosing one 
model rather than the other sould not be an  arbitrary decision.  Thus, in order to choose which model 
fit the  research, the researcher needs to take into consideration the results of Hausman test as it is 
agreed in the  literature that this test will determine which model will be a better fit. This test assumes 
the random effect model is the most efficient.  
Table 6.10 Hausman IC_ScoreFE IC_ScoreRE 
                                                             --------Coefficients --------- 
Variable  (b) (B) (b-B) sqrt(diag (V_b-V_B)           
IC_ScoreFE IC_ScoreRE Difference S.E.  
Brd_size -.1560409 -.0640593 -.0919816 .0544649 
Brd_Independ -.0209471 -.0476734 .0267262 .0359499 
Duality .7788634 1.059784 -.2809206 .1631722 
Fam_Own -.0412693 -.0071541 -.0341152 .0103854 
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Manag_Own .3428618 .3331109 .0097509 . 
Foreign_Own .0687623 .0376296 .0311327 .0186049 
Instit. Invest.  4.59521 .2478262 4.347383 .8653851 
CGC 2.088918 2.616289 -.5273718 .2087471 
Comm_size -1.749445 -1.094285 -.6551599 .1524174 
AC Independence  22.99151 20.55225 2.439267 1.426433 
AC Meetings  .1239194 .1056754 .0182439 . 
Size .0291059 .039025 -.009919 .0010227 
Leverage .0059737 .0049523 .0010214 . 
Performance .0016658 .0018085 -.0001427 . 
 
  
b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg 
B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg 
 
Test: Ho: difference in coefficients not systematic 
chi2(14) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B) ^(-1)](b-B)  = 45.56 
Prob>chi2   =    0.0000 
(V_b-V_B is not positive definite) 
The Hausman test suggests that the fixed effect model to be adopted  
High value of Chi2 means we cannot accept the assumption that the RE model is better fit the data thus 
we need to use the FE model in the current research.  
 
 
 
Brd_size: Board size, Brd_Independ: Board Independence, Duality: role duality the CEO and the board 
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chairman is the same person, Fam_Own: Family ownership, Manag_Own: Managerial ownership, 
Foreign_Own: Foreign ownership, Instit. Invest. Institutional ownership. CGC establishing a GC committee 
within the board. Comm_size: audit committee size, AC Independence: percentage of the independent 
members within the audit committee, AC Meetings: frequency of audit committee meetings, Size: natural 
logarithm of the total assets of the firm, Leverage: percentage of the firm’s debits to the owners’ equity, 
Performance: profitability i.e. ROA.  
 
Thus, based on the above results the FE model will be applied to test the retaliations between the 
explanatory variable(s) CG and of course the control variables and the dependent variables which is 
ICD either the level of disclosures or the quality of the disseminated information.  
6.8 Regression Results and discussion  
The table below presents the results of the regression test which was based on the fixed effect panel 
data regression model as indicted by the  Hausman test. However, according to  Wooldridge, J. (2013) 
“fixed effects analysis is more robust than random effects analysis”.  This was discussed previously in 
this thesis. The study is characterised as positivistic-deductive as it moves from  theory to  
assumptions concerning the causal relationship between the dependent and explanatory variables. 
Thus, in the following part; the regression model will be presented and interpreted in light of the 
literature and by linking the current study’s results to the existing theories. Double-barrel dependent 
variables (ICD level and quality) will be sought to explained by eleven independent variables and 
three control variables namely (Leverage, size, and performance). 
The independent variables which represents CG parameters in three major groups for easy explanation 
are: 
1. Board of Directors Structure (board size, board independence, role duality) 
2. Ownership structure (management ownership, family ownership, foreign ownership, and 
Institutional ownership) 
3. Audit committee characteristics: (audit committee size, independence, and effectiveness).  
4. CG committee within the board. 
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Regression model equation: 
ICD = β0+ βBrd_size it + βBrd_Independence it + βRole_Duality it   + βFam_Ownership it + 
βForeign_Ownership it     + βManag_Ownership it   + βInstit_Ownership it   + βCGC it    + βComm_size it    + 
βComm_Independence it    + βComm_Meetings it    + βsize it    + βLeverage it    + βPerformance it    + ε 
Where: 
ICD: is the variance of quantity and quality of IC information referred to the change in CG factors.   
Brd_size: Board of director size (number of members)  
Brd_Independence: Board independence (number of independent members within the board. 
Role_Duality: if the CEO and the chairman occupied by same person.  
Fam_Ownership: if two or more members of the same family maintain a membership(s) in the board.   
Foreign_Ownership: non-Jordanian owners represented in the board.  
Manag_Ownership: Management ownership if the executive management have outstanding ownership 
of the company’s shares.  
Instit_Ownership: institutional ownership 
CGC: if the company has a CG committee within its board.  
Comm_size: Audit committee size 
Comm_Independ: Independent members within the audit committee.  
Comm_Meetings: frequency of audit committee meetings.  
Size: company size total assets reduced to the natural log.  
Leverage: total liabilities divided by the owners’ equity.   
Performance: company financial performance and referred as ROA.    
Ε: error term.  
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Table 6.11 Regression model for ICD level. 
ICD_Score      Coef. Std.Err. z   P>z         [95% Conf.       Interval] 
Brd_size -.1560409 .1382533 -1.13 0.260 -.4275731             .1154914 
Brd_Independ -.0209471 -.0954008 -0.22 0.826 -.2083163              .166422 
Role_Duality    .7788634 .5076116 1.53 0.125 -.2180961            1.775823 
Fam_Ownership  -.0412693 .0151497 -2.72 0.007 -.0710236            - .011515 
Manag_ 
Ownership 
.3428618 .1138616 3.01 0.003 .1192352            .5664883 
Foreign_ 
Ownership 
.0687623 .026228 2.62 0.009 .01725                 .1202746 
Instit_Ownership 4.59521 .9001377 5.11 0.000 2.827321              6.363099 
  CGC 2.088918 .7327762 2.85 0.005 .6497302             3.528105 
Comm_size -1.749445 .3455267 -5.06 0.000 -2.428067            -1.070823 
Comm_Independ 22.99151 2.502323 9.19 0.000 18.0769              27.90613 
Comm_Meetings .1239194 .0602616 2.06 0.040 .0055644              .2422744 
Size .0291059 .0051855 5.61 0.000 .0189214            .0392905 
Leverage .0059737 .0032959 1.81 0.070 -.0004994           .0124468 
Performance .0016658 .0007605 2.19 0.029 .0001722            .0031594 
  _cons 12.86382 1.715384 7.50 0.000 9.494768            16.23287 
sigma_u 13.608483  
sigma_e 1.2321211  
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F-test that all u_i=0: F(99, 586) = 148.09 Prob > F =
 0.0000 Fixed-effects (within) regression Number of obs = 700 
Group variable: ID Number of groups                         = 100 
 
R-sq:                                 Obs per group: 
within = 0.2891 min = 7 
between = 0.1663 avg = 7.0 
overall = 0.1661 max = 7 
 
 F (14,586) = 17.02 
corr (u_i, Xb) = -0.6978 Prob > F = 0.0000 
ICD_Score: Represents the dependent variable which stands for the total aggregate score of the firm’s ICD on 
the disclosure index. Brd_size: Represents the board size which is the number of the board members. 
Brd_Independ: Represents the number of independent members within the board.  Role_Duality: Represents the 
role duality if the chairman is the same the CEO this was represented by a dummy variable if the chairman and 
CEO position are occupied by different persons takes 1 or 0 otherwise. Fam_Ownership: this represents the 
percentage of the shares owned or controlled by the same family out of the outstanding shares capital. 
Manag_Ownership: this represents the existence of the executive top management ownership of the firm’s 
capital. The JCGC requests the ownership of the key management personnel to be disclosed in the annual report 
this was indicated in the model by dummy variable and takes 1 if the management do hold ownership of the firm 
or 0 otherwise.   
Foreign_ Ownership: Represents the percentage of the shares directly or indirectly owned by foreign investors 
(percentage out of the outstanding shares capital) Instit_Ownership: Represents the shares owned by 
institutional investors. CGC: Represents the Corporate Governance committee if established within the board 
take 1 and if not takes 0 (the JCGC suggests that the board to establish CGC within the board and it is mandatory 
for the banks) Comm_size: represents the size of the audit committee this is presented as the number of the 
members of the committee (the Corporate Governance act mandate that the Audit committee to be formed of 
minimum three nonexecutive members. Comm_Independ: represents the percentage of the independent 
members within the Audit Committee out of the total committee members. Comm_Meetings: Represents the 
audit committee effectiveness indicated by the frequency of meetings held during the year. Size: Represents the 
firms size indicated by the natural log of the firm’s total assets. Leverage: Represents the firm’s reliance on debt 
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in financing its assets. Performance:  indicated by the firm’s profitability (ROA) Leverage and performance are 
provided by the SDC database38.   
 
Resources dependency theory suggests a positive role for a large board size on the effectiveness of the 
board in carrying out the supervisory role over the executive management. Nonetheless, as indicated 
the regression results  failed to prove any significant relationship between  the board size and  ICD 
level. However, there is no consensus in the literature about the role of the board size either in CG, in 
enhancing the internal control function in general or in having a positive reflection on the transparency 
specifically (Samaha et al. 2015). Some studies who found a positive and significant role for the board 
size in enhancing the level of transparency refer that to the effects of size which bring  diversity, 
variety in expertise and variety of mindsets: all of which can bring a richness of experiances and 
effectiveness to the board e.g. (Linsley et al, 2012; Elzahar and Hussainey, 2012; Abraham and Cox, 
2007).  
Thus, and when it comes to  ICD levels as voluntarily information disseminated by firm and the role 
board size on it again there is no consensus in the literature. As, for example, Zahra Moeinfar, 
NAsrollah Amouzesh (2011) who conducted their study in a developing country (Iran), found  the 
board size has a positive and significant effect on the ICD. However, (Donnelly & Mulcahy,2008) 
found that the board size  negatively affects  voluntary disclosure generally. The same results were 
reported by Satta et al. (2015) within the context of Italian medium-sized companies: they did not find 
any significant relationship between board size and voluntary disclosure.  
The present study’s findings indicate that there is no significant effect for the board size on  ICD 
which is consistent with the results reached by Cheng & Courtenay )2006) in a Singaporean context 
and Falikhatun et al. (2011) in Indonesia. A possible explanation to this situation is that the increase in 
the number of the members of the board39 is not associated with brining in expertise. Especially as 
indicated by the interviews, as some interviewees indicated that the lobbying and connections between 
the members themselves and some members and the executive management can hinder the board in 
carrying out its role properly: that is in monitoring the executive management.  However, one 
interviewee suggested the following “maybe the larger board is likely to have diverse expertise and 
                                               
38 Security Depository centre offers a sort of statistical and analytical information that facilitate researchers’ 
analysis and could be accessed through their website: www.cds.com.jo  
39 The corporate Act suggest the size of the board to be between three and 13. The CG code suggests that the size 
of the board to be between 5 and 13)  
   
153 
 
dedicated members however, this not always works as sometimes larger board brings useless debate 
and conflict of agendas to the board table”.  That is similar to the results indicated by Nekhili, M., 
(2016) who conducted their study in France: they have concluded that no significant effect from  board 
size on the level of R&D voluntary disclosure.   
Agency theory suggests that an increase in the number of independent members within the board of 
directors will positively increase the effectiveness of the board role in monitoring the executive 
management (Donnelly & Mulcahy 2008; Ben-Amar & Zeghal 2011; Pepper & Gore 2012).  
Accordingly, the JCGC has requested independent members to be appointed in the board and it 
recommends that they should be a third of the board members, stating the following: 
 “Principles of good corporate governance require that board 
members be elected by the company’s general assembly in a secret ballot, by means of 
cumulative voting system, provided that at least one third of the board members are 
independent members”.  However, the code remains silent about the mechanisms of nominating those 
independent members.  This allows the door to be  opened by the block holders to exercise their 
influence and nominate their allies. Furthermore, because of the “Cumulative voting” methodology in 
selecting the board members those who possess more shares can impose their will in voting.   
The regression model results indicated in the above table failed to find any significant effect for  board 
independence on  ICD levels, which confirms the results of Falikhatun et al. (2011) and is consistsent 
with Ho & Wong (2001) in their study in Hong Kong failed to find any relationship between  board 
independence and  voluntary disclosure. This is in contrast with Ben-Amar & Zeghal (2011) who 
concluded that there is a direct significant effect of board independence on  transparency and the level 
of information voluntary disclosed. Likewise, Li et al. (2008) found that  board independence  
significantly and positively affects the. However, Appuhami & Bhuyan (2015) confirmed in their 
study that there is no relationship between the number of independent members and  IC, while Eng & 
(Mak 2003) revealed that there is a negative effect from increasing the number of independent 
members within the board on  ICD levels. The possible explanation for these results could relate to the 
lack of legal enforcement: according to García-Meca & Sánchez-Ballesta (2010) in their meta-analysis 
review of the relationship between  corporate governance and ICD. They have suggested that the 
independent board members can play a positive role in enhancing the transparency level and of course  
ICD however, only in the countries that have established investor protection. The investor protection 
in Jordan is still not at the level required by the investors themselves. As one of the interviewees has 
stated  “…. On the ground, not effective due to the absence of the proper evaluation mechanism for 
the independent member. Sometimes the other members try to overwhelm the role of the 
independent member in voting” Thus, the ideal  of appointing some independent members within the 
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board is being marginalised by the lobbyists within the board or by the collusions between the 
executive management and other members within the board: these relationships are still a common 
practice within Jordanian (Ajlouni 2017). Another explanation for the failing to prove any positive 
role for the independent members may relate to the socio-political atmosphere in Jordan as according 
to (Alweshah 2009) the political and social connection from the controlling shareholders will play a 
significant part in hindering the expected role of the independent members in enhancing the CG 
function within the firm and the consequently in positively impacting on transparency levels.     
Thus, the independent members’ role in ICD will remain debatable due to the absence of consensus 
about the role of independent members. However,  the indicated results failed to prove any role for the 
independent members in ICD levels. This further supports the view that in Jordan the  common 
practice when selecting  board members is to vote based on connections: this undermines the 
designated role for the independent members within the board and marginalise their role in CG 
especially in Jordan where the rights of the minority of the shareholders are still not perfectly 
enforced.   
Role duality (chairperson of the board being the CEO) is subject to ongoing debate in terms of its 
effect on the voluntary disclosure. From the agency theory perspective, it is expected that the 
segregation of duties will lead to better control function for the board; there will be greater demand for 
information and a higher level of transparency. Moreover  role duality will affect the independence of 
the board as a whole which hinders the governance role of board (Cheng & Courtenay 2006). 
However, under  stewardship theory’s premises  role duality will lead to more efficient leadership, and 
a  streamlined decision making process (Abeysekera 2010). In addition to the genuine intention for 
managers to be stewards rather than being opportunistic and self-interested, the assumption of a 
conflict of interest does not exist under stewardship theory. Rather, it is the manager’s passion to do a 
good job (Donaldson & Davis 1991).  The results indicated by the above table failed to prove any 
significant relationship between the CEO role and chairperson role separation and  ICD. The results 
are consistent with the results reached by Muttakin et al. (2015;) (Hidalgo et al.) 2011; (Li et al.) 2008) 
which suggests that this is the case either in developed and developing countries as well. Samaha et al. 
(2015) elaborated on this issue in their meta-analysis study and they concluded that  voluntary 
disclosure will increase the proprietary cost which is something the CEO will try to avoid to increase  
short-term income and their own benefits . On a wider level  Ho & Wong (2001) studied  voluntary 
disclosure generally and likewise, they failed to find any significant effect for  role duality on  
voluntary disclosures.   
Ownership concentration is expected to abolish  transparency; the concentration may be manifested in 
the form of block holders or family ownerships etc. (Chau & Gray 2010; Chen et al. 2008). Among 
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these types of concentrations this study focuses on  family ownerships because of its materiality to the 
capital market. Family owned businesses dominate all other types of ownerships and represent 
approximately 85% of all firms worldwide. They offer jobs for 80% of the U.S. workforce, and they 
produce more than half the gross national product (Ghosh & Tang 2015). Jordan is not an exception to 
this rule:  according to the ASE yearly statistical bulletin (2017) more than 70% of the Jordanian listed 
companies are family businesses, started as family businesses or are controlled directly or indirectly 
by family networks.  
The results indicated by the above table show that family ownership has a significant negative effect  
on ICD . This finding confirms the results of Nekhili et al. (2012): they found that  family ownership 
within French companies results in a negative effect on  voluntary disclosure. Moreover, Abdifatah 
Haji Ahmed & Nazli A Mohd Ghazali (2013) found that the presence of family domination in the 
board of director’s membership will impact ICD negatively. The same results were reached in the 
Malaysian context by Taliyang et al. (2011). Muttakin et al., 2015) found the same effect in their study 
of the listed companies in Bangladesh. As showed previously, it is agreed among the prior studies that  
family ownership will negatively impact the CG and consequently reduce  transparency and of course 
the voluntary disclosure of intellectual capital.  
This can understood through the perspective of agency theory premises as ownership concentration 
will worsen the information asymmetry due to the natural “vested interests” of families running 
business to increase their dominance and gain more returns on their investments (Chen et al., 2000). 
Moreover, Chen et al., (2000) indicated in their study of Hong Kong that  independent directors in the 
family controlled businesses are less efficient in carrying out their roles. In firms with closely held 
ownership (like family substantial ownership) the board members representing these families will be 
able to get the needed information about IC and relating information through informal channels. 
Hence, less attention will be given to the formal traditional disclosure mediums like the annual reports 
(Ahmed Haji 2015). One of the interviewees has presented a very interesting point stating that “this 
maybe an obstacle for the transparency due to the nepotism, family lobbying and long-arm to 
dominate the board and the firm, especially if a collusion exists with the executive management”. 
Thus, considering the cultural and socio-political aspect of  Arab and Jordanian society the family 
dominance of ownership can affect  management independence and the board’s efficacy in perfecting  
CG – this being referred by the interviewee as fertile soil for “nepotism” and connections. This is 
genuinely against  CG principles.    
According to agency theory, management ownership separation is a bedrock for transparent decision 
making within  firms (Fama & Jensen 1983). They also (Fama and Jensen) introduced the concept of 
mutual monitoring where the higher-level managers and second level managers are monitoring each 
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others’ performance the organisation itself is referred to as a set of contracts between the owners, 
managers, customers...etc. and these contracts specify the “rules of the game” between these engaged 
parties. The study states: “Control of agency problems in the decision process is important when the 
decision managers who initiate and implement important decisions are not the major residual 
claimants and therefore do not bear a major share of the wealth effects of their decisions”. However, 
Jensen and Meckling, (1973) suggested that  agency cost will be reduced if the managers hold a 
substantial ownership or, as they define this situation, there is interest’s alignment between the 
managers, the other shareholder and stakeholders. This was also, empirically confirmed by Sing and 
Davidson, (2003). They found that managerial ownerships will reduce the agency cost proxied by the 
operating income. These positive consequences on the management and in reducing the agency cost 
are connected to a positive role for the management ownership on the informativeness (the quality of 
disclosures) made by the firms (Warfield et al., 1995). Thus, when the mangers are sharesholders they 
are not the major residual claimants. So, they are interested in signalling  good news about  IC to 
affect the share price in the market and to maximise their own capital gains. This was specifically 
mentioned by Fama and Jensen,( 1983) by reflecting on  Human Capital as the disclosure of good 
news will provide a good mental image about the managers as a source of wealth or success to the 
organisation:  according to the study’s assumption the mangers will be priced in the agent markets 
based on their performance. 
The current study’s results provide empirical evidence on the positive and significant relationship 
between the mangers ownership and the level of ICD. This is consistent with Fama and Jensen, (1983) 
and confirms also the assumptions of  stewardship theory:  it introduces the managers as stewards not 
self-interest oriented actors.  The position is that some studies that indicated a significant negative 
relationship between the management ownership and ICD e.g. (Satta et al. 2015; Li et al. 2008), and  
others failed to prove any relationship between the managerial ownership and  ICD e.g. (Eng & Mak 
2003). Stewardship theory is overlappign with impression management thoery which also, provide 
explination for voluntary disclsoure as managers desire to affect the perceptions of the information 
users either by highlighting the good news or by hidign the bad news (Brennan et al. 2009; Rutherford 
2003) 
The relationship between  managerial ownership and voluntary disclosure generally is very complex 
as it also affected by many other interrelated factors including the level of  IC, industry, and firms’ 
performance which is closely connected to  management performance etc. (Cui & Mak 2002) and of 
course the other CG parameters (Baek et al. 2009).  
Institutional investors’ ownership as one of the CG mechanisms expected to bring efficient monitoring 
to financial and operational performance to those companies and of course an efficient CG system will 
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lead to higher level of transparency (El-Diftar et al. 2017). In this study, we hypothesise a positive 
relationship between the presence of the institutional investors and the level of ICD. The regression 
results indicated that  firms that have institutional investors among their shareholders tend to provide 
better ICD. These results confirm the results indicated by El-gazzar, (1998) who found that  
institutional investors significantly and positively affect  voluntary disclosures. Considering the fact 
that  institutional investors are not a homogeneous groups in terms of size, sophistication, goals of the 
investment and their investment strategy, this will lead to variation in their impact on  CG and their 
monitoring role (Eaton et al. 2014).  Some studies in literature e.g. (Huafang & Jianguo 2007) 
indicated a negative relationship between  institutional investors and voluntary disclosure. Likewise,  
Schadewitz & Blevins (1998)  documented a negative effect for  institutional investor and  voluntary 
disclosure. However, (Donnelly & Mulcahy 2008) have indicated no relationship between institutional 
investors ownership and general voluntary disclosure. 
In Jordan where the institutional investors are either banks, investment management companies or 
pension funds, they  play a good role in monitoring and observing CG which is reflected in their role 
in the promoting voluntary disclosure, including voluntary ICD; this could be attributed to their 
accountability and the monitoring from other stakeholders they undergo. For example, if we consider 
banks as institutional investors, in their investment decisions they will be subject to questions from the 
bank’s board of directors as well as  the central bank. Thus, due to this complex supervisory system 
that institutional investors regularly undergo, they will always adhere to a pre-established and 
approved investment strategy, due professional care and  will as far as possible make informed 
decisions. Thus, to facilitate this role, they will demand  more information and a higher level of 
disclosure form the investee companies so they can prove to all supervisory agencies that they have 
conducted their investment decisions in accordance with the best professional standards.  Such 
explanation is consistient with the views of Yang et al. (2014) who found that institutional ownership 
was associated with  releasing  higher levels of information and making earlier preannouncements  and 
information signals which  reduces information asymmetry resulting from new products. 
Ownership diffusion either in terms of the number of shareholders or in terms of geographical location 
will increase the agency cost because of high risk estimation and widening the information 
asymmetry. Thus, under the premises of agency theory,  scattered ownership will lead to higher 
demand on information, which will place more pressure on the management for greater disclosure than 
from the those who are informationally less disadvantaged. The present research finds a positive and 
significant relationship between  foreign ownership and the level of the ICD.  These results are 
consistent with results from the study conducted by Haniffa & Cooke (2005) who found a direct 
relationship between foreign ownership and corporate social responsibility disclosure. Similarly, Liang 
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et al. (2012) found that foreign investors enhance the governance status in  Taiwanese companies and 
this reflects on better transparency and disclosure levels.   
The positive association between  ICD and the presence of foreign investor’s ownership have many 
possible explanations in the literature:   according to Jiang & Kim (2004) who conducted their study in 
Japan, foreign investors will avoid  companies with a wide information asymmetry and will target 
those  with rich available information about  financial and operational situations. Another point of 
view explains the phenomenon based on a developing countries’ study by Bokpin et al. (2015) . the 
study indicated that, local firms in developing countries disclose more inforamtion to satisfy foreign 
investors in response to their demands to mitigate information gap between them and the local 
investors.   
Consulting the views of our interviewees, we received the following explanations for the Jordanian 
case where the foreign investors will support  CG function which leads to better disclosure habits 
including better voluntary disclosure about IC.       
“I think they have a positive effect as when the foreign investment be substantial they delegate a 
sophisticated member to the board and I know some cases they also brought a highly-qualified 
management team those who exited to reflect their expertise and knowledge and their own style 
of management on the local firms”  
Another respondent suggested that information asymmetry will  widen in the case of foreign investors 
and this will put more pressure on the  firms’ management to disclose more information especially 
around IC stating that: “As foreigners are geographically away from the firms they invest in; this 
increases information asymmetries and makes managerial monitoring more difficult. So 
foreigners may add more pressure on management to increase corporate transparency”. 
 
Audit Committee Charcteristics  
Audit committee (AC) is one of the very important CG mechanisms that affect voluntary disclosure 
generally and ICD specifically. According to disclosure theories the relationship is expected to be 
positive (Wang & Hussainey 2013; Allegrini & Greco 2013; Wang et al. 2013). However, the 
empirical results are not conclusive about the direction of the relationship between the audit committee 
and  voluntary disclosure. Moreover, the literature suggests many factors which can affect the audit 
committee’s performance in fulfilling its role in enhancing the internal control system and in 
encouraging transparency. This is because the audit committee’s monitoring role will be subject to its 
size, independence, expertise and experience, as well as having access to sufficient resources to hold 
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meetings to discuss all matters relating to the firms’ financials and internal control system (Li et al. 
2012; Ahmed Haji 2015).  
Regression test results indicated in the above table no. (6.8.) have suggested a negative relationship 
between the audit committee’s size and  ICD. These results  confirm the results indicated by Wang & 
Hussainey( 2013) who found that  AC size negatively affects the level of voluntary disclosure. This 
provides further evidence that the larger audit committees would not participate in better disclosure 
practices extending the results of Ahmed Haji 2015; Mangena & Pike (2005) which also failed to 
prove a positive relationship between the audit committee size and the level and quality of disclosure. 
The first study examined the effect of audit committee size on  ICD in Malaysia and the second  
examined the relationship between  audit committee size and interim financial disclosure. The findings 
are also consistent with Li et al. (2012) who fail to find any significant effect for the size of the AC on  
ICD. A possible explanation of this  results could be the lack of proper enforcement for  investors 
protection of regulations in Jordan as suggested by Samaha et al. (2015) who noted a positive role for 
the audit committee on voluntary disclosure – this was  contingent on the availability of proper 
investors’ protection regulations. Moreover, larger audit committee can bring dysfunctionality to the 
decision-making process within the committee  which will affect its monitoring role negatively as 
suggested by Ahmed Haji (2015); it may even lead to “process losses” and responsibilities diffusion40 
(Mangena and Pike, 2005).  
Audit committee effectiveness in carrying out its monitoring role proxied by the frequency of its 
meetings is expected to positively affect its role in monitoring and supporting the internal control 
system and should lead to a better governance position for the company by assuring executive 
management discipline and reducing  agency cost and information asymmetry (Li et al. 2012; Li et al. 
2008). As indicated in the above table, the results show a positive significant effect for the frequency 
of the audit committee meetings on  ICD. These are consistent with the results of Ahmed Haji (2015;) 
and  Li et al. (2012) who also found that  more frequent meetings are associated with a higher level of 
ICD.  These results support  agency theory arguments as they underline that the effective monitoring 
role of the audit committee as depicted by frequent meetings will result in a higher level of voluntary 
disclosure: this is an indication of the better transparency which manifests  good CG.     
The independence of the audit committee’s  effect on  ICD is significantly positive as the above table 
shows. According to  agency theory premises, the more independent members in the committee the 
                                               
40 Responsibilities diffusion is a concept borrowed from social-psychology literature which defined according to encyclopaedia of 
psychology as “term in social psychology first introduced in early 1960s, perhaps Wallach, Kogan, and Bem (1964). It refers to the idea 
that, in some contexts, individuals within a group are less (or report feeling less) responsible for actions that occur than if they had done 
the same action outside the group by themselves. In broad terms, there are fewer consequences to any one person in a group from what 
that group does than if an individual person had done the action alone” 
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more effective monitoring role we have Allegrini & Greco (2013) and Cerbioni & Parbonetti( 2007). 
The present study results confirm the prior studies, as the independent non-executive members within 
the audit committee will be more diligent in reviewing the financial and non-financial activities of the 
firm which also includes ICD (Ahmed Haji 2015). Hence, as outsiders, the demand for information 
will be higher and the quantity and quality of information  they need for sound  judgement will be 
greater than required by  insider directors; this will be especially so when undertaking large 
investment in  intangible assets as according to Li et al.( 2012) information asymmetry will be more 
acute in such firms as the IFRS will  not have dealt with intellectual capital reporting.   
Establishing CG Committee within the board of directors was recommended by the JCGC and it is 
mandatory for banks and insurance companies. According to the CG code this committee will be 
formed with at least from two independent non-executive members chaired by the chairperson of the 
board. The role of this committee, according to the code, is to develop CG policy for the firm and to 
make sure that the board of directors put in place all resources and efforts to carry out its duties 
effectively and efficiently. However, its functions do not overlap with the nomination and 
remuneration committee which engages with the performance evaluation of the board. Rather the CG 
committee shall direct and examine the preparation and review of the internal corporate governance 
code and monitor its implementation. This includes reviewing  the procedures and policies that are 
intended to improve the governance system in the firm and make sure it is  up-to-date and supporting 
the holistic objectives of the CG code.  This study hypothesises a positive relationship between the 
presence of a CG committee and  ICD. The indicated results in the above table show  a significant 
positive effect of the CG committee on the level of ICD: the presence of such committee will offer 
additional leverage for empowerment of the CG system within the firm and assure higher levels  of 
monitoring on the firm’s performance. The strength of CG system will directly affect the level of 
transparency and voluntary disclosure which will have some positive reflections on  ICD. As this 
parameter was not empirically examined before, the study has sought  further explanation.  During the 
interviews one interesting point of view was provided by one of the experts who stated that “I think 
such committee if properly implemented will bring a higher level of transparency to the firms. 
Because speciality in governance issues will allow the member of the committee to take their 
time and allocate sufficient effort to review the governance structure and identify any loopholes 
to tackle them and to enhance the internal control system and I think will lead to more 
transparency and the ICD will be positively affected accordingly”. 
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6.9 The ICD Quality 
It is agreed in financial accounting literature that one of the most important roles of the board of 
directors is to supervise the quality of information that the firm disseminates (Holtz & Sarlo Neto 
2014). The present study in addition to its objective for examining the effect of  CG on  ICD level or 
extent aims to examine the effect of the same CG parameters on the quality of information disclosed 
about the intellectual capital .  
6.9.1 Data Description 
The table below summarises the descriptive statistics for the ICD quality on the component level and 
on the average total IC level.  
 
Table 6.12 Descriptive analysis of the ICD quality 
ITEM Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min.  Max.  
SC 700 1.779 1.036 0 4 
RC 700 1.766 1.046 0 4 
HC 700 1.773 1.038 0 4 
Total IC 
Quality  
700 3.722 2.162 0 8.4 
SC: Structural Capital, RC: Relational Capital, HC: Human Capital,  
 
Frequencies 
ICD_Quality Freq. Percent Cum. 
0.00 7 1.00 1.00 
0.10 2 0.29 1.29 
1.10 9 1.29 2.57 
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2.00 3 0.43 3.00 
2.10 355 50.71 53.71 
3.10 8 1.14 54.86 
3.20 16 2.29 57.14 
4.10 7 1.00 58.14 
4.20 100 14.29 72.43 
4.30 7 1.00 73.43 
5.20 6 0.86 74.29 
5.30 6 0.86 75.14 
6.20 6 0.86 76.00 
6.30 93 13.29 89.29 
6.40 5 0.71 90.00 
7.30 6 0.86 90.86 
7.40 10 1.43 92.29 
8.20 2 0.29 92.57 
8.30 4 0.57 93.14 
8.40 48 6.86 100.00 
Total 700 100.00  
 
The indicated figures in the above tables give us an impression that the ICD quality can not be 
described as very good as more than 53% of the sample have a score of less than (2.1/10).  
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6.9.2 Regression Model 
As the previously indicated, before running the regression model, a study must choose either the fixed 
model or the random model: this choice will be determined based on the outcomes of Hausman test as 
the below table indicates: 
 
Table 6.13 Hausman Test 
Hausman Test 
  Coefficient  
Fe      
Coefficient 
Re  
Difference  Sqrt (diag(V_b-V_B)) 
S.E. 
Board_size .0196563 .0051464 -.0248027 .0285859 
Board_Indepen .0089501 -.0219356 .0129855 .0195095 
Role_Duality  .0135246 .1508986 -.137374 .0879543 
Family_Own .0099013 .0071891 -.0170905 .0042679 
Manag_Own .0305283 -.0410614 .0105331 . 
Foreign_Own .0069914 .0020839 .0049075 .0081874 
Institutional_Own 2.432364 .0315698 2.400794 .329759 
CGC .1001158 .4621849 -.5623007 .1310343 
Comm_size .5936369 -.3137765 -.2798604 .0777064 
Comm_Independ 5.770319 4.496281 1.274038 .6878729 
Comm_Meetings .0121292 .0095817 .0025475 . 
Size  .0047583 .0084711 -.0037129 .0006618 
Leverage  .0021888 .0017772 .0004116 . 
Performance  .000435 .0004368 -1.79e06 . 
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Test: Ho: difference in coefficients not systematic 
  chi2(14) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) 
                  =       89.82 
  Prob>   chi2 =       0.0000 
  (V_b-V_B is not positive definite) 
Based on the results of Hausman test the FE Model will be implemented 
 
Fixed-effects (within) regression Number of obs = 700 
Group variable: ID Number of groups = 100 
 
R-sq: Obs per group: 
within = 0.1806 min = 7 
between = 0.0064 avg = 7.0 
overall = 0.0066 max = 7 
F (14,586) = 9.23   Corr (u_i, Xb) = -0.9427   Prob > F = 0.0000 
  
Table 6.14 Regression model for the ICD quality. 
ICD_Quality Coef. Std. Err. z P>z     [95% Conf. Interval] 
Board_size .0196563 .0515719 -0.38 0.703 -.1209446 .0816321 
Board_Indepen .0089501 .0355869 -0.25 0.802 -.0788435 .0609433 
Role_Duality  .0135246 .1893518 0.07 0.943 -.3583663 .3854155 
Family_Own .0099013 .0056512 -1.75 0.080 -.0210004 .0011978 
Manag_Own .0305283 .0424732 -0.72 0.473 -.1139466 .05289 
Foreign_Own .0069914 .0097837 0.71 0.475 -.012224 .0262068 
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Institutional_Own 2.432364 .3357739 7.24 0.000 1.772897 3.091831 
CGC .1001158 .2733439 -0.37 0.714 -.6369688 .4367372 
Comm_size .5936369 .1288901 -4.61 0.000 -.8467797 -.340494 
Comm_Independ 5.770319 .933429 6.18 0.000 3.937045 7.603592 
Comm_Meetings .0121292 .0224791 0.54 0.590 -.0320202 .0562786 
Size .0047583 .0019343 2.46 0.014 .0009592 .0085573 
Leverage .0021888 .0012294 1.78 0.076 -.0002258 .0046035 
Performance .000435 .0002837 1.53 0.126 -.0001221 .0009921 
_cons .2997587 .6398813 0.47 0.640 -.9569814 1.556499 
sigma_u 
sigma_e  
 
rho  
6.3612676 
 
.45961204 
  
.99480681 (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
F test that all u_i=0: F(99, 586) = 64.02 Prob > F = 0.0000 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity  
Ho: Constant variance 
Variables: fitted values of ICD_Quality 
chi2 =    41.03      Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
Testing for Heteroskedasticity indicated that the data are heteroskedastic. Thus, as the results failed to 
reject the null hypotheses means the data are heteroskedastic. Hence I need to do robust regression to rule 
out the problem of heteroskedastic or the absence of homoscedasticity41  Robust Fixed Model. 
                                               
41 Econometrics literature e.g. (Jeffrey M. Wooldridge 2013) and (Richard Williams, 2015) suggested applying  
Error standard robust test to rule out the problem associated with heteroskedastic data. Richard Williams 
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Table 6.15 Robust regression model for ICD quality. 
ICD_Quality Coef. Robust 
Std. Err.  
T  P>|t|    [95% Conf.   Interval] 
Board_size .1560409 .2212093 -0.71 0.482 -.5949681 .2828863 
Board_Indepen .0209471 .028531 -0.73 0.465 -.0775587 .0356645 
Role_Duality  .7788634 1.421283 0.55 0.585 -2.041271 3.598998 
Family_Own .0412693 .0425434 -0.97 0.334 -.1256846 .043146 
Manag_Own .3428618 .0922188 3.72 0.000 .1598796 .5258439 
Foreign_Own .0687623 .0391117 1.76 0.082 -.0088437 .1463684 
Institutional_Own 4.59521 2.807254 1.64 0.105 -.9749905 10.16541 
CGC 2.088918 .5651333 3.70 0.000 .9675707 3.210265 
Comm_size -1.749445 .836837 -2.09 0.039 -3.409911 -.0889789 
Comm_Independ 22.99151 6.00615 3.83 0.000 11.07401 34.90902 
Comm_Meetings .1239194 .0388712 3.19 0.002 .0467905 .2010483 
Size .0291059 .0071257 4.08 0.000 .0149671 .0432448 
Leverage .0059737 .0029018 2.06 0.042 .0002159 .0117315 
Performance .0016658 .000811 2.05 0.043 .0000566 .003275 
_cons 12.86382 3.785091 3.40 0.001 5.353376 20.37426 
Fixed-effects (within) regression                Number of obs      =        700 
Group variable: ID                                     Number of groups =        100 
R-sq:                                                            Obs per group: 
                                                                                                                                                   
research note available on University of Rotter Dam website at https://www3.nd.edu/~rwilliam/stats2/l25.pdf 
accessed 20/5/2017.   
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within = 0.2891                                         min =          7 
between = 0.1663                                         avg =        7.0 
overall = 0.1661                                         max =          7 
                                                                F (14,99)          =       8.17 
corr (u_i, Xb) = -0.6978                        Prob > F          =     0.0000 
 
(Std. Err. adjusted for 100 clusters in ID)   
ICD_Quality: Represents the dependent variable which stands for average score of the firm’s ICD on the disclosure index. 
Brd_size: Represents the board size which is the number of the board members. Brd_Independ: Represents the number of 
independent members within the board.  Role_Duality: Represents the role duality if the chairman is the same the CEO this 
was represented by a dummy variable as if the chairman and CEO position are occupied by different persons takes 1 or 0 
otherwise. Fam_Ownership: this represents the percentage of the shares owned or controlled by the same family out of the 
outstanding shares capital. Manag_Ownership: this represents the existence of the executive top management ownership of 
the firm’s capital. The JCGC requests the ownership of the key management personnel to be disclosed in the annual report 
this was indicate in the model by dummy variable and takes 1 if the management do hold ownership of the firm or 0 
otherwise.   
Foreign_ Ownership: Represents the percentage of the shares owned directly or indirectly by foreign investors (percentage 
out of the outstanding shares capital) Instit_Ownership: Represents. CGC: Presents the Corporate Governance committee if 
established within the board take 1 and if not takes 0 (the JCGC suggests that the board to establish CGC within the board and 
it is mandatory for the banks) Comm_size: represents the size of the audit committee this presented as the number of the 
members of the committee (the Corporate Governance act mandate that the Audit committee to be formed of minimum three 
nonexecutive members. Comm_Independ: represents the percentage of the independent members within the Audit 
Committee out of the total committee members. Comm_Meetings: Represents the audit committee effectiveness indicated by 
the frequency of meetings held during the year. Size: Represents the firms size indicated by the natural log of the firm’s total 
assets. Leverage: Represents the firm’s reliance of debit in financing its assets. Performance:  indicated by the firm’s 
profitability (ROA) Leverage and performance are provided by the SDC database.   
 
The results failed to prove any relationship between  board size and the quality of ICD. However, on 
this issue the literature is inconsistent:  some studies found board size  negatively affected the quality 
of disclosure. One such study by Holtz & Sarlo Neto (2014) found that the board size negatively 
affects the quality information disclosed by Brazilian listed companies. Likewise, Cerbioni & 
Parbonetti (2007)  also found a negative effect for the board size on the “good news” about structural 
capital in a comparative study among the European biotechnological companies.  The present study 
findings are consistent with a large strand of literature that failed to find any significant relationship 
between  disclosure quality and  board size. However, Zhang et al., (2007) found that smaller sized 
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boards are more able to carry out duties more effectively in enhancing the internal control system and 
supporting the governance process.  
According to  agency theory arguments, independent members within the board are expected to 
facilitate the transparency and enhance both the disclosure levels and the quality of information. 
However, the indicated results failed to prove any significant relationships between the board 
independence and ICD. Certainly,the literature was not conclusive regarding the effect of board 
independence on voluntary disclosure in general. Some studies have provided evidence of a positive 
effect for board independence on the quality of disclosure e.g. (Britto et al. 2014; Cerbioni & 
Parbonetti 2007) found that board independence can positively affect the quantity of IC information 
disclosed by companies but not the quality. Likewise,  Lim et al. (2007) found that there is a 
significant relationship between  board independence and forward looking information as a proxy for 
good quality information.  On the other hand Forker (1992) found that the increase in independent 
members in the board associates with better quality of information disclosed in the annual reports. 
However, this was about general disclosure but not specifically ICD.  
According to  agency theory the separation of  management and monitoring roles will lead to better 
transparency and better information dissemination. Despite these argument’s wide acceptance, the 
present study failed to prove any significant effect for role duality on ICD. These results  confirming 
the results of (Moumen et al. 2015) who failed to prove any significant effect for the CEO/Chairman 
roles separation on the quality of risk information disclosed by listed companies in MENA. Finally, 
(Cerbioni & Parbonetti 2007) found that the role duality is negatively affecting the ICD quality.  
Family ownership is expected to widen the information asymmetry when it is sizeable and associated 
with engagement of a managing role within the firm. Hence, the expected relationship was to be 
negative and the present study indicates that  family ownership has no significant effect on the ICD 
quality. Although, Ghosh & Tang (2015) and  Ali et al. (2007) found that family controlled listed 
companies in the  USA were associated with better quality financial reporting. However, this might 
not be the case in non-financial voluntary disclosure.  As Nekhili et al. (2012) found in their study in 
the French context, family ownership is associated with a negative effect on the quality and extent of 
R&D information disclosed by companies. This also was the conclusion of a study by Chen et al. 
(2008) who found that  family ownership could be  hinder  the voluntary disclosure.  
According to agency theory, managerial ownership is expected to have a negative effect on  voluntary 
disclosure. As according to the agency theory premises which argues that: because of the opportunistic 
behaviour of the managers, moreover,  agency theory assumes that managers will try to maximise their 
own interests at the cost of  other stakeholders (Morris 1986; Fox & Hamilton 1994). On the contrary; 
the stewardship theory argues that the managers will act for the well being of the firm and its 
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stakeholders because they are self-motivated to be stewards rather than  opportunistic and self-
interested (Donaldson & Davis 1991; Fox & Hamilton 1994). 
The current study finds that  managerial ownership  significantly and positively affects the quality of 
ICD. These results confirm Khiari & Karaa (2013) who found that  management ownership is 
positively affects the quantity and quality of  ICD. Likewise and in the same context (France) Carlos, 
et al (2013)  also found that the management ownership  positively affecting the quality and quantity 
of the voluntary disclosure.  
Institutional investors’ ownership is expected to represent a leverage for CG system and accordingly 
transparency (Jensen & Meckling 1976).  However, this study fails to find any significant relationship 
between the presence of  institutional investors’ ownership and the quality of ICD. This probably can 
be referred to the institutional investros ability to access information relating to IC through other 
channels. Nevertheless, Nekhili et al. (2012) found that  institutional investor’s ownership hinders the 
quality and quantity of information relating to intellectual capital (Research and Development) as they 
sometimes according to Nekhili, et al., (2012) may encourage the managers to withhold  information. 
Satta et al. 92015) indicated in their study that there is no significant relationship between the 
institutional ownership and the quality of disclosure.  
Sound CG system will lead to higher standards of owner’s protection (Dyck, 2001). foreign ownership 
holders, due to their remote location, will demand higher and better level of information to facilitate 
the purpose of monitoring their ownerships abroad (Jiang & Kim 2004): this will enhance the role of 
internal CG mechanisms (Boubakri et al. 2005). 
The present study failed to prove any significant effect for  foreign ownerships on  ICD quality. This 
can be referred to the policy differences as the positive role for the foreign investors will be contingent 
on the level of investors protection legislations. This is the first time that the effect of foreign 
ownership on the ICD quality has been examined (according to the researcher’s best knowledge).  
Similar results were indicated by Cormier et al.( 2005) who studied the effect of  foreign ownership on 
the quality of environmental reporting in Germany and  failed to find any significant relationship from 
the presence of  foreign ownership on the quality of environmental corporate reporting in the annual 
reports.  
The results also indicate a significant relationship between the independence of the audit committee 
and the quality of intellectual capital disclosure. This is consistent with the assumptions of  agency 
theory.  These results also confirm the results indicated by Li et al. (2012) who found that the 
independent audit committee  positively affects the quality of information about human capital 
reported in the corporate annual reports. Moreover, these results confirm the results indicated by 
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(Cerbioni & Parbonetti 2007) who found a significant positive effect for the independent non-
executive members in the audit committee and the quality of information relating to  internal capital.  
The audit Committee’s frequency of meetings as a proxy of  audit committee effectiveness is expected 
to positively affect the intellectual capital disclosure quality. It is proved in the literature the more 
frequent meetings for the audit committee will lead to a better supervisory role and better CG 
practices, which in turn are expected to enhance the transparency and improve the quality of 
information (Karamanou and Vafeas, 2005). The current study’s empirical results indicate a positive 
and significant effect for the frequency of audit committee meetings on the quality of ICD. These 
results confirm results indicated by  Li et al. (2012) who found that the frequency of meeting is 
positively associated with the level of ICD but that this does not necessary  reflect a good quality of 
the information. Nooraisah (2012) however, failed to prove any effect for AC effectiveness on the 
quality of voluntary general disclosure. Nonetheless, the indicated results support the premises of 
agency theory suggesting that more time and effort is allocated to carrying on the monitoring role of 
audit committee over the executive management. This will include demanding more and varied 
information especially for IC.  
The audit committee’s size is an important determinant of the committee’s ability to fulfil its duties. 
The recommended size has a minimum of three independent non-executive members. However, a 
larger committee is expected to bring more expertise and to allocate more resources for reviewing 
firms day to day activities which should bridge  information asymmetry (Li et al. 2012).  The current 
study results have indicated a significant negative  relationship between  ICD quality and audit 
committee size. These results contradict the results indicated by Li et al. (2012): the context may 
explain this difference, imposing  cultural and political differences between the Jordanian  and the UK 
business and legal environment. Legal enforcement in Jordna is less rigorous than in UK. Thus may 
also be the  case with the larger board size-  a larger audit committee may bring inconsistency and 
disputes to the committee more than bringing expertise to the committee.  
Establishing a CG Committee within the board of directors has previously  indicated a positive effect 
on the level of ICD and our results also, indicate a positive and significant relationship between such a 
committee and the quality of ICD.  This indicates that the committee plays a signifcant role in 
enhancing transparency on both sides and improving equality of access to a higher level of 
information. This committee, which is recommended by the code,  ensures that the board is acting 
according to the CG code and has in place all necessary policies and procedures that facilitate the 
supervisory role of the board and encourages the highest level of compliance with the code; this will 
have a direct implication on the quality of disclosure as well as the quantity of disclosures  
 .   
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6.10  The Control Variables  
The present study has controlled for the firm size, performance (ROA), and leverage as well as  
industry type: the latter was eliminated from the model due to multicollinearity as the industry factor is 
time invariant and mathematically cannot be measured in the fixed effect model.  The results of testing 
the control variables are vindicating the prior studies in the field as expected.  
The empirical evidences supports the arguments that the size and profitability  significantly affect  
ICD levels but not  leverage, which is consistent with the findings of García-meca et al. (2005) who 
also failed to find a significant relationship between  leverage and  ICD.   
Our results are consistent with prior literature (Absar 2016; Ahmed Haji 2015; De Silva et al. 2014; 
Allegrini & Greco 2013; Abeysekera 2012; Abeysekera 2010; Abeysekera & Guthrie 2005b). 
However, regarding the failure to find any significant relationship between leverage and  ICD levels, 
despite it being found to significantly affect the quality of information, may be a result of creditors 
asking for certain kind of information which may be supplied in copious quantities but not necessarily 
associated with an appropriate quality (Abhayawansa & Guthrie 2016). Nonetheless, Beattie & 
Thomson (2010) stated that leverage can positively affect the level of ICD in the large companies.  
Moreover, all the three variables were found to significantly affect the quality of ICD42. Despite 
empirical evidence about the relationship between  ICD quality and such variables being rare. Some 
prior studies have examine the determinant of the quality of voluntary disclosure including CSR 
(Milne 2002; Khan 2010; Td et al. 2014) and others have examined the determinants of  voluntary 
non-financial reporting quality (Torchia & Calabrò 2016; Wang et al. 2013; Alcaniz et al. 2011; Wang 
& Hussainey 2013; Goswami & Lodhia 2014; Michelon & Parbonetti 2012) Most theoretical 
frameworks for voluntary disclosure e.g. agency theory, signalling theory, capital market theory, and 
cost- benefit theory suggest a positive relationship between the firm’s size and  voluntary disclosure 
whichwould hold true in the case of ICD (Hussainey et al. 2003; Haniffa & Cooke 2005; Cooke 1989; 
Jensen et al. 2006) Moreover,  leverage puts the firms under the close monitoring of the debit holders 
who demand a high-quality information to keep assessing the borrowers ability to make repayment 
and in certain situation, before extending the credit facilities, to assessing  their credit decisions which 
is consistent with the arguments of signalling theory, cost of capital theory and agency theory  (Healy 
& Palepu 2001; Cooke 1989). 
                                               
42 Size is significant at 10% and performance and leverage significant at 5%. 
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Profitable companies always will provide voluntarily disclosure about all aspects of achievements to 
signal the market and facilitate its opportunities for further growth (Drees & Heugens 2013; Carlos P., 
Sabri B. 2013; Vergauwen & Alem 2005; Madhani 2016).     
On the other hand, un-profitable firms also found to give good quality information with rich 
discussions and more information about future plans and prospects to build confidence and facilitate 
analysts (Wang & Hussainey 2013; Bamber et al. 2009): the same point of view also supported by 
Schleicher et al. (2007).   
6.11 Endogeneity 
Endogeneity exists when one or more of the explanatory variables are correlated with the error term; 
this can happen because of omitted variables, simultaneity when two variables are affecting each other 
simultaneously, or as a result of dynamic endogeneity when the variable is affected by a previous 
value form (Ai & Meng 2015; Semykina & Wooldridge 2010). 
Accounting literature suggest that studies which implement CG mechanisms as explanatory variables 
may suffer endogeneity especially between the CG items and performance (Moumen et al. 2015; 
Schultz et al. 2010). 
Econometrics literature offers some strategies to tackle the problem of endogeneity in the regression 
models that rely on the OLS formulas. These include utilising instrumental variables, 2SLS, GLS and 
GMM. However, under the panel regression model the only option available is the GMM (Abdallah et 
al. 2015). The general rule of thumb; “the GMM relies on instruments that are in the form of lagged 
levels of the dependent and the independent variables (for the equations in first differences) and 
lagged differences (for the equations in levels” (Abdallah et al. 2015). However, this practice is not 
valid anymore and according to (Wooldridge 2016) instrumental variables should not be included in 
the regression model when the model has endogenous explanatory variables  as they can have negative 
consequences rather than adding value.   
Considering the controversy associated with  endogeneity and its effect on the validity of the 
regression model and also the absence of reliable an econometric approved solution,  researchers need 
to take alternative steps to either make sure that all variables are exogenous or to add more robustness 
to the regression model so that it will maintain the credibility of the regression model outcomes.  
Under the fixed effect panel data regression model the unobservable or omitted variables endogeneity 
is naturally ruled out, especially when the data are strongly balanced (Semykina & Wooldridge 2010). 
Another step which reassure the exogeneity of the explanatory variables are the results of the 
heteroskedasticity as, if the independent variables are free of any harmful autocorrelation this supports 
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the independent variables exogeneity. Finally, the results of the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test have been 
used to check for the presence of endogeneity. Durbin-Wu-Hausman tests the null hypothesis that the 
residual values of the endogenous variables are jointly equal to zero. If this test shows a significance 
level of (F)-statistic, the null hypothesis is rejected and this means that an endogeneity problem is 
present. Accordingly, the result of Durbin-Wu-Hausman test indicates that the causality effect is not a 
problem.   
6.12  Summary 
This chapter presents the data analysis and strategies and techniques used by the researcher to analyse 
the data. As this study uses both qualitative and quantities methods, a detail discussion of data analysis 
has been presented, including descriptive statistics to highlight the patterns and the disclosure choices 
made by the Jordanian companies to present their intangible assets and other IC items in their annual 
reports. the regression models also presented the results of assumed relationship between the 
dependent and independent variables. The statistical analysis results are discussed in detail in light of 
the prior studies results as well as the justifications of the current study’s results also presented based 
theory and literature and the expert views extracted from interviews.  
The analysis has produced many interesting results which can help  information users, policy makers, 
and the companies management in dealing with IC.  
Disclosure amongst Jordanian companies differs by economic sector:  the descriptive analysis shows 
the banking sector has higher scores based and better quality on the disclosure index. Jordanian 
companies share more information about their structural capital and specifically about the corporate 
strategy, systems and IT infrastructures and future’s plans.  
Regarding the regression models results. There were statistically significant effect for  family 
ownership, foreign ownership, institutional ownership, audit committee characteristics and having CG 
committee within the board on  ICD levels or quality of the information. Moreover, institutional 
ownership, audit committee size and independence were found significantly affect the variance of  
ICD quality.  
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7 Conclusion, implication and suggested future research 
venues 
7.1 Introduction 
Due to the paramount importance  of  IC in value creation and in enhancing corporate performance, 
transparency around IC and how these resources are managed are also is very important. To maintain 
an acceptable level of transparency, a sound CG system should be in place to make sure that all 
relevant information is available on a timely basis for all stakeholders. Thus, this study has empirically 
tested the relationship between CG and ICD  - either the level of disclosure or the quality of 
information. Hence, after explaining the research phases, the current chapter provides a brief overview 
of the entire thesis. It presents a summary of the research’s approach, and methodology. Also, it offers 
a summarised picture of the study’s aims and motivations, the main findings, contribution to 
knowledge, implications for policymakers, limitations and suggested avenues for future research. This 
chapter is organised as  follows: the second section summarises the research approach and revisits the 
research methodology. The third section summarises the research findings and presents the answers 
for the research questions. The fourth section summarises the present research contribution to 
knowledge, practice and policy makers. In the fifth section the implications encountered by the 
researcher in this study have been discussed, and finally on the sixth section the limitations and the 
possible avenues for future research have been presented.  
 
7.2 Summary of the research approach and methodology 
This PhD project has deployed a positivistic philosophical stance to examine the relationship between  
CG as an independent variable and ICD (quantity and quality) as a dependent variable, controlling for 
firm size, financial performance, leverage and industry. The industry variable has been removed due to 
the statistical limitation of incorporating a time-invariant variable in the panel data fixed effect model. 
Moreover, as this study is built on the premises of  agency theory which suggests that  more 
transparency and higher quality disclosures will facilitate the monitoring role over the agent 
(management). Therefore, this study started by reviewing the literature to determine the possible 
relationship between the explanatory variable and the variance in the dependent variable (ICD levels 
and quality). The determination, measurements and empirical observations that leads to theory 
verification are the general characteristics of positivistic approach in research (Stanley 1997). From a 
time horizon point of view, this study is a longitudinal study as it covers a time window of seven 
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years, between years 2009, the year of enforcement of the CG code, until the cut off date 2015. That 
allows the current study to examine the pattern of ICD over the period of study offering deeper 
understanding of the ICD phenomenon and avoiding the shortfalls of  prior studies which mostly were 
cross-sectional studies.  
This study has utilised a mixed method to achieve its goals.  The first stage of research started by 
collecting data from the annual reports of the population (the top 100 companies of the listed 
companies in ASE). Statistical tests (Panel Regression Test) were performed to measure the effect of 
the independent variables (CG) on the dependent variables (IC). But, in order to gain more 
understanding of the result of the statistical analysis the researcher used qualitative technique (Semi-
structured interviews) with a sample of financial analysts, professionals and stakeholders who 
normally follow the disclosure and able to understand and differentiate different kinds of disclosures.  
The study was conducted in phases. The first phase was the development of the research instrument 
and piloting. The piloting study was primarily intended to evaluate the research instrument’s 
feasibility and its ability to collect the secondary data from the corporates’ annual reports. This process 
of collecting data from source documents i.e. annual reports, books, magazines, speeches, newspapers 
and or scripts is referred to as content analysis (Krippendorff  2013; Beattie et al. 2004).   
7.3 Research aims and questions 
This study aims to examine the effects of the corporate governance on ICD on both the quantity of 
information as well as the quality of them. Accordingly, a survey has been carried out on the 
corporates annual reports of the Jordanian listed companies to collect the data relating to the board of 
directors and governance mechanisms adopted by them and the quantity and quality of disclosure 
about the IC items based on a specially developed research tool i.e. the disclosure index. Therefore, 
the research objectives are summarised by the following points: - 
• Extending the understanding of IC and ICD by Identifying the patterns and practices of ICD 
among the Jordanian listed companies within the study period. 
• Analysing the effect of the corporate governance mechanisms on ICD and identifying the 
governance aspects that significantly affecting ICD either positively or negatively. 
• Developing a model for the relationship between corporate governance and ICD based on 
circumstances of the Jordanian and Arab region 
Thus, the current study accepts responsibility for answering the following two questions: 
1. What are the patterns and the current practices of reporting the IC in Jordanian listed 
companies 
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2. To what extent do these corporate governance’s mechanisms affect the ICD within the 
Jordanian listed companies; and what is the direction of the relationship between them? 
 
7.4 Summary of the findings 
7.4.1 Findings 
The answer for the first research question was discussed in detail in the second part of  chapter six 
where a sample of the visual disclosure patterns and  descriptive statistics provided a clear view of the 
current practices and the state of ICD in the Jordanian market. The visual disclosure of IC items which 
includes images, tables, graphs and figures in annual reports focuses on  structural capital items, e.g. 
certifications accreditations, R&D, and future plans. Still, the realtional and HC are represented in the 
visual disclosure patterns but with the focus of training and employees allocation to training which is 
summarised in the table with comparative data also, over  the period of the study. At a glance it can be 
seen that the Jordanian companies were not the same in engaging in ICD. The best economic sector (in 
terms of ICD) was the banking, sector followed by the insurance sector, then  the service sector and 
finally  the manufacturing sector.  
Jordanian Companies focus on  structural capital followed by  human capital and finally  relational 
capital according to the aggregate score on the ICD index. The most frequent score for this component 
of IC i.e. structural capital was the corporate strategy. This reflects the level of awareness of the 
managements in the Jordanian companies of the importance of IC and the information relating to the 
corporate strategies and companies’ plans for future.  
Moreover, as described before, within  SC the most frequent items were corporate strategy, systems 
and IT infrastructures and future plans. Regarding HC, the number of the employees and employees’ 
breakdown, in addition to staff competencies and education were all  discussed in the annual report 
with details including the distribution of the employees according to the level of education and 
professional qualifications. The information disseminated also included information about the future 
plans of hiring, training and preparing of the staff to match the developments in the industry or to meet 
new professional standards. This referred mainly to the high demand of information by regulators, 
especially that the banking sector is active in the region and this will make these banks subject to 
another foreign supervisory agencies and governmental bodies requirements; this is in addition to the 
international standards set by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. Moreover, the Jordanian 
banking sector is historically well established as according to the ASE database, the first listed 
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company in the market was a bank. These results are consistent with the results of Brown et al. (2016) 
who conducted their study on a selected sample of  service companies in Botswana. They  applied in-
depth case studies over the selected companies and their results indicated that the regional banks were 
the best in terms of IC reporting with emphasis on the human capital and relational capital.  
To answer the second question of this PhD thesis. Panel data fixed effect regression model has been 
run to examine the effect of CG mechanisms (Board structure, ownership structure and the 
characteristics of the audit committee) on the ICD quantity and quality.  
• Board of Directors Structure (board size, board independence, role duality) 
• Ownership structure (Management Ownership, Family ownership, Foreign Ownership, and 
Institutional ownership) 
• Audit Committee Characteristics: (Audit committee size, independence, and effectiveness).   
The regression models results indicated that board size, board independence and role duality have no 
effect on  ICD quality and quantity. Regarding the board size, the present study results confirm the 
relsuts of Cheng & Courtenay (2006), as in such cases more memebrs in the board will not be able to 
add value to the transparency or motiviate  voluntary disclosures. This referrs to the ability of some 
memebrs to dominate others and the lack of law enforcement in developing countries. The same  study 
also failed to find any significant effect for the board size on the quality of IC information. This 
confirms the resluts indicated by Holtz & Sarlo Neto (2014).  
This sutdy failed to prove any positive relationship concerning the effect of board independence on  
ICD which is consistent with the results indicated by Falikhatun et al.( 2011), who examined the 
lobbying and connections between the board memebers which marginalise the role of  independent 
memebers. That was the same with the size of the audit committee where again the results indicated a 
negative effect for the audit committee size on  ICD and this conclusion confirms Wang & Hussainey 
(2013) which suggests that it is a false assumption that bigger size brings effectivness and a diversity 
of experience. Regarding the effect of the board independece, this study conforms Lim et al. (2007) as 
the empirical resluts failed to prove any significant relationship between  board independence and the 
quality of  ICD. These results are consistent with the results indicated by Moumen et al. (2015) in 
failing to find any signifciant relationship between the board independence and the risk disclosure.  
In addition, based on the regression model resluts the separation of the CEO and Chairperson roles 
was found to have no significant effect on  ICD on both the level of disclosure and its qaulity. Which 
is consistent with results indicated by Muttakin et al. (2015).   
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Moreover, family ownership has negative effect on the level (quantity) of ICD but has no effect on the 
quality of information.  As the family ownership makes the members of the controlling families 
entitled to access information from other resources rather than the annual reports. The results are 
consistent with the resluts indicated by (Nekhili et al. 2012).  
Our empirical results for the effect of management ownership indicate a significant positive effect for 
the management ownership on  ICD. This is in line with the view point that states that the managers in 
case they are a shareholders will not be  residula claimants. This means they will do their best to bring 
benefits to the owners of the firms and for themselves. When  foreign invesors hold  ownership in 
local firms they will be affected more by information asymmetry. This will lead them to press for 
more better quality information due to their remotness. This in one way or another, will enhance  
transparency.   
Moreover, the present study results indicate that the institutional investors’ ownership,  affect ICD 
levels positively. This conclsion supports El-gazzar (1989) who found that generally  institutional 
investors ownership is. associated with better voluntary disclosure choices in USA. However, the 
results also, failed to indicate any significant effect of the institutional investors ownership on the 
quality of the ICD which is consistent with Satta et al (2015): an explanation for this may lie in the 
fact that the insistutional investors will ask for infomration about  finanical and operational issues 
more than focusing on ICD information.   
As mentioned early, audit committee size has a negative effect on both the level and the quality of 
ICD. This may be attributed to the fact that more members in the committee will encourage disputes 
and increase the opportunities for disagreement often referred to as the “paradox of plenty”43   
Conversely, audit committee independence and audit committee effectiveness  positively affect quality 
and quantity. These resluts are confirm the findings of Ahmed Haji 2015; Li et al. (2012).  
Having a CG committee within the board was empirically found to  positivley affect  ICD on both 
sides: the level of disclosure and the quality of it. The role of the CG committee is described in the CG 
code as an independent committee within the board that should review and develop the firm’s CG 
manual and  take all necessary steps to make sure that the company adopts a sound and robust CG 
system. Adhering to this role will particiapte postiviely in motivating the board to match the 
                                               
43 This terminology I borrowed from political economy literature which was first introduced by Hussain Mahdavy, in his 
article published in 1970, titled The Patterns and the Problems of the Economic Development in the Rentire States; the case 
of Iran. In his argument he assumes that plenty of resources in some developing countries allows the ruling elite to block the 
adancement of democarcy and instead empowers their autocratic rulership. The full version of Dr. Mahdavy  article can be 
accessed on line via: http://www-personal.umich.edu/~twod/oil-s2010/rents/Mahdavy.pdf  
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expectations of the shareholders and will give the board the momentum to carry on an active 
supervisory role.  
The table below summarises the research variables and how they affect the ICD.  
Table 7.1 The Relation Between Study's  Variables 
Varibale ICD Quantitiy ICD  
Quality 
Relationship The sing of 
relation 
Relationship The sing of 
relation 
Board Size NO N/A NO N/A 
Board Independence NO N/A NO N/A 
Role Dulaity NO N/A NO N/A 
Family Ownership  YES Negative (-) NO N/A 
Mangement Ownership YES Positive (+) YES Positive (+) 
Foreign Investros Ownership  YES Positive (+) NO N/A 
Institutional Investros 
Ownership 
YES Positive (+) NO N/A 
Audit Comittee Size YES Negative (-) YES Negative (-) 
Audit Comittee Independence  YES Positive (+) YES Positive (+) 
Audit Comittee meetigns  YES Positive (+) YES Positive (+) 
Corporte Governacne 
Committee  
YES Positive (+) YES Positive (+) 
Size YES Positive (+) YES Positive (+) 
Leverage YES Positive (+) YES Positive (+) 
Performance (ROA) YES Positive (+) YES Positive (+) 
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7.5 Contribution to knowledge and implications for policymakers 
7.5.1 Contribution to literature 
This study offered some new evidences for the effect of CG on  ICD levels and quality. These 
evidences are from a virgin context which has been overlooked by the research community until this 
study filled the existing gap in the literature: most prior studies were conducted either in Nordic 
countries or Anglo-phonic countries: developing countries have been neglected by scholars. Thus, this 
study, by presenting  evidences from Jordan and based on Jordanian listed companies, which share 
many characteristics with other Arab and other MENA countries is considered a genuine contribution 
to the knowledge and an extension to  IC literature. Moreover, this study is longitudinal which helps to 
offer a deeper understanding of the ICD phenomenon. In addition, the sample size is larger than any 
prior study covering all economic sectors which also extends the body of knowledge and provide new 
and comprehensive explanations for the variance in ICD levels and quality. Moreover, according to 
the researcher’s best knowledge, this study has explored for the first time the effect of establishing CG 
committee on the ICD which indicates a positive effect of such committee on the quantity and quality 
of IC information in annual report. To sum up, the present study’s contribution to literture can be 
summarised in the following points:  
▪ The present study provides disclosure’s literature, in Jordan, MENA region and developing 
countries generally, with a validated research instrument (disclosure index) to capture, in a 
relatively comprehensive way, IC main categories and items. This represents a great value 
added to the research community and knowledge itself too.  
▪ The present study has empirically demonstrated that the examined explanatory variables are 
varying in their effect on ICD. Possible explanations for this variation also have been provided 
based on the institutional and regulatory circumstances in Jordan.   
▪ Locally, this study provides two contributions to the research community in Jordan:   
▪ The present study offers researchers in ICD field with a comprehensive 
database about Jordanian listed firms with a detailed information about IC and 
ICD the main items that Jordanian firms disclose and the categories that they 
focus on. This database remains valid for future research and assessment of 
the IC status quo in Jordan.  
 
▪ The explanatory variables (corporate governance variables) have never been 
grouped together and examined as determinants of ICD in prior literature in 
Jordan. The current study according to the researcher’s best knowledge is the 
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first in Jordan and the in region (MENA) that has provided empirical 
evidence, which supports the effects of these factors on level and quality of 
ICD.  
 
▪ This study (to the researcher’s best knowledge) is the first study to consider 
the quality of ICD in the MENA region and specifically in Jordan and it is the 
first study to take in consideration the visual ICD patterns and quantifies it in 
a state of the art manner.  
 
▪ Internationally, the current study has introduced new explanatory determinant that have never 
been tested before in ICD field. Principally, the presence of corporate governance committee 
within the board. This variable proves a significant effect on ICD quantity and quality.  
7.5.2 Contribution to theory 
        This study has provided a genuine contribution to theory by introducing a new comprehensive 
theoretical framework for studying  ICD. As indicated in the theoretical framework chapter, there are 
many overlapping theories in the arena of voluntary disclosure. Empirical evidence can identify which 
can be effectively applied to certain situations and which can be ignored. Thus, the indicated results 
contribute to three theories that can be implemented to understand  ICD. The first theory is  agency 
theory, based on the results the shareholders: shareholders and the debit-holders play a crucial role in 
motivating companies to disclose higher level and better quality of information about its IC and 
intangibles generally. Moreover, this study provides  new evidence which contributes to  stewardship 
theory and impression management theory as  managers will be keen on sharing the information that 
reflects their pioneership, stewardship and leadership as the managers in certain occasion will be 
derived by demotivation to appear as a good citizens and successful leaders for their institutions. 
Meaniwhile, managers are interested in providing information that impresses the audiences either by 
draw their attention to the good news which could be related to growth, achieving the targets etc. Or 
providing information that disrtact the audience from recognising the bad news e.g. failour to meet the 
targets, losses, etc. The diagram below summarises the suggested theoretical framework as indicated 
by empirical results: 
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Figure 7.1 Theoretical Framework for ICD 
7.5.3 Methodological Contribution  
The current study has developed a customised research instrument for measuring IC using content 
analysis from the annual reports. This double-barrelled disclosure index was designed to measure the 
level or quantity and the quality of ICD. It remains a valid disclosure measure for similar studies 
which may take place in similar conditions other Arabian and middle eastern countries as well as 
countries in North Africa. Another contribution to methodology provided by the current study is that it 
involves two different techniques of data collection – (disclosure index and interviews for quantitative 
data results validation. This approach allows the researcher to gain deeper understanding of the ICD 
practices and determinants and provide a solid ground for generalizability.    
7.6 Implications 
This study found that the IC in Jordan is still in its early stages in terms of how it benefits the economy 
and  participates in  social and public wellbeing. Therefore it can recommend  that countries with 
small and limited resources should invest more in their IC infrastructure. A nationwide IC survey is 
recommended so that the policy-makers will know how to draw on the available resources and where 
to invest further resources to establish a real knowledge based economy. Still, on the macroeconomic 
level Jordan needs to benefit from countries like Austria, Sweden and Denmark in the field of 
identifying the national IC and maintaining a comprehensive national IC. This will be positive for both 
public and private sectors and will help business to identify  possible investment opportunities.  
   
183 
 
For professional and standard-setting bodies, ICD needs to be regulated, as this will help to  increase 
the transparency and efficiency of the financial market; also, it will support and enforce market 
discipline. In addition, regulating the ICD will motivate  companies to be creative and more 
competitive by offering higher levels of information than the required by regulations.  Finally, it is 
recommended that  higher education policy maker in Jordan and other Arab countries  consider 
teaching modules about  IC in economic and business specialties allowing  students to develop an 
awareness of  IC and its importance for businesses and for nations.  
7.7 Limitations and future research venues 
No research project can run without limitations. Some of these limitations can result from the time and 
resources availability. Some could  result from access to data or technical aspects that prevent the 
researcher from processing the data.  
The first limitation that can affect the generalizability of the results is the small size of the population: 
the ASE has 265 listed companies which remains small compared to established financial markets in 
the western world. Thus, despite the data being collected from the top 100 companies, which accounts 
for about 78% of the market capitalization, some of the included companies in the bottom of the list a 
merely have no engagement in ICD: this also raises a red flag to the policy makers as mentioned in the 
previous section, prompting regulations which will  enact  suitable regulations to motivate  companies 
to show their investments in  IC and their future plans for expansion into a modern economy:  IC 
remains the gateway to  intellectual investments and sustainable smart businesses.  
Second, this study relies on the secondary data which collected from the corporate annual reports and 
for the sake of deeper understanding of the results a semi-structured interviews been conducted with a 
highly qualified and carefully selected respondent covering a range of professionals from the industry, 
investors (institutional and individuals) academics and financial experts to get deeper understanding of 
the results. However, perhaps deploying other research techniques such as the case study, comparative 
studies between some companies from Jordan and similar companies in the developed world can 
provide more explanation for feeble ICD situation within the Jordanian companies apart of the 
banking sector.  
Third, this study has adopted as its research instrument a (disclosure index) from literature as indicated 
in detail in the methodology chapter. However, from about the 180 items recognised in literature as  
subcomponents of the three intellectual capitals parts, only 44 items were applicable to Jordanian 
companies. Thus, for the companies who get high scores on the customised index might not  reflect 
the same high score on other indices: for example Li, et al., (2008) have a disclosure index of 65 items 
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for their study in the  UK. Similarly, Beattie & Thomson (2007)  have an index of 75  items. This 
should be considered when reading the results, especially in developed countries.  
Fourth, due to the fact that the majority of Jordanian companies publish their annual reports only in 
Arabic, consistency for both versions (English and Arabic) was a challenge. Moreover, some 
companies do not publish their annual reports on their websites and this made the researcher  refer to 
the JSC database to collect the annual reports from there. Having these annual reports as images and 
some of them with Arabic version only made it impossible for the researcher to process the annual 
reports through computerised content analysis techniques. Thus, to keep the highest possible degree of 
consistency in analysis and coding, the researcher incurred the burden of conducting a manual content 
analysis for the 700 annual reports which took a huge amount of time and effort at this stage of 
building  the IC database for the study sample. However, this raises the importance of establishing the 
national IC database for Jordanian companies which will facilitate more research and help in 
increasing the awareness of IC and its importance to the economic development.  
Fifth, as mentioned previously, this study relies on the data collected from the corporate annual 
reports, which remain important disclosure channel for companies. However, approaching other 
disclosure channels e.g. websites, media, professional networks and social networks can provide a 
clearer and more comprehensive picture of  ICD practices and the general situation of the IC 
transparency within the Jordanian companies.  Thus, future studies can utilise such disclosure channels 
for more understanding of the ICD phenomenon. 
Sixth, as this topic is still relatively new and according to Li., et al (2008) still feeble and 
underresearched. This must be considered to some extent a limitation, as some of the concepts are not 
well defined and this accordingly will pose some challenges during  research. 
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7.8 Summary 
In this chapter of the current thesis has summarised  a detailed discussion of the research findings 
which have been presented as well as the answers for the research questions being discussed and the 
practical recommendations for the industry and policy-makers provided.  
The contributions made by the present study are on all levels including the contribution to the 
knowledge, methodological contribution, contribution to the theory, and practice. 
Limitations and avenues for the future studies also have been provided in light of the findings of this 
study: future studies can benefit from the comprehensive database built under this PhD project. Future 
research project can handle the IC from many angles including for example exploring the phenomena 
in other countries or taking a comparative study between more than one country. Collecting data from 
other sources than the annual reports can help in gaining a wider overview of ICD in Jordan for 
example in examining the disclosure patterns on websites, social media channels and or in  
professional networks.   
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Appendices: 
Appendix A. 
A List of the Study Sample: 
Banking Sector: 
1) JORDAN ISLAMIC BANK 
2) JORDAN KUWAIT BANK 
3) JORDAN COMMERCIAL BANK 
4) THE HOUSING BANK FOR TRADE AND FINANCE 
5) ARAB JORDAN INVESTMENT BANK 
6) BANK AL-ETIHAD 
7) ARAB BANKING CORPORATION /(JORDAN) 
8) INVEST BANK 
9) CAPITAL BANK OF JORDAN 
10) CAIRO AMMAN BANK 
11) BANK OF JORDAN 
12) JORDAN AHLI BANK 
13) ARAB BANK 
14) SOCIETE GENERAL JORDAN 
15) JORDAN-DUBAI ISLAMIC BANK 
Insurance Sector: 
1) MIDDLE EAST INSURANCE 
2) NATIONAL INSURANCE 
3) ISLAMIC INSURANCE CO.,  
4) EUROPEAN ARABEAN GROUP FOR INSURANCE.  
5) AL-NISR AL-ARABI INSURANCE 
6) JORDAN FRENCH INSURANCE 
7) JORDAN I INTERNATIONAL INSURANCE CO. 
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8) ARAB ORIENT INSURANCE COMPANY 
9) DELTA INSURANCE PLC 
10) ALQUDS INSURANCE CO 
11) UNITED INSURANCE CO 
12) FIRST INSURANCE CO 
13) MEDERERANEAN AND GULF INSURANCE (MEDGULF)  
14) JERUSALEM INSURANCE  
15) THE HOLY LAND INSURANCE 
Manufacturing Sector: 
1) AL-EQBAL INVESTMENT COMPANY LTD 
2) JORDAN STEEL 
3) JORDAN PHOSPHATE MINES 
4) THE JORDAN CEMENT FACTORIES (Lafarge) 
5) ARAB ALUMINIUM INDUSTRY /ARAL 
6) THE JORDAN PIPES MANUFACTURING (ASPM) 
7) THE JORDAN WORSTED MILLS 
8) THE ARAB POTASH 
9) JORDAN ELECTRIC POWER 
10) JORDAN PETROLEUM REFINERY 
11) THE JORDANIAN PHARMACEUTICAL MANUFACTURING  
12) DAR AL DAWA DEVELOPMENT AND INVESTMENT 
13) PHILADELPHIA PHARMACEUTICALS 
14) ARAB CENTER FOR PHARMA-CHEMICAL  
15) JWIKO WOODEN FURNITURE MANUFACTURERS  
16) NATIONAL POULTRY  
17) INDUSTRIAL COMMERCIAL AGRICULTURAL  
18) ZAY 
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19) ARAB TEXTILE  
20) NATIOAL ALIMUNEUME  
21) NATIONAL CABLES AND WIRES COMPANY 
22) GENERAL INVESTMENTS  
23) JORDAN DAIRY PRODUCTS COMPANY 
24) JORDAN PIPES  
25) HYPEX 
26) UNITION FOR TOBACO AND CIGARETTS  
27) REDY MIXED CONCRET  
28) UNITED IRON AND STEEL COMPANY 
29) UNITED CABLES (UCIC) 
30) SINROA FOOD INDUSTRIES  
31) ARAB INTERNATIONAL FOOD AND INVESTMENT  
32) HAMMOUDEH 
33) EKBAL PRINTING AND PACKAGING 
34) INDUSTRIAL RESOURCES  
35) MULTI-PROJECTS COMPREHENSIVE COMPANY  
36) UNITED CABLE UCIC 
Services Sector: 
1) JORDAN TELECOM (ORANGE) 
2) MEDITERRANEAN TOURISM INVESTMENT (4seasons) 
3) ARAB INTERNATIONAL HOTELS (Sheraton)  
4) ZARA INVESTEMENT HOLDING 
5) JORDAN ARAB INTERNATIONAL HOTELS (MARIOTTS)  
6) JORDAN PRESS FOUNDATION/AL-RA'I 
7) PETRA EDUCATION COMPANY  
8) AL-ISRA FOR EDUCATION AND INVESTMENT "PLC" 
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9) ROYAL AIR ACADEMY  
10) THE ARAB INTERNATIONL FOR EDUCATION AND INVESTMENT (Applied Uni) 
11) AFAQ HOLDING FOR INVESTMENT & REAL ESTATE DEVELOPMENT CO. P.L.C 
12) ISTEKLAL HPOSBITAL  
13) NATIONAL ELECTRIC COMPANY  
14) ELECTRICITY DSTRIBUTION COMPANY 
15) IRBED ELECTRICITY COMPANY  
16) JORDAN NATIONAL SHIPPING LINES  
17) TAJAMUTAT INVESTMENT (TAJ MALL)  
18) JORDAN DECALPOLIS  
19) DUTY-FREE SHPOS COMPANY  
20) ROYAL JORDANIAN AIRLINES 
21) COMPREHINSIVE LEASING COMPANY 
22) MASAFAT SPECIALIZED TRANSPORT  
23) LOANS GUARANTEE COMPANY 
24) INTERNATIONAL CARDS COMPANY 
25) INJAZ FOR DEVELOPMENT & PROJECTS 
26) DULAYL INDUSTRIAL PARK  
27) QAWASMI LAND TRANSPORT 
28) MASAKEN 
29) OFFTEC JORDAN 
30) SOUTHERN ELECTRONICS  
31) AFAQ REALESTATE INVESTMENT 
32) JORDAN MORTGAJE REFINANCING COMPANY 
33) FIRST FINANCE  
34) BINDAR-JO 
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Appendix B. 
Interviews Thematic analysis: 
 
Theme 1 Intellectual Capital Concept  
Respondent 1 intangible assets information technology and employee’s competencies.  
Respondent 2 All intangible assets including employees and knowledge.   
Respondent 3 Knowledge and research and development and qualified staff.   
Respondent 4 It is an intangible asset which is different from the common component of 
physical items that are easily measurable and included in the financial 
position statement. IC generally includes human capital and relational 
capital (relationship with firm’s stakeholders) and usually includes 
forward-looking information. 
 
 
Respondent 5 A part of value of any investee that is added by its human resources, its 
hard to measure and even harder to build a financial model to forecast such 
value, but I think it is the key factor that determines the success of any 
business at mid to longer term, as a portfolio manager I rely on interviews 
of executives to build my perception regarding management capabilities 
and their way of thinking, as well as to understand their strategic 
objectives.  
 
 
Respondent 6 For me IC is the knowledge, experience and all competencies that 
company can transfer to value or use to create value 
 
 
Respondent 7 Mostly connected to the intangible and HR reputation and IT. Basically 
this kind of disclosure is so special and intended to specific audiences 
whom the sophisticated investors and financial analyst 
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Respondent 8  The difference between BV and MV.     
 
Final Remarks  
 
 
Theme 2 Firms’ interest to disclose such sensitive-type of information 
Respondent 1 Sometimes companies do so to affect its share price in the market as 
market value a one of the most used indicator by creditors and investors 
to evaluate the company 
Also, companies intend to expand its business or to show its growth to 
the market will find itself need to share alone of information about its 
future plans and new product if any.  
 
Respondent 2 I do not think we disclose anything will cause us any harm.  
what do you recognise as A SENSETIVE INFORMATION we already 
know that disclosed information either known to our competitors or it 
will not help them in affecting our market share. 
 
 
Respondent 3 To highlight its Strategic vision to the market and other audiences 
including potential investors.  
To reassure stakeholders that It has a clear plan  
Sometimes it could be doing that to draw the investors’ attention to its 
potential growth showing its share as sustainably opportunity for capital 
gains and maybe for accessing credit facilities. 
 
Respondent 4 Due to the rapid corporate growing, traditional disclosure (e.g. financial 
reporting) going to be insufficient to meet users’ needs. 
 
 
Respondent 5 I think a voluntary disclosure regarding IC will help investors and or 
analyst to better understand the strategy of any investee that will 
determine its value at the long term through enhancing the transparency 
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and credibility of the management, in which at the end it will decrease 
cost of capital as a direct result to decreasing operational risks 
Respondent 6 Companies will disclose such information to please its customers and to 
catch the investors’ attention. However, it will do so only if the 
regulatory environment able to protect them from unfair coemption 
 
Respondent 7 Facilitate the expansion and future planning  
Proper and precise evaluation for present and potential investors 
 
Respondent 8  Any firms will try to present all information that reflect its honesty and 
integrity to the information users Especially potential investors to take 
informative decisions.   
 
 
Final Remarks  
 
Theme 3 IC Importance to the Companies and other stakeholders  
Respondent 1 It’s a good strategy to communicate its achievements and to keep 
existing on the analysts table.  
 
 
Respondent 2 Absolutely, more information means clearer image and the information 
user can see the whole picture 
 
Respondent 3 Perhaps for precise evaluation. Understanding the new business lines or 
the new products 
 
Respondent 4 Yes, because of the genuine need of the investors for information and 
companies maybe really need to enhance its mental image within the 
public so obviously, all parties going to benefit from disclosure whatever 
the item disclosed transparency is good in all cases. 
 
Respondent 5 Decreasing cost of capital. 
Decreasing operational risks. 
Increasing firm value 
 
   
219 
 
Enhancing market efficiency 
Respondent 6 Generally, transparency will increase investors’ confidence in the 
company. More information about the IC especially if it about its 
developed systems its market share increase will give the investor the 
opportunity to assess the potential gains from the stock.  
For companies; reputation will create more reputation and lead to better 
mental image of the companies within its customers and providers. 
 
 
Respondent 7 Investors will give a higher value to the companies that adopt a 
transparent policy; assess the possibility of the continuity 
 
Respondent 8  Yes I do and that could be because of the companies thrive to build Trust 
with the audience and also, it could be a strategy for leveraging its social 
capital and promoting congruence within the staff. 
 
 
Final Remarks  
 
Theme 4 Jordanian Corporate Governance Code effectively motivate firms to be transparent 
about their IC.  
Respondent 1 To some extents yes but it is still needs more enforcement and a proper 
monitoring techniques to enhance the level of compliance. 
 
Respondent 2 Theoretically yes; however, the practice suggests that more effort by 
government should be done in enforcement of the compliance to the CG 
code. 
 
Respondent 3 Yes to some extent by enforcing the market discipline  
 
 
Respondent 4 Yes- JCGC encourages companies to offer accurate, timely and sufficient 
information which therefore enable investors in making rational 
economic decisions. This includes annual and periodic reports, 
transactions with other stakeholders e.g. suppliers and lenders and any 
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their relevant information. 
 
Respondent 5 I think yes, it is what I feel during my meeting and interviews with the 
listed companies, but to a larger extent with large cap companies.  
 
 
Respondent 6 to some extent yes, because the CGC has refer companies to other best 
practices and give too much emphasize to the transparency and openness 
which defiantly will lead to more disclosure about its intangibles 
 
Respondent 7 still not too much helpful  
Respondent 8  I think good CG will lead to a good financial system which will provide 
more honest information. However, considering the mentality and the 
specification of the Jordanian markets CGC needs more regulatory 
support to give its fruits. 
 
 
Final Remarks  
 
Theme 5 ICD Motivations  
Respondent 1 Competition and sometimes mimicking other companies abroad also, 
sometimes the international best practices and TQM requirements may 
motivate companies to be more transparent generally 
 
Respondent 2 Perhaps the completion and sometimes some companies try to just follow 
the leading companies in reporting practices and even the shape and the 
content of the annual report 
 
Respondent 3 competition and opportunities 
 
 
Respondent 4 Competition as I believe in Jordan some companies try to grow its market 
share via marketing and PR campaigns this will be reflected in all 
disclosure channels including its website, press-releases and of course the 
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annual reports.  Also, the small and relatively new companies try to 
imitate the established companies for example I the company that I am a 
board member the GM once told me that he wants the make the annual 
report looks like Deutsche Bank. Despite that do not make any sense to 
me. I can understand his point of view as that will give a good impression 
to the receiver (the first impression) especially they need to distribute the 
annual report to all existing investors before the Annual General 
Assembly.      
 
Respondent 5 When they truly believe that such disclosures effect on the fair value of 
their entities, an example of that, in the last February I met a group of 
executives of potential Jordanian investees (to be added to my portfolio), 
during the meeting I pointed to them that an accurate disclosure in general 
will add value to your firms, because as a portfolio manager when I 
calculate cost of capital to any investee I add a risk premium to those who 
doesn’t have enough disclosures, which means lower firm value. 
 
Respondent 6 Perhaps because they want to give the potential investors such 
information to encourage them to buy when the offering take place or they 
maybe reassuring the existing investors about the potential gains and 
growth opportunity.   
 
 
Respondent 7 sometimes the competition push the companies to do so.  
Respondent 8  motivate by the growth seeking Trust building and might be to extend the 
CG compliance.   
 
 
Final Remarks  
 
Theme 6 Board size, structure, Ownership structure, Role Duality 
Respondent 1 Board Size, I doubt that the BS have any effect. 
Board structure: Having specialised committees within the board will 
make the work more effective and this may enhance the CG function 
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generally which will support the transparency in general. 
Role Duality: wherever possible segregation of duties is better than hold 
all power in one-man hand; so I guess role-duality is will be negative 
effect.  
 
Respondent 2 No Answer provided   
Respondent 3 Board Size: experience diversity will be good  
Board Structure: subcommittees will help by dividing the assignments 
for more specialised people and give these subcommittees the 
opportunities to focus their effort on specific aspect then to be discussed 
effectively on the board level.  
 
Ownership Structure: this will depend on how own the majority of the 
capital or have an influential ownership.  As the scattered ownership will 
help the transparency and vis versa.  
Role Duality: absolutely will be negative to the CG   
 
 
 
Respondent 4 Ownership structure: I think it influences the level of IC disclosure 
particularly in a context like Jordan where the ownership is concentrated in 
hands of few investors. Therefore, those blockholders (especially families) 
have a significant role in monitoring and controlling managers’ decisions 
due to their ownership and voting power. They may demand high level of 
disclosure to pass a positive signal to minority shareholders and to other 
stakeholders.  
board size: I do not think the is any association between BZ and 
disclosure level. In Jordan, board size merely reflects the company size. 
role duality: RD is expected to hinder the disclosure level. As CEO 
almost controls the information given to the board, this make the CEO’s 
monitoring and evaluation by the board less effective. Ineffective board 
could be therefore less interested in the disclosure matter. Also, The 
Chairman who is CEO at the same time may tend to lack of transparency 
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as a way to mask management fraud. 
Respondent 5 Board size: I think a large board size will enhance disclosures as the 
probability of board coalition and agreement to decide not to disclose 
become less. 
Ownership Structure: I think an institutional domination on the 
ownership structure will enhance disclosures, as institutions are more 
professional and have better understanding of the importance of 
disclosures and transparency than individuals. 
Board Structure: an existence of independent board members will lead to 
enhance disclosure process as he/she doesn’t have direct benefit related to 
not to disclose decision 
Role duality: a segregation between the role of CEO and the chairman 
will minimise the ability of CEO to control the board, and as a final result 
the decision of not to disclose becomes harder. 
 
 
Respondent 6 board size I do not have a role in ICD or to any kind of transparency  
Ownership Structure: is respective issue and it depend it could be 
positive or it could be negative this depends on the company sector. And 
case by case 
Dividing the board into committees will help them to divide work between 
them and this can lead to better monitoring level so it maybe positive to 
ICD  
as well as the role duality.  
 
Nader 
Respondent 7  
 
 
Respondent 8  board size: maybe the larger board is likely to have diverse expertise and 
dedicated however, this not always works as sometimes larger board 
brings useless debate and conflict of agendas to the board table.   
Ownership structure: this maybe an obstacle for the transparency due to 
the nepotism family lobbying and long-arm to dominate the board and the 
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firm especially if a collusion exists with the executive management.  
board structure enhances the effectiveness of the board   
role duality it is bad for disclosure. As separation of duties can help the 
transparency in general by abolishing the opportunistic behaviour and 
separation will create information asymmetry under which the chairman 
will claim for more information and accordingly the flow of information to 
the board will be higher and board discussion will be more informed     
 
Final Remarks  
 
 
Theme 7 Independent member and Intellectual Capital disclosure 
Respondent 1 Yes, if the external member was properly qualified to such role because 
sometimes a good external member will not jeopardise his/her reputation 
for being rubberstamp member.  
 
Respondent 2 I am not sure if this will help. Sometimes the independent member does 
not have the expertise to carry out the monitoring role as stated in the 
CGC.  
 
Respondent 3 on ground, not effective due to the absence of the proper evaluation 
mechanism for the independent member.  
Sometimes the other members try to overwhelm the role of the 
independent member in voting 
 
Respondent 4 Independent directors may positively affect the disclosure level. Because 
of they are free from management pressure; independent directors wield 
more effective monitoring and control activities in order to protect their 
reputations and to protect shareholders’ interests. From own experience as 
independent board member I won’t sacrifice my personal reputation under 
any circumstances and I did register my conservative opinions in certain 
cases when I thought the GM try to convince the board to adopt a bit 
aggressive risk abietite 
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Respondent 5 (Please refer to my answer on Board structure) an example of that is when 
the central bank of Jordan required all the Jordanian banks to appoint third 
of their boards as independent members, Jordanian banks disclosures and 
even the content of disclosure became materially better 
 
Respondent 6 I don’t think that the independent member has any role in pushing the 
transparency up.  
 
Respondent 7 it good that CGC requested for third of the board to be independent 
members but as long as this has not been compulsively asked the corporate 
law the implementation will be subject to the discretions of the companies 
and this will be useless especially the independent members do not have 
the proper channels to communicate their concerns to the supervisory 
agencies and regulators. 
 
Respondent 8  From agency theory point of view this should be positive specifically if 
(he/she) well educated and knowledgeable having both technical 
knowledge and theoretical knowledge so the IM will be a great value 
added to the board and an essential pillar of the good Governance which 
will positively impact the transparency and absolutely the voluntary ICD 
will be increased.  
 
 
Final Remarks  
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Theme 8 Foreign Investors and Transparency and ICD  
Respondent 1 I think they have a positive effect as when the foreign investment be 
substantial they delegate a sophisticated member to the board and I know 
some cases they also brought a highly qualified management team those 
who exited to reflect their expertise and knowledge and their own style of 
management on the local firms. 
 
Respondent 2 to some extent the foreign investors when they have a substantial share in 
the firm and able to put their representative in the board. They enhance the 
supervisory role of the board. Moreover, they demand high quality of 
information either about the operation and financial affairs so perhaps this 
will either directly or indirectly affect the level of transparency.  
 
Respondent 3 Yes, foreign investor seeks the stability and the Possibility of growth and 
the sustainable gain. They bring with them good practices in management 
and internal control which will enhance the governance structure 
 
Respondent 4 As foreigners are geographically away from the firms they invest in, this 
increases information asymmetries and makes managerial monitoring more 
difficult. So foreigners may add more pressure on management to increase 
corporate transparency. 
 
Respondent 5 I think it depends on the foreign investor itself, some foreign investors have 
positive effects as they are reputable institutions such as International 
Finance Corporation (IFC), the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (EBRD), and the Islamic Bank for Development (IBD), in the 
other hand some foreign investors didn’t have any positive effect on the 
disclosures of investees, on the contrary they added more ambiguity. 
Mainly those incorporated offshore in Cayman Island, Virgin Islands, 
Jersey,,, etc.   
 
Respondent 6 I think this depend on the background of the foreign investors  
but generally foreign investors will demand higher level of information and 
this can lead to better level of disclosure of Intellectual Capital and other 
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aspect of companies’ operation 
Respondent 7 Yah, I guess they bring expertise and sometimes they press for more 
transparency to protect their investment.  
 
 
Respondent 8  there is a lot of factors affecting the role of the F.Is. including the regulation 
and the enforcement of the CG 
 
 
Final 
Remarks  
 
 
 
Theme 9 Institutional Investors role in Transparency and ICD 
Respondent 1 I don’t think they have any role because to some extent from my own 
experience the institutional investors do not engage with managerial 
activities. 
 
Respondent 2 Maybe because they have access to a sophisticated and improved analysis 
techniques and they are more educated in the financial analysis approaches 
they can enhance the level of transparency and absolutely this may lead to 
better disclosure about the ic. 
 
Respondent 3 Positive as normally the institutional investors will appoint a qualified 
representative and this individual will be subject to questions from the 
management (in institutional investor) and need to provide regular reports 
about the status of the investment on regular basis.   
 
Respondent 4 I expect that institutional investors could play positive role in IC disclosure 
due to their ownership magnitude and due to the analytical and 
information processing resources at their disposal.  
When it comes to the ICD I think any enhancement to the transparency 
level will lead to better voluntary disclosure for all aspect of the firm’s 
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business, operations and other sides including intangibles, plans, act.,  
Respondent 5 In general I do believe that institutional investors enhance the quality of 
disclosures, as they have better understanding of the importance of 
disclosure than individuals.  
 
Respondent 6 to some extent they have a good role in enhancing the level of  
voluntary disclosure generally and this possibly will affect the ICD 
They can help through the know how transfer 
 
Respondent 7 Yah, they always have better understanding to the market conditions and 
more aware of the regulations and the international business environment, 
hence, when they represented in the board they will be make a good active 
member.   
 
Respondent 8  Institutional investors normally bring professionalism and strict 
compliance with them.       
 
 
Final Remarks  
 
 
 
Theme 10 Audit Committee effect on the ICD  
Respondent 1 AC have a very important role as it one of the oldest and most established 
committees worldwide 
their supervisory role given they are have the qualifications and expertise 
will enhance the level of transparency and voluntary disclosure. 
 
Respondent 2 Yes, because this committee is mandatory and its role associated with legal 
responsibility so the member will work under pressure of responsibility 
and this may cause them to consider the enhancement of the reporting 
levels and maybe also the quality of information. 
 
Respondent 3 it depends on the qualification of the members and their performance   
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it depends on the effectiveness of the committee and the board as whole.  
Respondent 4 The essential role of audit committee is directly related to overseeing 
financial reporting and auditing activities. Therefore, its role in disclosure 
is expected to be marginal. 
 
Respondent 5 I think Audit Committee has a direct effect on the compliance with 
statutory disclosures, but as IC disclosure still voluntary in general I’m not 
sure if the audit committee has material effect, I think the steering 
committee has more effect on voluntary disclosures.   
 
Respondent 6 when they are having the good qualification and knowledge they will help 
in enhancing the level and the quality of information  
Their role as risk management instrument will shape their participation in 
disclosure.  
 
Respondent 7 I do not think they have a direct effect. As according to the regulations, the 
role of the audit committee is to review and approve the financial 
statements and pass it to the board for final approval 
 
Respondent 8  will be a positive relationship in the normal situations by increasing the 
level of disclosure as they mostly are educated and qualified  
 
 
 
Final Remarks  
 
 
 
Theme 11 CG Committee effect on the ICD  
Respondent 1 Yes, I think such committee if properly implemented will bring a higher 
level of transparency to the firms. Because speciality in governance issues 
will allow the member of the committee to take their time and allocate 
sufficient effort to the review the governance structure and identify any 
loopholes to tackle them and enhance the internal control system and I 
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think will lead to more transparency and the ICD will be positively 
affected accordingly.  
Respondent 2 If such committee properly formed from a well-educated people and its 
role has enforced well by the governmental bodies and supervisory 
agencies this will help in achieving better disclosure practices.  
 
Respondent 3 Yes I think it is good as this will allow them time and effort to work on 
developing the governance structure enhancing the transparency and this 
will absolutely affect the ICD ether in levels and quality. 
 
 
Respondent 4 As long as we talk about “voluntary” disclosure, I think CG committee 
could positively participate in enhancing the transparency levels as I think 
having an independent committee that entitled to follow up and track the 
compliance with the recommendations of the CGC and if the board backed 
the recommendations and the executive management was cooperative 
absolutely this will help. 
 
Respondent 5 Yes I’m sure that such proposed committee will play a main role in this 
issue, mainly if this committee is established by the independent board 
members.   
 
Respondent 6 This depends on the sector and the level of supervisory monitoring for 
example in banking sector I think they do a good job but I am not sure 
about the other sectors 
 
Respondent 7 Currently this committee is existing only in banks because the CBJ asked 
the licensed banks to form such committee on board level and as you know 
the Governance code issued by CBJ is rule based and subject to CBJ 
examiners onsite review so in this case yes it can help in lifting-up the 
transparency as whole and the ICD.  
 
Respondent 8  NO Answer provided   
 
Final Remarks  
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Theme 12 influencing factor that affect the firms’ decision to disclose or to withhold 
information about its IC 
Respondent 1 The genuine intention of the local companies to cope with the international 
best practices and sometimes the uniform annual report when the eternal 
auditors have a role in preparing the annual reports will affect ICD.  
 
Respondent 2 Competition in the market  
Education and spreading the financial awareness. 
 
Respondent 3 the opportunity for the growth and possible gain of disclosure, especially 
increasing the market share.  
 
Respondent 4 I think any effort to develop the voluntary disclosure generally will 
enhance the ICD. However, I assume any further development of the 
regulations and make it in line with developed countries will help.  
We do not need to go through the long path of development; why not to 
start from the stopping point of countries who already ahead of us e.g. 
Scandinavian countries and neighbouring Israel.      
 
 
Respondent 5 Management perception, once firms recognise that such disclosure 
decrease the cost of capital, facilitates the process of capital issuance, and 
enhancing their borrowing ability with favourable rates, and directly affect 
the wealth of shareholders or the firm value at the long run, they will 
voluntarily disclose.   
 
Respondent 6 In country like Jordan The government needs to lead the effort in ICD by 
incentivising the companies for do more disclosure and encourage them to 
adopt a higher level of transparency. 
offering more support to the supervisory agencies (JSC, CBJ, CCD) to 
effectively carry on their role and increase the awareness of the public 
interest.  
Encouraging the civil society to play an effective role in the public 
supervision  
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Respondent 7 Regulation then Regulation then Regulation 
establishing a high commission for transparency which will lead to higher 
a better level of disclosure. 
taking in consideration the cultural differences  
 
Respondent 8  Attract more investors   
Timing  
Other peer-firms in the market 
 
 
Final Remarks  
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Appendix C: 
A list of the participants in interviews: 
Participant  Biography  Type 
 
1  
 
CEO  
 
Internal Preparer  
2  General Manager  
Industrial Company  
Internal Preparer 
3  Manager External Audit  
E.Y. Jordan  
Preparer  
4   Independent Board Member  Internal Preparer 
5  Executive Manager – Financial Market Stability 
and Banking Supervision dept. CBJ  
Regulator.  
External  
Regulator  
6 Investment Manager  
Institutional Investor’s Rep.  
External  
User  
7 Individual Investor External  
User 
8 Financial consultant  External  
User 
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Appendix D: 
Disclosure Index., 
    This index has been developed based on literature and by going through most prior papers published in 
Intellectual Capital (IC) that utilized the disclosure index (DI) as a method to measure the level of ICD. 
Moreover, a survey has been done on a selected sample of annual reports of the Jordanian listed companies that 
covers all sectors operate in Jordan to evaluate the feasibility of such DI. The DI divided into three parts each 
one of them is designed to capture the information relating to each category of IC i.e. (Structural, Relational, or 
Human Capital).  
This DI is a dichotomous index as if the any relevant piece of information presented in the subject annual report 
will take a value of (1) or (0) otherwise (Krippendorff 2013). Which is unweighted disclosure index, (Ali et al. 
2004; Craig & Diga 1998)  as it intend to measure the level of disclosure; while The Quality of disclosure will 
be measured by another technique which simply using a four points scale 1-4; where if the item disclosed in 
narrative without any financial or monetary value information will be assigned score of (1) if the narrative 
associated with numbers/monetary or financial value will be assigned score (2) if the narrative and monetary 
value accompanied by graph and or images will take a score of (3), moreover if the previous information 
enhanced with future oriented/forward looking information this make it deserves score of (4). This methodology 
of assessing the quality of disclosure used by (Husin et al. 2012; Abdifatah Haji Ahmed & Nazli A Mohd 
Ghazali 2013; Haji & Ghazali 2012) with some modification as their scale was of three score. In addition, this 
scale has been judge by experts and institutional investors were consulted to assess this method validity.  
 
Structural Capital 
 
Corporate Strategy This covers the vision and mission of the corporate its core values, business model 
and long run goals and any other information relating to this item. 
Excellence All methods, possibilities and techniques deployed by business to adhere to the best 
performance and achieve higher level of customer’s satisfaction.  
attitudes towards long term success and the Practices in maintaining and improving 
quality standards of products and & improvement services  
Certification and 
Accreditation 
Any kind of disclosure about the company if it has any national and/or international 
accreditations, and disclosure about alignment with the any international standards 
(ISO, UKAS, HACCP etc.), or applying specific standard to gain trust and the how 
this help it to achieve its objectives. Prizes and awards  
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Intellectual property this refer to all disclosures made about intangibles that include but not limited to 
patents, innovations, copyrights, trademarks, trade secrets, licenses, commercial 
rights and other related fields owned by firm and its assets which is protected by law 
this may include also Concessions and favourable contract (Singh & Mitchell Van 
der Zahn 2008; Li et al. 2008a) 
Research & 
Development: 
This refers to future-oriented, longer-term activities in business practice, which 
development (R&D) can achieve higher levels of knowledge and improvement in 
business practice, allowing the organisation to exploit competitive advantages. It 
includes, e.g. R&D policies, programmes, planning, progress, budgets. R & D plans 
projects budget and expenses dedicated for quality improvements (Merkley 2014). 
Online environment This include the services that firm provide via its website, its email, mobile 
applications and other technological channels. Also, the description of the services in 
narrative or providing statistics for such services. (Mouritsen 1998) 
Systems Any information disclosed about the interrelated elements, structures and 
subcomponent of the company that used by company to facilitate either producing 
its products or rendering services or to facilitate delivering these to its customers or 
helping the management to achieve the corporate’s goals.  
information 
technology systems 
A collection of, software’s, technologies and/or techniques, which combine 
resources to produce desired products or helping in making the quality of service 
better, or to solve problems, fulfil needs, or satisfy wants. It includes machines IT 
(e.g. computer hardware and software), IS (e.g. programs, applications, database), 
technical methods, and techniques. Also this includes Investments in information 
technology and reasons for investment in IT Description of existing IT and IT 
systems expenses and the MIS and utilization of systems and technologies system 
integration and information system security. 
Management 
philosophy 
The way leaders in the firm think about the firm and its employees’ i.e. the way a 
firm’s managed. Leaders thinking about their company and its employees. For 
example, management philosophy can be Kaizenii (continuous improvement), Total 
Quality management, or Empowerment, (Brooking, 1998). 
Corporate culture Organizational disclosure about its mind-set, including its values, beliefs, attitudes 
and understandings shared by its people and groups within an organisation, which 
controls the way members of the organisation interact with each other and with other 
stakeholders.  
   
236 
 
Policies, Procedures, 
And Procedures 
(PPP) 
Any disclosures that describes the policies and procedures that approved and used to 
govern the operations and practices within the company and show how the company 
is run. Also, disclosures about its organisational norms and operations for utilizing 
resources, routines, and documentations which enables the company or employees to 
follow.  Indicators are, e.g. efficiency, effectiveness, and productivity. (Li et al. 
2008a) 
New Products, and/or 
Plans for new 
products 
Any information disseminated by company about developing a new products and a 
plans for new products/ new business lines. 
Knowledge 
Management 
This includes information relating to knowledge sharing any information relating to 
know-how-transfer, educating employees/customers/suppliers and sharing 
experiences with local societies (Bratianu & Orzea 2013). 
Risk Management Any information that describe the company’s attitude in dealing with risks including 
risk management policy and risk appetite statement, risk profile, hedging techniques 
and the  measurements of internal and external processing failure, this may include 
any pre-established criterias for measuring the failure, near-miss incidents and etc. 
Organization 
structure / reporting 
lines  
Organizations hierarchy, reporting lines, governance structure within the 
organization and the authorities and responsibilities allocation within the company. 
flexibility Information reflect the company’s ability to cope with changes in economy, 
operation circumstances and how it’s able to face challenges in order to turn the 
threats into opportunities. This may include information about energy alternative,  
or shortage of raw materials, failure of specific supplier and business continuity 
planning  
Tacit Knowledge This covers information about the company learning ability taking in consideration 
the feedback company acquired, experience build-up. 
Knowledge-based 
infrastructures 
It includes, e.g. documented materials (e.g. shared database) that a firm shares 
infrastructure amongst employees, facilities or centres (knowledge centres, 
laboratories) (Merkley 2014) 
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Relational capital 
 
Networking and 
Connectivity 
Any information disclosed about the channels utilised by company to connect and 
communicate with its customers and suppliers e.g. internet, mailbox voice-mail, 
social media channels and professional networks. Groupware and corporate 
intranets, personal digital assistants, and newsletters. Also, networks of distribution, 
such as distribution centres. It is what a company owns and forms a very essential 
part of the business supply chain. (Hassan & Marston 2010; Campbell 2004) 
Market presence The geographical area that the company is serving or covering including the selling 
points representative office or branches  locally or internationally, targeted markets 
and ability to satisfy all expected demands 
Market share Information about the market share statistics, competition in market growth in sales, 
sales per segments and per business line major customers and long term contracts 
with customers sales forecast etc.  
Customer 
relationships 
Information covers include principles, practices, and guidelines that an organization 
follows when interacting with its customers. (E.g. customer loyalty schemes, 
customer satisfaction survey and the initiatives taken for improvement, complaints 
management). Also, this covers company’s channels to obtain feedback form 
customers such as hot-lines call centres etc. (Li et al. 2008b; Li 2009) 
Customer retention: Disclosure made about the activities company takes to prevent customers from 
switching to alternative companies.  
Customer 
involvement 
this include the strategy that identifies and develops ways to involve customers in 
the business and product development process, such as design, marketing, sales, 
customer service, etc. The degree of involvement can be as far as to make the 
customer a part of the product, experience, and delivery. it focuses on customer 
consultation on product or services development, which could also include customer 
and company connectivity. 
Company image Information disclosed about reputation (goodwill) and how the customers and all 
other stakeholders perceived the company and how they look to the company and to 
what extent this affect the company policies and its reactions toward this mental 
image (Li et al. 2008a) 
Strategic alliance and partnership with other companies joint effort products and/or joint venture and any 
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Business 
collaboration 
joint effort in research for developing products Collaborations established with other 
business partners, moreover, this include relationship with subsidiaries and sister 
companies and/or parent companies. 
Distribution channels 
and Intensity 
Defined as appropriate mechanisms of getting products and services into the 
market (Brooking, 1996). It refers to various third party distribution channels e.g. 
distributors, agents, dealers knowledge of suppliers, relationships with them (such as 
suppliers reliance on key suppliers, bargaining power against suppliers, support of 
suppliers, and payment terms). Intensity also covered by information about 
company’s position in the market and its ability to cover the local market and ability 
to reach markets abroad. (García-Meca & Martínez 2007; Whiting & Miller 2008) 
Business agreements It includes such as licensing and franchising agreements, any agreement that 
company think it empower its competition in the market. 
Diffusion Is the process by which a new idea or new product is accepted by the market? The 
rate of diffusion is the speed that the new idea spreads from one consumer to the 
next 
 Human Capital  
Number of 
employees 
Information about employee’s count of a firm, employee breakdown by, e.g. market 
(business operation or geographical segments). 
Staff’s breakdown Disclosures covering qualifications and by role of employees within the firm 
Employee’s benefits what benefits offered by firm to its staff including fringe benefits and other benefits 
e.g. education support career mobility 
Recruitment policy is there any approved policy for hiring/ firing employees in place, the qualification 
should be in the employee to be hired job discerption for each vacancy in the firm 
Employee diversity Diversity is defined as the division of classes among a certain population. The item 
refers to the mix of, e.g. ethnicity, gender, and colour, and nationality. Relevant 
disclosures include employee diversity policy, the mix and breakdown of employee 
by race, religion, and culture. 
Employee education 
And Skills/know-how 
Education of directors as well as other employees diversifications of the employees 
according to the level of education and certifications held by them also, practical 
knowledge on how to accomplish something Disclosures can be description of 
knowledge, know-how, expertise or skills of directors and other employees. Matrices 
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could also be shown indicating number of employees with such skills, vocational 
qualifications etc. (Li et al. 2008b) 
Employee work-
related competences 
and work related 
experiences  
The knowledge and skills that can be useful to accomplish jobs. It refers to 
competences e.g. current positions held outside the company by directors, 
professional recognition/qualification, awards won (external), and employee 
publications. Also information that is acquired during the job in terms of tacit, 
explicit and implicit knowledge including employees’ previous working experiences.  
Employee equality  
and Genderism 
Disclosures cover written policy or any mechanism to ensure equal treatment of staff 
irrespective of social and cultural differences. Related disclosures include employee 
equality policy and initiatives taken for enforcement, senior management by gender, 
and percentage of disabled employees irrespective of social and cultural differences 
(Li et al., 2008). 
Training including training policy, budget and training expenses also types of training its 
implications on the firm’s future and key employees replacement policy 
(Succession-plan) 
Work environment Firm’s attitude toward offering supporting work environment discrimination free and 
challenging to the employees’ abilities. Providing safe workplace and safety 
initiatives  
Employee 
relationship 
The acknowledgments and recognition of importance of employees, employee 
appreciation, dependence on key employees, employee satisfaction, loyalty, Health 
& Safety and working environment. It also includes initiatives to build and improve 
employee relationship, e.g. trade union activities, promotion in share ownership and 
employee contractual relationships 
Employee attitudes 
and commitments 
Information that reflects how employees are working and how they attached to their 
work. Relevant disclosures could be, e.g. behaviour employee friendliness, 
welcoming, hardworking, optimism, enthusiasm, and identification of individuals 
with company’s goals 
Employee motivation Policies, initiatives and evidence of motivation of directors and other employees. It 
includes reward (internal) and incentives systems, e.g. employee explicit 
recognition, performance psychometric occupational assessment, and indicators of 
such as employee turnover, stability, absence, and seniority (Li et al. 2008a; 
Campbell 2004; Hassan & Marston 2010) 
Employee Other employee abilities apart from the above discussed, e.g. communication ability, 
interpersonal ability, sensitivity (e.g. thoughtful), flexibility, and management 
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capabilities quality (Guthrie 2007) 
Employee teamwork Teamwork is the concept of people working together cooperatively. It covers 
information about culture of teamwork (expert teams and networks, teamwork 
capacity), programmes that enhance relationships between employees within/across 
departments 
 
 
                                               
i a Japanese business philosophy of continuous improvement of working practices, personal efficiency, etc. 
ii a Japanese business philosophy of continuous improvement of working practices, personal efficiency, etc. 
